Korean media: [Comment] If South Korea wants to successfully possess a "nuclear-powered submarine"
¬ Although it may be accelerated with Trump's approval, it is still too early to celebrate ... The United States is concerned about South Korea achieving nuclear armament, and there are also restrictions on military technology and its use, so the solidarity of the Republic of Korea-US alliance is a prerequisite
Currently, there are about 130 nuclear-powered submarines in operation worldwide, operated by the United States (66), Russia (31), China (12), the UK (10), France (9), and India (2). These submarines can be divided into strategic nuclear submarines and attack nuclear submarines. The purpose of strategic nuclear submarines is to respond to preemptive nuclear attacks from enemy countries, hiding nuclear retaliatory weapons underwater, retaining the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Therefore, this large nuclear submarine with the function of storing nuclear weapons underwater is called a strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN).
There is another type of atomic submarine that does not carry nuclear weapons, but is used for surveillance, tracking, and destroying enemy submarines or warships, known as SSN (attack nuclear submarines). Although these submarines are several times more expensive than diesel submarines and have a large reactor noise, their diving speed is about twice that of diesel submarines, and they can dive continuously for several months, making them very suitable for long-range maritime operations. The nuclear submarines that the United States decided to provide to Australia, an AUKUS member country, in 2021 are of this type, and the one that South Korea wants to possess is also of this type.
Recently, with the opportunity of the South Korean and US leaders' summit, the issue of South Korea possessing nuclear-powered submarines has quickly become a focus of social attention. Regarding South Korea's request for nuclear fuel for submarines, Trump proposed a domestic construction plan in the United States. Although the plan may proceed rapidly with the principle agreement of the United States, it is still too early to celebrate, and there are many obstacles to overcome. Considering that at least 2-3 presidents will change before the final realization of South Korea's nuclear submarine project, this is even more true. During this process, there will be four representative obstacles.
The first obstacle is the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. All nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors on Earth are subject to at least 1-12 international inspections per year by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and are monitored in real time by IAEA cameras 24/7, 365 days a year. However, the nuclear reactors installed on submarines belong to military nuclear facilities and are not under the jurisdiction of the IAEA, and it is objectively impossible to monitor them. Therefore, the current or future U.S. government or Congress may be worried that South Korea could use it to achieve nuclear armament, thus opposing South Korea's possession of nuclear submarines, and South Korea needs to be prepared for this.
The second obstacle is the protection of U.S. military technology. The reactors used in nuclear submarines have characteristics of military weapons and are completely different from the operation methods of nuclear power plants or SMRs (Small Modular Reactors). Nuclear power plants operate using low-enriched uranium below 5%, while U.S. nuclear submarines use uranium of 90% or higher, and Russia uses high-enriched uranium of 20-50%. In addition, unlike nuclear power plants that can replace nuclear fuel at any time, the nuclear fuel used in submarines can be used for more than 20 years until the end of the submarine's life. The propulsion technology of U.S. nuclear submarines belongs to advanced military technology, and according to reports, the U.S. did not provide it to countries other than the UK in the 1950s, and the U.S. military authorities have also taken a negative attitude towards providing the technology to Australia.
The third obstacle is the restriction on use. For South Korea to possess a nuclear-powered submarine, it would need to provide a clear blueprint for its use as an expensive strategic asset. If the nuclear submarine is limited to the Korean Peninsula and only used to monitor the 70 or so submarines of North Korea, it would be extremely inefficient and uneconomical. Therefore, it would be more efficient to build a large number of advanced AIP diesel submarines that can submerge for a month, and deploy monitoring unmanned submarines and underwater sensors throughout the Korean Peninsula waters.
The fourth obstacle is the uncertainty of the future direction of the ROK-US alliance. After Britain, the United States decided to provide nuclear submarine technology to Australia because it recognized that Australia is a crucial core ally in dealing with China's maritime operations. It is likely that the United States will make similar considerations when reviewing South Korea's nuclear submarine project. Therefore, whether it is to reach a specific agreement between the two countries on building a nuclear submarine, or to continue the support of the subsequent U.S. presidents for the project over the next few decades, or to ensure the maintenance and support provided by the United States after completion, the solid unity and trust between South Korea and the United States will be an essential prerequisite.
Source: Chosun Ilbo
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1848590068565259/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.