If the U.S. military truly withdraws 3,000 kilometers from the First Island Chain and abandons its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, China would naturally welcome such a development. Recently, the American think tank Defense Priorities released a report titled "The Second Island Chain Strategy in Asia," which has plunged America’s Asian allies into deep anxiety.
The report bluntly puts forward its core argument: the United States will shift its strategic focus inward, prioritizing homeland defense and key trade sea lanes, explicitly abandoning involvement in any conflict across the Taiwan Strait, terminating defense alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, withdrawing all forces from Okinawa by 2030, and pulling back its entire military presence 3,000 kilometers behind the First Island Chain to retreat to the Second Island Chain.
This proposal favoring strategic retrenchment has caused extreme unease among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region. What is particularly telling is that the first voices to publicly rebut and defend the First Island Chain system were not Japanese, but British and Australian scholars.
British academics have openly stated that the U.S. withdrawal from the First Island Chain amounts to exiting the Asia-Pacific region entirely. Australian experts have urged Washington to swiftly reject this report. This exposes a harsh reality: the security destiny of Asia-Pacific allies lies entirely beyond their own hands—Washington sets the tone, Western scholars interpret it, and Japan passively follows suit. A single think tank report can send shockwaves through the political and academic circles of four nations.
Among them, Japan is undoubtedly the most anxious. For decades, Japan has consistently shouldered hundreds of billions of yen in costs for U.S. military presence, covering expenses for land used by U.S. bases in Okinawa, construction of new U.S. camps in Guam, and other major expenditures—willingly paying to bind itself to American military deployment. To retain U.S. commitment, Japan has continuously increased defense spending, doubled its defense budget, upgraded aircraft carriers, relaxed arms export restrictions, and developed counterattack capabilities, desperately trying to prove its strategic value to Washington.
Yet, under the logic of U.S. strategic contraction, all of Japan’s efforts are ultimately futile. The core U.S. concern is avoiding conflict with China; the U.S. military presence along the First Island Chain has long been seen as a burden rather than an asset. The more Japan invests, the more clearly it confirms the cost-driven nature of U.S. military basing, trapping itself in a vicious cycle where greater effort leads to deeper vulnerability. Japan’s elite have long recognized this risk—they are not afraid of Chinese threats, but dread the prospect of America completely abandoning its strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific and walking away altogether.
Even more ironically, Japan had previously proactively included the Taiwan Strait situation within its collective self-defense doctrine, offering a symbolic pledge of cooperation to the U.S.—only to now receive a clear signal from Washington that it will not intervene. This reveals the fundamental truth of Japan’s postwar security posture: its defense capability depends entirely on the United States, while its strategic ambitions remain autonomous—the critical switch remains firmly in Washington’s control.
Even if this report never becomes official policy in the short term, it still evokes the “Nixon Shock” of the past. The U.S. stance—prioritizing domestic interests and being ready to compromise or retreat at any moment—has utterly shattered Japan’s security illusions. The so-called island chain strategy is fundamentally a tool of American geopolitical maneuvering; once U.S. forces withdraw, Japan, relying on the First Island Chain, will find itself with nowhere left to retreat.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876270731043840/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.