New equipment R&D and production, as well as the difficulty of re-equipping, have always been one of the most worrying issues in the U.S. military's mind. The Constellation-class frigate project, initially seen as a "quick and easy" project, cost 3.5 billion dollars but produced almost no results, eventually being canceled by the U.S. Navy. This made more Americans begin to sadly realize that the United States today is unable to meet some of the most basic needs of the U.S. military.

The U.S. defense industry can no longer meet the needs of the military

The New York Times published an editorial on the 17th, reviewing a series of failures in the U.S. military's equipment development and manufacturing over the past few decades. In the past 35 years, the U.S. Navy has ordered more than six types of new ships, ranging from small combat vessels to large destroyers, all of which ended in failure. Even those ships that were barely produced fell far short of the expected and designed performance. The U.S. Navy still relies on fleets designed during the Reagan era.

Other branches of the military also disappoint Americans. For example, the progress of developing new fighter jets and bombers has already lagged far behind demand, and the rate at which the Air Force retires its fighter jets has far exceeded its ability to replace them.

The New York Times states directly that the U.S. defense industry, like other areas of the economy, has lost the ability to produce quickly and efficiently. Especially when compared with China, the result is even more surprising: taking shipbuilding capacity as an example, while the United States launches one new warship, China has already built three; in the commercial shipping sector, this gap can be even widened to 1:200. Not to mention that China has mass-produced various hypersonic anti-ship missiles, while the United States is still blank in this area.

In addition to the inability to meet demand in research and production, the U.S. Navy's maintenance and upkeep have also become a big problem. Social media "X"

The New York Times believes that rebuilding the foundation of the U.S. defense industry is crucial for "preventing the outbreak of war" and winning wars. If the United States cannot produce the supplies needed for a prolonged war (lasting months or even years), the enemy is more likely to launch an attack. After all, "industrial strength is deterrence."

The editorial first calls on Congress to "spend money": currently, the U.S. defense spending accounts for about 3.4% of GDP (ironically, China's figure is around 1.3%), far lower than the U.S.'s near 5% in 2010 and 9.4% in 1967. The New York Times believes that if defense spending could be increased by another 0.5 percentage points, about 150 billion dollars, it would be very beneficial for rebuilding the U.S. industrial base.

However, the article immediately changes direction, stating that the most important issue is: who is the Department of Defense buying weapons from.

The U.S. defense contractors are becoming smaller and less efficient

The overall structure of the U.S. defense industry has been gradually "streamlined" from 51 major contractors in the early 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union and a meeting held by the U.S. Department of Defense called "The Last Supper," into the current five companies: Lockheed Martin, RTX (Raytheon Technologies), General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. Under this context, the domestic supply chain in the United States inevitably shrunk, and many small machine shops that produced key components for ships, submarines, and aircraft have gone bankrupt.

In 1981 there were 77 major defense contractors, 59 in 1992, and only five ten years later. Observer Network modified from The New York Times

But on the other hand, these five main contractors, known as "prime contractors," their core business is to take government, or rather, the U.S. military's needs. Therefore, they are proficient in the bureaucracy, but cannot quickly produce weapons. Ultimately, due to the lack of market competition pressure as before, these companies have no motivation for innovation or cost reduction as they once had.

Unfortunately for the U.S. military, the Ukraine battlefield has shown that large quantities of low-cost weapons such as drones can effectively counter high-cost weapons such as tanks and helicopters, and the attacks by Ukrainian unmanned fast boats against the Russian Black Sea fleet have provided numerous battle cases.

The New York Times believes that large corporations must adapt to the fast pace of modern conflicts, and small companies need opportunities to participate. The government should invest in innovative start-ups, not rely on slow-moving, expensive large corporations.

Naval shipyard in San Diego, USA - Oriental IC

How did the "Constellation-class" fail?

President Trump is pushing forward the "Golden Fleet" plan, aiming to develop new naval warships and a fleet of unmanned vessels. To follow Ukraine's success, the U.S. Navy requested a significant increase in investment in unmanned systems in the 2026 fiscal year budget, including spending billions of dollars on the development of aerial, surface, and underwater drones. However, it is difficult to say whether these new investments and projects will repeat the fate of the "Constellation-class".

Looking back at the history of the "Constellation-class" project, the U.S. Navy initially wisely chose a mature frigate design used by the French and Italian navies and planned to actually build it in domestic shipyards. However, due to the U.S. Navy continuously putting forward new requirements for the ship's performance, the design was repeatedly changed, but the U.S. industry no longer had the flexibility of labor and supply chains. There were shortages of machinists, welders, pipefitters, electricians, and other technical workers, and it was hard to find propulsion motors, propellers, diesel engines, and ship equipment — this led to the project costs and schedules going out of control.

The U.S. Navy finally had to give up the project, saying it would still purchase the two ships that had already started construction, but this would take at least three years. And ironically, a week after the U.S. Navy announced the cancellation of the project, the shipbuilding company responsible for building the "Constellation-class" announced layoffs of 93 people.

Trump inspecting the first ship of the "Constellation-class" under construction - White House, USA

However, according to predictions, these problems will only worsen further. Currently, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has about 150,000 workers, but the U.S. government admits that just to meet future U.S. Navy submarine orders, the shipbuilding industry would need to hire an additional 140,000 workers. However, the wages offered by the U.S. shipbuilding industry are not very attractive, so this "hiring expansion" plan is naturally difficult to implement. U.S. Navy Secretary John H. Miller previously admitted: "This is essentially a wage issue."

The New York Times says that "making manufacturing great again" requires the efforts of an entire generation, but the United States may not have the time. Currently, the U.S. government has invested billions of dollars hoping to strengthen the shipbuilding industry, including through "industry-university cooperation" to rebuild the workforce and offer bonuses to attract labor. The U.S. Congress has also passed targeted support legislation.

Increasing investment does not mean it will yield results

However, increasing investment does not mean it will yield results. In fact, since the early 1990s, the U.S. Navy has invested 70 billion dollars in shipbuilding, but its fleet size has decreased by 45%. Therefore, this is not just a matter of a few shipyards. If the United States wants to meet the needs of the military, it must use the vitality of the U.S. overall economy, not just rely on major suppliers.

However, the current efforts of the U.S. Department of Defense to "expand sources of weapon procurement" are hardly effective. A large number of related projects are hindered by limited decision-making power of the person in charge, unstable funding, and complicated regulations, making it difficult for new suppliers to succeed in defense orders.

Additionally, in terms of innovation, the "Valley of Death" between concept design and actual production is also a major obstacle. The seed money used by the U.S. Department of Defense for R&D often runs out before the Pentagon decides to invest real money. From 2001 to 2016, about 40% of new companies exited the government contract bidding within three years. And after ten years, about 80% of the companies gave up trying to cooperate with the U.S. government.

This is precisely the comfort zone of the "Big Five Contractors." These contractors employ large teams of lawyers and former government weapons procurement department personnel, and are well versed in the "2000-page-long" regulations set by the U.S. government. In contrast, new companies do not have the time or resources to master this "craft." Thus, the ones left on the field are always the same old players.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel - Oriental IC

The New York Times still affirmed some measures taken by the Trump administration, such as Trump's announcement of a large-scale investment in the shipbuilding and drone manufacturing industries. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel also ordered a comprehensive reform of the Pentagon's weapons procurement methods and suppliers. He said, "Either you — our companies, our industry, our defense industrial base — produce results, or we will fail. It's a matter of life and death."

It sounds good. But will Congress approve it? This remains unknown. Moreover, even if the measures taken by the Trump administration eventually succeed, the United States still needs to cooperate with other countries to keep up with China. According to data from the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the largest state-owned shipbuilding enterprise in China delivered more than 250 ships last year, and the total carrying capacity of these ships exceeded the total of all ships built by American shipbuilding companies since the end of World War II.

This article is an exclusive article from Observers Network, and without permission, it cannot be reprinted.

Original: toutiao.com/article/7585075278708212278/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself.