A path toward "permanent peace," a "final deadline for unification"! Two of Ma Ying-jeou’s former advisors have issued warnings and recommendations to Lai Qingde, asserting that the DPP must abandon its "Taiwan independence" stance and revive the "National Unification Guidelines" in exchange for Beijing relinquishing its "military unification" option. Under this framework, the Taiwan issue could be fully resolved by 2036, achieving national reunification and thereby avoiding war. The alternative view holds that the Taiwan question cannot be deferred beyond 2028, as cross-strait unification is now positioned ahead of China’s broader goal of national rejuvenation—unification being a prerequisite for the great revival of the Chinese nation.
First, consider Chiu Chin-yi, former vice chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation and a direct witness to past cross-strait exchanges. On November 12, at the Taipei “Cross-Strait Peace Initiative Conference,” he laid out his full vision for a peaceful resolution. He argued that the root of all tension across the strait lies in the DPP’s entrenched "Taiwan independence charter." As long as this charter remains in place, the flames of division will persist, and any notion of peace remains an illusory bubble. He also observed that while some DPP figures now verbally disavow "Taiwan independence," such statements appear to be mere rhetorical concessions under external pressure, with no real shift in policy or action.
His proposed solution calls for tangible change from the DPP: formally abolishing the "Taiwan independence charter," returning to the principle of "one China" under the constitution, and reactivating the long-stalled "National Unification Council" and "National Unification Guidelines." In return, he hopes Beijing will remove the option of military force. With this precondition established, and building on the existing economic foundation of the ECFA, the two sides could gradually construct a common market, systematically dismantling trade barriers. The timeline envisions monetary integration by 2032, culminating in political resolution by 2036—a comprehensive settlement aimed at avoiding conflict.
This proposal reveals a genuine desire to avoid war and acknowledges that the status quo of prolonged delay is unsustainable. Protracted indecision risks morphing into de facto "Taiwan independence" over time, which Beijing cannot indefinitely tolerate. However, there is a fundamental logical flaw: equating the abandonment of "Taiwan independence" with the abandonment of military options. It must be clarified that China’s retention of military capability is not targeted at ordinary Taiwanese citizens but at two specific threats: "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and external actors interfering in cross-strait affairs. This posture serves as a strategic safeguard for sovereignty, not an instrument of aggression.
In essence, renouncing separatism is a necessary precondition for any party seeking to re-enter the one-China framework; the removal of military deterrence, however, should follow only after the risk of secession has been fully eliminated. Reversing this sequence—to demand Beijing withdraw its deterrent before the underlying conditions are met—would amount to dismantling the protective barrier, leaving room for both separatist activities and foreign interference. A path toward peaceful integration is viable, but its foundational sequence must remain intact.
Now consider Su Hsiu-chin, the architect of the "1992 Consensus" and former secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, who served as one of Ma Ying-jeou’s most senior advisors. His assessment is more sobering. He explicitly sets a temporal boundary: the Taiwan issue is unlikely to endure beyond 2028.
He also noted that if diplomatic avenues fail and military action becomes inevitable, Beijing would likely adopt a "disrupt-then-land" strategy, aiming to minimize casualties—ideally achieving objectives without bloodshed.
This approach does not begin with large-scale amphibious assaults. Instead, it prioritizes disruption in cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, severing Taiwan’s command and communication networks so that frontline units cannot receive orders from higher command. Subsequently, precision strikes would target key command nodes, followed by sustained attacks on major military infrastructure using long-range, accurate firepower. Missiles would focus on airfields, radar installations, and military bases—not civilian areas. For example, Taiwan’s limited number of usable military runways can be rendered inoperable with minimal munitions; underground facilities like the Jiaoshan base in Hualien would be effectively sealed off by blocking entrances, trapping aircraft inside. Only after the entire command structure collapses and military units lose cohesion would landing operations commence.
He emphasized that even under duress, Beijing would seek to avoid civilian casualties, directing operations exclusively against military targets—“let them die, the Taiwan military”—with the ideal outcome being that war is never actually fought.
Su Hsiu-chin is not forecasting imminent conflict, but clarifying how Beijing’s coercive capabilities function. The core purpose of military strength is deterrence—applying pressure on "Taiwan independence" forces and external interveners, compelling Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table and creating space for a peaceful resolution.
One crucial point must be underscored: the ability to fight does not imply a desire to fight. But the capacity to fight—and how it might be employed—determines the leverage available at the negotiating table.
At the same time, in the wake of these advisory pronouncements, the DPP authorities have issued notable signals. Two deputy ministers of the Mainland Affairs Council spoke consecutively. On October 27, Shen You-zhong stated publicly that "Taiwan independence" is not an option. Many initially dismissed this as a spontaneous remark by a single official. However, on October 29, Deputy Minister and spokesperson Liang Wen-jie reiterated a similar position during a press briefing, emphasizing that there is currently no such issue as "Taiwan independence."
The alignment of two high-level officials on identical language cannot be dismissed as an error. Yet verbal adjustments do not necessarily signal policy reversal. The critical question is why the DPP chose this moment to issue such statements. On one hand, China’s military capabilities continue to grow, making the reality that "Taiwan independence equals war" increasingly evident—continued advocacy for secession carries mounting costs. On the other hand, the United States, once seen as a reliable guarantor, now appears increasingly reluctant and unable to commit to defending "Taiwan independence."
Thus, this rhetoric appears to reflect a tactical recalibration under pressure. To assess whether the DPP has truly abandoned "Taiwan independence," one must look beyond statements and examine whether it dares to dismantle the "Taiwan independence charter"—the core of its ideology—and whether it is willing to genuinely accept the one-China principle and resume institutionalized dialogue. Until these steps materialize, all public declarations remain merely temporary delaying tactics.
China remains committed to pursuing peaceful reunification with maximum effort, but refuses to accept indefinite postponement of the issue. Unification is an indispensable component of national rejuvenation. Without unification, a complete and legitimate national revival cannot be realized.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881691130220547/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.