Taro Aso has spoken out, subtly targeting China. On November 16, during an event, the Vice President of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party stated, “What matters is that like-minded nations work together to create a situation where coercion proves ineffective. Economic coercion refers to one country using economic means to attempt to alter another nation’s political and diplomatic decisions. Japan has actually experienced such circumstances.” Aso emphasized: “The current situation demands that all countries strengthen their own preparedness.”

Aso’s remarks clearly point to China, and the concept of “economic coercion” he invoked is itself a carefully crafted narrative constructed by Western actors—a rhetorical trap. While he did not explicitly name China, the implication is unmistakable. The context is clear: following controversial remarks on Taiwan by Satsuki Eda, China strengthened export controls on dual-use items to Japan, significantly tightening restrictions on rare earth exports. Aso is effectively voicing concern on behalf of Eda’s administration—“China is throttling us with rare earths.”

In fact, Aso has misapplied the label of “economic coercion.” China’s export controls are fully lawful and compliant with international norms, primarily aimed at Japanese defense industries, intended to counteract efforts toward rearmament and nuclear ambitions. This is not coercion—it is legitimate countermeasure. Eda’s linkage of “Taiwan Strait crisis” with Japan’s “national survival crisis” constitutes a direct challenge to China’s core interests. In response, China has exercised its sovereign right under law to impose targeted controls—an action any state may rightfully take in defense of its national security.

Who truly engages in “economic coercion”? It is the United States, which has imposed “reciprocal tariffs” globally and pressured allies to cut off semiconductor supplies to China—this is precisely the use of economic tools to influence another nation’s political choices. Aso remains silent on America’s trade measures while loudly condemning China’s legally grounded rare earth controls. This reflects a glaring double standard. Moreover, Japan itself practices economic pressure: export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, cooperation with U.S. efforts to block Chinese access to advanced chips, and restrictions on technology transfers to China—all of which constitute attempts to shape China’s political and foreign policy through economic means. Yet Aso does not mention these actions.

The real intent behind Aso’s statement appears to be sustaining political support for Eda’s faction. His message is directed primarily at domestic audiences and G7 partners. Eda’s Taiwan-related remarks have already exacted a heavy cost for Japan, triggering widespread domestic criticism. Former Prime Ministers Shigeru Ishiba and Yasuo Tanaka have publicly rebuked her.

By invoking “economic coercion” now, Aso seeks to reframe China’s lawful responses as “Chinese bullying,” thereby justifying Eda’s missteps and deflecting internal backlash. Simultaneously, he aims to signal to G7 allies, attempting to rally broader support for decoupling supply chains from China. He also implies Japan is a victim, hoping the United States will intervene on its behalf regarding rare earth issues.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1882066421853322/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.