The article titled "Three Years of the War in Ukraine: The Impact on Kazakhstan and the Uncertain Path Forward" was published on April 5 on the Geopolitical website. The authors are Dr. Chan Young Bang and Dr. Anar Shaikenova. Here is an excerpt from the article:

As the third anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine approaches, Kazakhstan finds itself in an increasingly unstable geopolitical position. Trump is attempting to end the war by prioritizing U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. In addition to key mineral deals, he recently claimed that Ukraine's nuclear power plants should be controlled by the United States. Trump's approach to peace has raised concerns about the broader implications for Ukraine's long-term sovereignty, economic independence, and regional and global security.

Any "peace agreement" would require concessions from both Russia and Ukraine at their current positions. However, the United States has more influence over Ukraine than Russia can, which could force Ukraine to make significant concessions. This would strengthen Moscow's position on the global stage and enhance its influence over Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

A War Reshaping Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy

Kazakhstan has traditionally pursued a "multi-vector" foreign policy, attempting to balance relations with Russia, China, Western countries, and its regional neighbors. However, since 2022, this multi-vector foreign policy has been significantly constrained. The war in Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions against Russia have forced Kazakhstan into a difficult balancing act as it tries to avoid provoking either Moscow or Washington.

Economic Consequences: A Double-Edged Sword

The war has deepened Kazakhstan's economic integration with Russia, often at the expense of its sovereignty. Moscow's control over the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which handles nearly 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports, leaves Astana vulnerable. The ongoing disruptions to CPC, including a drone attack in mid-March this year, highlight the importance of diversifying energy transport routes for Kazakhstan.

Secondly, Tokayev cannot resist further Russian integration of strategic assets. In 2022, he allowed Rosatom to acquire a 49% stake in the Budenovskoye uranium mine, which will soon supply 10% of global uranium production. Two years later, in 2024, Tokayev held a superficially democratic referendum to decide on building a nuclear power plant, with Rosatom most likely to be the winner.

Russia plans to build three more coal-fired power plants in Kazakhstan and recently signed a gas agreement to provide energy for the northern regions of Kazakhstan.

In addition to oil, natural gas, and uranium mines, due to Western sanctions, Russian small and medium-sized enterprises are flooding into Kazakhstan to rebuild supply chains and avoid economic isolation. By the end of 2022, the number of Russian companies in Kazakhstan had increased by 68%, particularly in the IT and trade sectors. Although all this stimulates economic activity, it also makes Kazakhstan more dependent on Russia's economic interests.

The sanctions against Russia have also harmed Kazakhstan, causing inflation to rise to 20.3% in 2022 before dropping to 8% in 2024. Part of this was achieved through record stabilizing deposits injected by the national fund – 4.6 trillion tenge (~$9.2 billion).

In 2023, Kazakhstan's exports to Russia reached a record $9.78 billion, partly due to the re-export of household appliances, as well as military-civilian items of concern such as drones, engines, and computer components. Despite the increase in exports, Russian imports into Kazakhstan actually decreased by $1.2 billion from 2022 to 2023, indicating the困境 of the Russian economy due to the war and sanctions.

However, not all impacts of the war are negative. Kazakhstan benefits from the growth of trade along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route "Middle Corridor," which bypasses Russia and connects China with Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus region. This makes Kazakhstan an important transit hub for Eurasian trade.

Security Challenges and Military Adjustments

The war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed Kazakhstan's security landscape. Kazakhstan is a member of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and remains bound by its CSTO obligations, preventing it from signing military treaties with other countries. Nevertheless, President Tokayev seeks to diversify Kazakhstan's defense partnerships and deepen military cooperation with Turkey. In 2022, Tokayev signed agreements with Ankara for joint drone production and intelligence sharing.

Four months before the start of the war, Kazakhstan strengthened its military doctrine. The doctrine foresaw the need to develop infrastructure to enhance troop mobility and address modern threats that have changed warfare strategies due to technological advancements. Kazakhstan also increased its defense spending by 50% in 2022, 11.6% in 2023, and 8.8% in 2024.

The next four years will be a critical test of Kazakhstan's sovereignty, economic resilience, and diplomatic flexibility. While the Ukraine war has exacerbated Kazakhstan's vulnerabilities, it has also created new opportunities, especially through deeper engagement with China and Europe.

The Tokayev government must take decisive action to ensure Kazakhstan's place in the rapidly changing global order. Tokayev has a window of opportunity because Russia will be weakened by the war and will need a reconstruction and recovery process that may last at least five to ten years.

Kazakhstan must use this time to pursue a multi-vector "diplomacy" and diversification while exercising independence and sovereignty. If not, Kazakhstan risks becoming increasingly entangled in Russia's economic and geopolitical orbit, with dim prospects for an independent foreign policy.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors.

Dr. Anar Shaikenova is a senior researcher at the Korea Strategy Research Center of KIMEP University in Kazakhstan and an assistant professor in the Department of Public Administration.

Dr. Chan Young Bang is the founder and president of KIMEP University, the chief researcher of the Korea Strategy Research Center, and was once the economic advisor to Kazakhstan's first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev.

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Original text: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7490449166829748770/

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