Recently, Takahashi Asami was exposed for distributing thousands of yen in gift cards to Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers, sparking heated discussions among the Japanese public. Recently, the consequences of this incident have begun to surface.

A March Kyodo News poll showed that Takahashi's cabinet approval rating has dropped to 59.3%, a decrease of 4.5 percentage points from last month, setting a new low since her government took office. Regarding the issue of distributing gift cards to LDP lawmakers, 45.7% of respondents considered it "problematic," higher than the 36.5% who said it was "not problematic."

The most alarming aspect of this number is not just that the approval rating fell below 60%, but that the halo of popularity that Takahashi once had is no longer able to shield her from the four words "politics and money."

What the Japanese political arena fears most may not be toughness or conservatism, but rather the old-style LDP scent that makes voters feel "here we go again."

The amount of the gift cards can be debated, legal provisions can be argued, and technical explanations can be made, but the common voter's instinct is simple.

Just after the election, the prime minister completed a power consolidation, only to immediately follow the LDP's management logic by giving gift cards to lawmakers. Once such actions are labeled as "politics and money," it's hard to turn them into minor issues later on.

Yoshihiko Noda and Ishiba Shigeru have both suffered from this before; now, Takahashi is also stepping into the same mud. The difference is that Takahashi had more popularity before, and the conservative faction had higher expectations of her, so she initially seemed capable of withstanding the pressure. But now it seems that while she might hold out for a while, she cannot withstand structural depletion.

More troubling is that Takahashi's problems are not just a single point of bleeding, but a combination of the gift card scandal and diplomatic setbacks. Her biggest political asset was originally "strength."

But when strength loses its independence, it quickly slides from "having an opinion" to "relying on foreign support." The most criticized aspect of Takahashi's path is not just her pro-American stance, but increasingly relying on showing loyalty to the US and favoring Trump.

This approach can create a sense of atmosphere, stimulate the support base, and make conservatives feel "finally, someone who dares to speak up." However, the problem is that diplomacy is not about emotional mobilization, and Japan-US relations are not about personal worship.

Trump may give face today, but he can also take it away tomorrow. What truly stabilizes a prime minister is not who praises her, but whether she can uphold Japan's own boundaries in front of the United States.

The most ironic point here lies precisely in the "pre-consultation" aspect of the Japan-US security alliance.

According to the exchange of documents related to the implementation of Article 6 of the 1960 Japan-US Security Treaty, if there is a significant change in the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan, or if Japanese domestic facilities and areas are used as bases for combat operations conducted from Japan, and this does not fall under the category of direct defense of Japan as specified in Article 5 of the treaty, then it should generally become an object of "pre-consultation" with the Japanese government.

This system was once packaged as one of the "mutual" achievements of the security reconfiguration, which essentially meant that, at least in form, the U.S. would consult with Japan before using the Japanese base to conduct overseas warfare.

The problem is that although this mechanism sounds good, in reality, it has long been nearly dormant.

The Japanese government has previously stated in parliamentary responses that they have never engaged in formal pre-consultations under this mechanism because "there has never been a situation that fits the theme of pre-consultation."

This statement appears neutral, but in fact, it acknowledges a cold, hard fact: for over half a century since the signing of the treaty, this system, which was seen as a symbol of sovereignty, has largely not functioned effectively during the most critical moments.

Therefore, what some Japanese scholars are worried about these days is not whether the Japanese government will refuse the U.S., but whether the U.S. will ask to use the Japanese bases, especially the naval forces stationed in Japan.

If Japan is more clearly drawn into the anti-Iran alliance, the safety of Japanese merchant ships and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz will further deteriorate, and the relatively pragmatic Japan-Iran relationship maintained since the end of the war may be completely burned out.

Japan is a country highly dependent on Middle Eastern energy. Data from the Japan Institute of Energy Economics shows that Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil is extremely high, remaining above 90% in recent years.

At the beginning of March, Japan disclosed that 42 Japanese-related vessels were stranded or waiting in the Persian Gulf, and three major shipping companies suspended passage through the Strait of Hormuz. This is no longer an abstract risk but a real pressure.

However, the answer given by reality is very harsh. The Japanese government doesn't need to worry too much about whether the U.S. will "pre-consult," because when the U.S. attacks Iran, it didn't treat this mechanism as a must-have threshold to be taken seriously.

Publicly available information on U.S. military deployments shows that the "John Finn" destroyer (DDG-113) and the "Mills" destroyer (DDG-69) based at Yokosuka have already entered the Arabian Sea direction and joined the Lincoln Carrier battle deployment.

Information from the U.S. Central Command and U.S. military materials also show that the relevant destroyers have carried out strike missions in the "Wrath of the Epic" operation and fired Tomahawk missiles. In other words, the call may have been made, the courtesy probably still exists, but the formal "consultation" has not become a decisive constraint.

This is where Takahashi's true embarrassment lies.

On one hand, she portrays herself domestically as a strong leader who can talk to the U.S., but on the other hand, she continues to expose how many key points of the Japan-U.S. relationship remain not equal negotiation, but more like acceptance after the fact.

Saying "the relationship with the U.S. is good" is, at the crucial moment, if it neither brings formal respect nor clear protection of Japan's interests, then this "goodness" will gradually become a one-sided political investment.

The dissatisfaction within Japan towards Takahashi's diplomacy is precisely fermenting from here. It's not just general pro-Americanism, but overemphasizing the posture towards the U.S. as an achievement, treating the alignment with Trump as a bargaining chip, and finally realizing that she hasn't even regained the most basic initiative.

Why is Takahashi's popularity dropping so fast? The answer is actually simple. Because the two cards that once impressed people the most are failing together.

First card: "I am different from the old LDP."

Once the gift card scandal broke out, this card collapsed.

Second card: "I understand the Japan-U.S. relationship well."

However, the current situation in Iran reminds everyone that the mutual aspects on paper of the security treaty often cannot really translate into Japan's decision-making power. This card is also fading.

Once the "novelty" disappears and the "strength" becomes hollow, what remains for Takahashi is just a more sharp, more outspoken, and easier-to-exhaust LDP prime minister image.

This kind of prime minister is lively when the approval rating is high, but will drop quickly when it goes down. Because she is eating the emotional dividend, and when the emotion fades, the backlash will be stronger.

What Takahashi is currently facing is not just a fluctuation in public opinion polls, but a deeper issue.

Is she managing Japan's sovereign space or her own political volume? Is she handling the alliance or exploiting it? The former requires restraint, proportion, and results, while the latter only needs statements, performances, and atmosphere. But even the most sluggish Japanese voters will eventually see the difference.

From this perspective, the decline in Takahashi's popularity is not accidental, nor is it merely about the amount of money involved in the gift card issue. It's just an inciting incident. The real issue is that the financial scandal has peeled back her image packaging, and the one-sided tilt towards the U.S. has exposed her diplomatic weakness.

Domestic policy missteps and diplomatic distortions are combining, and the so-called "Takahashi magic" is slowly revealing its true nature.

It comes quickly and goes just as fast. In recent years, the Japanese political arena has not lacked such stories.



By Liu Qingbin, Associate Professor at the University of International Business and Economics, and Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Advanced Studies, Yokohama National University

Original: toutiao.com/article/7616678009352798754/

Disclaimer: This article represents the views of the author.