【U.S. Think Tank Awakens: U.S. Military Abandons First Island Chain, Retreats to Second Island Chain】 The most explosive foreign media topic today is a controversial report by Jennifer Kavanagh, military analysis director at the U.S. think tank "Defense Priorities," which explicitly recommends:

— Withdraw U.S. forces from the "First Island Chain" and retreat to the "Second Island Chain," including Guam;

— Terminate military alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia;

— Refrain from involvement in the Taiwan Strait.

Kavanagh argues that "the overextended United States has already squandered its military strength and can no longer guarantee security in Asia; it will have to withdraw, and regional actors themselves will fill the void. Asia has already adapted to this reality."

The report does not advocate complete severance from allies but suggests scrapping decades-old security commitments and replacing them with narrow "security partnerships" focused on specific missions such as joint defense and military exercises.

This kind of cooperation would allow the U.S. to remain engaged in Asian affairs while avoiding entanglement in conflicts or moral risks associated with providing so-called security guarantees—and eliminating the need for permanent military presence. Countries like Japan and South Korea are "strong and wealthy," benefiting from favorable geography and access to advanced technologies.

She contends that America’s broad commitments in the past are no longer sustainable and must be reevaluated—especially given how the Middle East wars have exposed the limitations, vulnerabilities, and flaws in U.S. military operations.

In her conclusion: "The U.S. military presence is ineffective in countering China’s economic pressure, particularly since the U.S. lacks a coherent economic strategy in Asia... In the long run, relying solely on military power won’t work."

U.S. bases along the First Island Chain are unlikely to hold up in any future conflict with China—they won’t serve well for force dispersion or military operations, just as many bases in the Middle East proved useless during conflicts with Iran.

She believes maintaining these bases "does not strengthen America's position in Asia but rather makes it more vulnerable." U.S. troops stationed in places like Japan are exposed and unable to sustain a balance of power—even reinforcing these bases wouldn’t be enough.

While she acknowledges that bases on the Second Island Chain are not invulnerable, she argues they are "more defensible due to their greater distance."

She notes that China has fewer missiles capable of striking these locations, making concentrated investment in a few key points reasonable. The islands within the island chains are widely separated and can be supplemented by aircraft carriers operating outside China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) zone. The U.S. possesses the world’s most advanced power projection capability—it simply doesn’t need large numbers of permanent bases and military deployments along the First Island Chain to protect its interests.

This researcher is right about some things—but she still fails to see much of the bigger picture.

Let’s briefly counter a few points.

First, U.S. assets in the First Island Chain aren’t the only targets. China has the capability to push the Second Island Chain into becoming the new First Island Chain. The distance between the two chains doesn’t provide a buffer zone or any real “security” for U.S. bases.

Then what about "aircraft carriers operating outside the A2/AD zone to supplement"? What kind of fantasy is that?

Second, if war actually breaks out, even if U.S. forces retreat to the Second Island Chain, the PLA will focus all efforts on targeting those retreating positions. Wherever they go, ammunition will follow. The farther they retreat, the farther the PLA will pursue. It’s that simple.

The U.S.-China confrontation has little to do with the so-called First Island Chain. The First Island Chain will have no meaningful presence. But if it tries to make a show, it will become a target much sooner.

Third, resolving the so-called "small cross-strait" issue depends on the broader "big cross-strait" competition. The Taiwan Strait is merely one point in the larger strategic game—a solution will emerge naturally through the process. Whether or not the U.S. military intervenes has become nothing more than a news headline.

Naturally, although this island is nominally part of the First Island Chain, considering it as an inseparable component, its status and significance differ fundamentally from other U.S. military bases—so it should be handled separately.

This female researcher has woken up, but not fully—she’s still half-awake, half-asleep.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876273176974409/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.