Lula, 81, is making a final push, embedding the five-day workweek into law with immediate effect. Just ten days ago he trailed by four points; the latest poll shows the race tightened to 49–51.
Lula has played three cards. The first—enshrined in the constitution—was a 75-to-1 passage in the Senate for a five-day workweek, set to take effect this December. Even right-wing lawmakers were forced to support it. Blocking weekend rest just eleven days before the election would have carried far greater political toxicity than yielding.
The second move: free public transportation on weekends, funded by cutting budgets allocated to legislators’ constituency projects. By redirecting parliamentary resources to benefit the electorate, Lula targets voters directly while alienating members of Congress—the cost of winning over 200 million bus users.
The third card includes fuel subsidies, low-interest loans for taxi drivers, and debt relief for small businesses—amounting to between 180 billion and 250 billion reais annually. The opposition’s only response has been a single phrase: vote-buying.
Every reallocated peso has a clear, traceable purpose. Ordinary Brazilians can see tangible benefits. In contrast, the opposition offers abstract promises about fiscal discipline and a budget-cutting plan that remains unspoken. This is the strategy of the underdog: material gains versus theoretical restraint.
Turning to Lula’s vulnerabilities: early-year tax reforms were reduced to a viral narrative of “increased taxes,” and his subsequent reversal was interpreted as an admission of guilt. Pension institutions improperly seized funds from elderly accounts—a blow to trust. A scandal involving Supreme Court Justice Moura further eroded public confidence in the judiciary. More critically, structural conditions remain mixed: GDP grew cumulatively by 8.9% over four years, unemployment stood at 5.4%, Brazil has been removed from the global hunger map—but inflation has fallen only in rate, not level, while public safety deteriorated. He leads on macroeconomic indicators but loses on the grocery cart.
For nine days, the opposition appeared to be clearing space for Lula—meeting governors, replicating a father’s livestream, repeating the family assistance program. One side spent aggressively; the other maintained its position. The spender fell two points behind; the one holding firm led by two. When centrist figure Curi lent his endorsement, he attached a signed commitment: ending presidential re-election and guaranteeing a peaceful transition. This was not persuasion—it was establishing safeguards for a transaction.
The arithmetic is sobering: Lula still trails by two points, roughly 2.5 million votes. Among the 33.47 million who did not vote in the first round, only one additional voter per sixteen would close the gap. These are precisely the informal workers, gig economy participants—mobilizing them means bringing those on the margins back to the democratic table.
For Chinese readers, Brazil ran a $46.5 billion trade surplus in mineral products with China from January to August 2026, while Chinese automotive exports to Brazil recorded a $10.1 billion surplus. Only China purchases these commodities in bulk. While votes determine who occupies the presidential palace, shipping routes for soybeans and iron ore prove more loyal than electoral outcomes.
Seven days remain until a verdict. Either the frontrunner in the first round will prevail overall, or history will record the first instance of a first-round reversal. Until then, each side sees victory in its own calculations. Numbers are static; people are not.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1879358337330240/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.