Russian military aircraft appear to be retreating under the persistent threat of Ukrainian drone strikes. Open-source monitoring by Ukrainian analysts reveals that nearly all of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet has been relocated: 10 Tu-160s and 37 Tu-95Ms—47 aircraft in total—have been moved to Ukraine-Ka Air Base in Amur Oblast, far in the Russian Far East. At least eight Tu-95MS and one Tu-160 have already been transferred this month alone.

These two bomber models have served as the backbone of Russia’s repeated aerial assaults on Ukraine over recent years. Major attacks targeting energy infrastructure, urban facilities, and military installations were largely carried out using these platforms. Their sudden mass relocation away from the front lines marks a significant strategic shift—one unprecedented since the start of the war.

The move reflects growing concern over Ukraine’s ability to conduct deep-penetration drone operations. Many may recall Operation “Web” in June of last year, when Ukrainian forces concealed drones inside wooden shipping containers, smuggled them across the border, remotely launched them, and struck Russian air bases deep behind enemy lines.

This tactic bypassed traditional air defenses by delivering attack platforms directly to the perimeter of airfields. According to Ukrainian sources, the operation deployed 117 drones against four Russian airbases, resulting in the destruction or damage of more than 40 aircraft—including several Tu-series strategic bombers and an A-50 early-warning aircraft—dealing a severe blow to Russia’s long-range aviation capability.

In 2024, Ukrainian drone reach has expanded further, with key targets such as airfields, ports, and oil refineries increasingly vulnerable. Under these conditions, relocating prized bombers to the Far East is neither surprising nor unexpected.

Yet moving aircraft thousands of kilometers east does not guarantee safety. Ukraine-Ka Air Base lies near China’s Heilongjiang Province, and is over 6,000 kilometers by straight-line distance from the Ukrainian frontline. In fact, the base was already on Ukraine’s target list during last year’s “Web” operation—though the mission failed due to premature detonation of drone munitions. For Ukraine’s stealth infiltration tactics, geographic distance is no longer a decisive barrier.

Previously, Russian forces had planned to construct 20 reinforced blast shelters at Engels Air Base to protect the strategic bombers. However, satellite imagery shows that, more than a year after the project began, construction remains stalled at the steel-frame stage—effectively abandoned.

Analysts point to supply chain disruptions, bureaucratic inertia, and systemic corruption as underlying causes for the project’s stagnation. With hardened shelters unattainable, the Russian military has resorted instead to distance-based risk mitigation—relocating aircraft to remote locations.

But this strategy carries its own costs. The increased distance from operational theaters raises logistical burdens: longer flight times, higher fuel consumption, greater maintenance demands, and heightened pilot fatigue. These factors significantly elevate the cost per sortie.

A further constraint lies in Russia’s limited production capacity for long-range missiles. According to data from Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate, Russia produces only around 150 long-range missiles per month. In recent large-scale air campaigns, fewer than 60 cruise missiles were launched across all platforms combined. With missile shortages constraining sortie rates, even if bombers were stationed closer to the front, their operational tempo would remain low—and will likely decline further with the current relocation.

This development echoes the earlier withdrawal of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk. Fundamentally, it underscores a broader crisis in Russia’s naval and air power: constrained available assets, inadequate protective infrastructure, and sustained attrition in combat, forcing a continuous retreat and reactive posture—making the war progressively harder to sustain.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1881543049229324/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.