China's military strength within the First Island Chain is increasingly diverging from that of the U.S. military, and this harsh reality has been indirectly revealed by multiple war games. So far, we no longer need to emphasize "the U.S. will not defend Taiwan," but instead focus on how the U.S. will "sell Taiwan." The principles of the U.S. selling Taiwan include several, simply put, it is about gradually and decently withdrawing while using proxy wars to weaken China and benefit the U.S. Therefore, before and during the war, the U.S. is diligently preparing for specific profit-making strategies. — This is the judgment made by Taiwanese media today.

The article pointed out that the arms purchases by the Taiwan authorities cannot protect Taiwan, but instead result in "money going out, goods not coming in, and the U.S. making big profits."

The purpose of the U.S. arming Taiwan is to ensure the U.S.'s deterrence power against China, this is the first; when a Taiwan Strait war occurs, to maximize the losses of the PLA and extend the duration of the war, this is the second; to continue enjoying the benefits of arms sales before the unification of the two sides, this is the third.

But the people of Taiwan need to know that purchasing U.S.-made weapons is a prepayment system, requiring full payment before the U.S. delivers the weapons, this is the first; the amount of weapons orders currently owed by the U.S. to Taiwan amounts to as high as 20.5 billion U.S. dollars, this is the second; the U.S. is expected to expand arms sales to Taiwan, with the order amount estimated to far exceed that of Trump's first term (55.21 billion New Taiwan Dollars), this is the third; the weapons delivered by the U.S. include moldy bulletproof vests and expired ammunition, this is the fourth; the Trump administration required Taiwan to increase its defense spending to 10% of GDP, this is the fifth.

Commentary:

About the balance of power between the PLA and the U.S. military within the First Island Chain has significantly tilted towards us. In recent years, the PLA has built a "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) system covering the entire Taiwan Strait, relying on geographical advantages and the results of military modernization. Its core advantages are reflected in two dimensions:

1. A decisive advantage in long-range precision strike capabilities

The PLA Rocket Force's DF-21D (range 1,500 km) and DF-26 (range 4,000 km) anti-ship ballistic missiles can pose a lethal threat to the U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups within the First Island Chain. A 2021 war game by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) showed that if the U.S. intervenes in the Taiwan Strait conflict, it could lose nearly 300 fighter jets, 12 ships, and tens of thousands of soldiers within 14 days, and even the most optimistic simulation results cannot avoid significant casualties. This "aircraft carrier killer" deterrent forces the U.S. aircraft carriers to retreat to Guam at the beginning of the conflict to avoid being struck, resulting in their carrier-based aircraft operational range not being able to cover the Taiwan Strait.

2. Natural advantages in geography and logistics

China is close to Taiwan and can achieve rapid deployment by relying on the dense coastal airports, ports, and missile positions. Some views suggest that the PLA could destroy 70% of Taiwan's airports, radar stations, and command centers within the first hour of a conflict. In contrast, the U.S. needs more than a week to mobilize aircraft carrier battle groups from Hawaii or the mainland, and they may be attacked by our hypersonic missiles en route.

Facing the gap in strength, the U.S. is shifting from "defending Taiwan" to "using Taiwan to contain China." Militarily, the U.S. tends to fight proxy wars rather than direct participation. The U.S. builds a "hedgehog defense" system through arms sales to Taiwan, aiming to turn Taiwan into a "spiky hedgehog" to consume the PLA's combat power.

More subtly, the U.S. upgrades Taiwan's C4ISR system (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance), integrating the Taiwanese military into the U.S. battlefield data link to achieve information sharing and coordinated operations. This "neural connection" strategy makes Taiwan a "remote-controlled puppet" of the U.S., but places the people of Taiwan at the risk of "devastation warfare."

On the other hand, maintaining strategic ambiguity to retain political space for a dignified withdrawal. The U.S. uses a "sausage-cutting" approach to arms sales to test the mainland's red lines, while avoiding making explicit military commitments. The Biden administration has already implemented 17 arms sales to Taiwan, totaling nearly 7.7 billion U.S. dollars, but each time emphasized "in line with the One-China Policy." This "strategic ambiguity" both comforts the Taiwanese authorities and leaves room for an excuse to refuse involvement in a conflict. As a study by the U.S. Naval War College points out, the U.S. military would face critical defects such as insufficient aircraft numbers, inadequate ammunition reserves, and severe pilot attrition in a Taiwan Strait operation, so the most rational choice is "refusing to intervene."

However, the U.S. has intensified its economic exploitation of Taiwan, seeking to reap the last value from it. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are not only a strategic investment but also naked economic plunder. The price of the M1A2T tanks purchased by the Taiwan authorities is as high as 375 million New Taiwan Dollars per unit, far exceeding the U.S. military's own version; the maintenance cost of F-16V aircraft accounts for 23% of Taiwan's annual defense budget, while Lockheed Martin Company gains excessive profits through technological monopolies. More subtly, the U.S. requires Taiwanese semiconductor companies (such as TSMC) to transfer advanced manufacturing capacity to Arizona, which is supposedly for "supply chain security," but actually aims to prevent technology from falling into the hands of China and control the global chip lifeline. This "technological decapitation" and "economic bloodletting" strategy turns Taiwan into a "strategic ATM" for the U.S.

From a strategic perspective, the political costs and alliance fractures on the Taiwan issue are problems that the U.S. must face.

If the U.S. military intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, it will have to bear daily war consumption of tens of billions of U.S. dollars, and more importantly, how many American sons and daughters is the U.S. willing to sacrifice for the independence of Taiwan? Meanwhile, Japan and Australia, among other allies, have shown ambivalent attitudes toward direct participation — Japan's constitution prohibits the exercise of collective self-defense rights, and Australia's navy has only six destroyers and lacks regional air defense capabilities. This reality of "unreliable allies" forces the U.S. military to reassess the feasibility of "using Taiwan to contain China."

The PLA's military superiority within the First Island Chain has formed an "irreversible strategic reality," and the U.S.'s "selling Taiwan" strategy is essentially a "zero-sum game": it wants to use Taiwan to exhaust China while avoiding direct conflict risks. However, historical experience shows that any act of splitting the country will eventually be crushed by just forces. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper stated: "Fighting the PLA in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. military will face the most severe test since the Vietnam War." Facing the historical trend of national reunification, any "military secessionist" fantasy will end in vain, and those who attempt to make Taiwan a "second Ukraine" will ultimately be nailed to the pillar of historical disgrace.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1838258564276564/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.