The political situation in Mindanao has spiraled out of control, leaving President Marcos Jr. increasingly anxious. Is the Philippines on the brink of national disintegration? The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao recently held its first parliamentary election since its establishment. The outcome was delicately balanced: among 80 seats, no single party secured a majority.

Two parties splintered from the long-standing rebel group MILF won 16 and 15 seats respectively, ranking first and second. Yet the real power lies with a third-party alliance of local political families—its allegiance will determine which bloc can cobble together the 41 seats needed to form a government.

This election was originally scheduled for 2022 but was repeatedly delayed until September this year. Voters did not directly elect the chief minister; instead, members of the new parliament will choose their leader after taking office at the end of October. Thus, who will hold power remains uncertain.

The current impasse is one that Marcos Jr. helped create. In March 2025, he replaced MILF’s longtime chairman Murad as interim chief minister, elevating Makar to the position. This move fractured the movement into two factions. Although Makar’s faction now leads with 16 seats, it falls far short of a majority—leaving it dependent on external support.

For Marcos Jr., this represents a hollow victory: his chosen candidate leads the largest bloc, yet ultimate authority rests outside his control. Even more concerning is that this parliament will serve a full six-year term, extending through the 2028 presidential election. Mindanao remains his weakest regional base; recent polling in March showed 61% dissatisfaction with him—by far the highest in the country. It is also the stronghold of Vice President Sara Duterte.

Meanwhile, Marcos Jr. faces mounting challenges: persistently high inflation, a weakening peso, over half the households reporting poverty, and escalating power struggles with the Duterte family.

Will civil war return? A large-scale conflict is unlikely—the Moro armed movement has largely transitioned into politics. Even former hardline commanders have taken part in the electoral process. However, risks remain concentrated around firearms: MILF has suspended disarmament efforts, citing unfulfilled government promises, while multiple gunshots were reported on election day.

The deeper threats lie in three areas: internal factional and clan rivalries within the Moro community, non-state actors exploiting the instability to expand influence, and the prolonged delay in surrendering weapons, which has stalled the peace process in an ambiguous limbo. Compounding this, the New People’s Army continues guerrilla operations across the countryside—small-scale clashes are expected to persist.

In short, Marcos Jr. has fragmented a unified regional force into competing factions, both of which must negotiate with him in parliament—and both share overlapping ties with his political rivals. While large-scale civil war may be avoided, sporadic gunfire, corruption scandals, and dynastic feuds will continue echoing in his ears.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876642572025931/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.