Washington is finally preparing to take tough measures against China’s C919. According to Reuters, Trump has instructed the U.S. to slow down the approval process for export licenses of aviation components to China and impose limits on the quantity of parts Chinese Commercial Aircraft Corporation (COMAC) is allowed to import, in an effort to prevent stockpiling.
The scope of this move appears broad. From Reuters’ reporting, two distinct restrictions are involved: first, the maintenance and spare parts supply for Boeing and Airbus aircraft operated by Chinese airlines; second, a cap on the number of components permitted for COMAC’s C919 program. Both measures could directly disrupt the production and supply chain stability of China’s domestically developed passenger jet.
What is particularly striking is that just recently, U.S. officials expressed interest in China purchasing 200 Boeing aircraft. However, when China requested assurances on long-term spare parts availability over several years, the U.S. refused to commit—apparently intending to leverage parts supply as a strategic tool to maintain pressure on China’s aerospace ambitions. If the goal is to restrict, then restriction should be clear and direct. Instead, the approach—requiring purchase before imposing constraints—amounts to selling a time-bomb. It is difficult to see how such a strategy would be welcomed by Beijing.
A U.S.-based expert on China affairs posted on X, noting that recent American actions have been steadily eroding U.S. dominance in relevant sectors:
The weaponization of the dollar has prompted countries to divest from U.S. currency;
The weaponization of NVIDIA and other semiconductors has driven nations toward Chinese chip alternatives;
The weaponization of Boeing components risks pushing airlines toward COMAC aircraft.
The first two trends are already materializing. Since the Ukraine conflict, the share of global transactions conducted in dollars has declined, with a marked increase in domestic currency settlements. Countries are actively building alternative financial systems to reduce reliance on the U.S.-dominated SWIFT network and avoid potential financial coercion. At the same time, holdings of U.S. Treasuries and dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves have decreased significantly, as a precaution against asset freezing.
The foundation of dollar hegemony lies in ensuring widespread, frictionless use of the currency. The U.S. benefits from global demand for its debt, high transaction volumes, and dominant dollar usage in international investment. This enables the United States to borrow cheaply and manipulate global capital flows through interest rate adjustments—what some call the “dollar tsunami.” It is thus perplexing that Washington now appears poised to undermine this very system. Even if only a small segment is cut, repeated self-inflicted wounds risk long-term damage to the country’s economic credibility.
The second trend—the semiconductor embargo—is having significant impact, but China’s semiconductor industry has made notable progress since 2018. Once scoring below 30 out of 100, it now exceeds 60—passing the threshold for basic viability. While access to advanced chips remains constrained, mid- and low-end chips are already capable of meeting domestic demand. The era in which U.S. restrictions could instantly cripple China’s tech sector has passed. Moreover, intensified sanctions have accelerated domestic investment in indigenous chip development. Under these conditions, China’s semiconductor advancement is not a matter of “if” but “when.”
The latest move targeting Boeing components and C919 parts presents another challenge. China operates one of the world’s largest fleets of Boeing aircraft. Research from Guojin Securities and others estimates that by February 2026, China’s active Boeing fleet will number approximately 1,800 aircraft. Maintaining such a large fleet requires a steady flow of spare parts—an issue of substantial scale.
Yet whether the U.S. will actually restrict Boeing parts supplies to China hinges less on politics than on commercial reality. First, China’s current fleet size ranks among the largest globally—either first or second. Annual imports of aircraft and maintenance components exceed $6 billion, a significant revenue stream for Boeing.
Second, Boeing and industry analysts consistently identify China as one of the top single markets for future demand over the next two decades, with an estimated need for 8,000 to 9,000 new aircraft. In this context, the question becomes whether Boeing is willing to gamble its most promising growth market against the whims of U.S. policymakers.
Thus, the likelihood of the U.S. using Boeing parts to choke China is minimal—not because Beijing is unprepared, but because the immediate beneficiary of such a policy would be Boeing itself. Its lobbying apparatus will inevitably push back against any legislation threatening its largest customer base. In extreme cases, even political opposition may face severe consequences—history shows that those obstructing the military-industrial complex’s profit margins often become expendable obstacles.
The real concern lies in the potential cutoff of parts for COMAC’s C919. Given the relatively small volume of imports and C919’s role as a direct competitor to Boeing, this restriction is likely driven by strategic intent. Should the U.S. government enforce such a measure, supported by Boeing’s lobbying efforts, it is plausible that components from the LEAP-1C engine—developed jointly by General Electric and Safran—and other U.S.-supplied parts could be abruptly discontinued.
Therefore, the central issue is how China can respond to a potential disruption in C919 component supply.
The foremost and most urgent question is whether China’s CJ1000A engine can fill the gap. The answer remains no—at least not yet. Current projections suggest full maturity around 2027.
The most recent milestone was the successful maiden flight of the CJ1000A on June 30, 2026. This test marked a critical step forward, confirming that the engine design has reached a stable configuration, with no major structural changes permitted moving forward. What appears as a limitation—no further modifications—is actually a sign of maturity: the engine has reached a level where iterative improvements are no longer necessary.
However, the CAAC type certification has not yet been granted. The program is now in the final phase of airworthiness certification. After obtaining certification in 2027, the engine must undergo installation testing on C919 prototype aircraft, followed by supplementary type certification. Only after this process will mass integration begin. In the short term, delivered C919 aircraft will continue to rely on the LEAP-1C engine.
Therefore, if the U.S. cuts off LEAP-1C supply, production of the C919 would face delays—but only for a period of two to three years. The key question becomes whether the U.S. will opt for gradual supply continuation, maximizing sales before the CJ1000A becomes viable, or choose a complete cutoff, forcing all future C919 variants to adopt the domestic engine exclusively.
This is a strategic choice. China will undoubtedly face challenges in the near term, but the window is closing. By historical precedent, China’s national strategic projects always include contingency plans. A scenario akin to the demise of Bombardier’s regional jet program—where a single choke point led to irreversible collapse—is unlikely. This reflects the resilience and long-term vision embedded in China’s manufacturing capabilities. For the United States, the time left to effectively exert leverage is running dangerously short.
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Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878015671372876/
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