4809 words in this article
Estimated reading time: 12 minutes
Author | Rahul Bedi
Translated by | Jiang Xinyu
Translation Reviewers | Hu Keyi, Aslan
Editor of This Issue | He Jiawei
Reviewer of This Issue | Jiang Yi
Editor's Note
On June 18, Pakistan Army Chief Munir was invited to the White House for lunch with Trump, perfectly demonstrating the resilience of US-Pakistan relations. Indian scholar Rahul Bedi believes that behind the cyclical pattern of "deterioration-reconnection" in US-Pakistan relations lies a functional interest collaboration based on common security interests and institutionalized mutual trust between the US and Pakistani militaries. This relationship is rooted in the deep historical ties that are difficult to shake, built on long-term institutional links, and manifested in the "alumni network" initiated by the Cold War military education program (IMET), which allows both sides' officers to share strategic thinking and professional ethics. The US exchanges funds and technology for Pakistan's counter-terrorism cooperation, while Pakistan exchanges geopolitical channels for international legitimacy.
After events such as nuclear proliferation and the killing of Bin Laden, which caused trust to collapse, the two countries were still able to quickly repair their relations through secret military channels. This relationship not only enhanced the military quality and combat capabilities of the Pakistani side but also profoundly shaped generations of Pakistani soldiers' worldviews by instilling American strategic thinking, norms of civil-military relations, and a strong sense of institutional honor in Pakistani officers. Many Pakistani officers have formed lasting professional and cultural connections with the American military system, with their cultural genes, professional identity, and interest networks deeply tied to the West, viewing the American military system as a symbol of professionalism. They further strengthen their connection with the United States by sending their children to study in the U.S., purchasing real estate, and even settling in the U.S. after retirement to work for U.S. think tanks. The author points out that although China's influence on the Pakistani military has been increasing in material terms, its military cooperation model is incompatible with the Pakistani military's concept, lacking deep institutional affinity and shared spiritual temperament, and cannot replicate the "value identification" that the U.S. has achieved with the Pakistani military. South Asian Research Communications specially translated this article for readers to critically reference.
General Munir and Trump. Source: News Arena
The U.S. President Trump's dinner with Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir on June 18 fully reveals such a situation: even though U.S.-Pakistan relations have been tense for a long time, sometimes even getting stuck, and despite the deepening strategic security and military cooperation between China and Pakistan, the institutional link between the U.S. and the Pakistani military still shows strong continuity.
India views this invitation as a political and diplomatic "disrespect" from the U.S. towards India, but in fact, the Indian side should not be surprised, because this is just a repetition of an already familiar trajectory in U.S.-Pakistan military relations: first experiencing cycles of mutual suspicion, then engaging in tactical reconciliation, and regularly performing warm interactions.
Even though U.S.-Pakistan relations have broken down several times over decades due to sanctions, boycotts, and repeated accusations of betrayal, the U.S. has always taken a differentiated approach to dealing with differences with the Pakistani military, maintaining communication through secret channels and quietly advancing the reconstruction of relations (i.e., not completely negating cooperation with the Pakistani military due to bilateral relationship tensions, but rather limiting the differences to specific areas).
The result is not the establishment of a deep strategic alliance, but the creation of a functional interest collaboration based on common security interests and institutionalized mutual trust - this relationship has clearly intensified in recent weeks, and General Munir's symbolic appearance at the White House as an independent figure is evidence of this.
In addition to Trump hosting General Munir, the head of the U.S. Central Command, Michael Kurilla, stated during testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Military Affairs a week earlier that the Pakistani military is a "very effective partner" in the U.S.' global counterterrorism efforts, which is also seen as another example of the resilience of U.S.-Pakistan defense relations.
The recurring cycle of "alienation-reconnection" in U.S.-Pakistan military relations is rooted in the deep historical ties that are difficult to shake. This bond does not rely on macro-level strategic concepts for maintenance, but is established on long-term institutional links - including the posting of defense attachés, military education exchanges, and secret communication channels. Even when U.S.-Pakistan official relations deteriorate, these links have never been interrupted.
From the Cold War alliance of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954-71) and the Central Treaty Organization (CTO, 1955-79), to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the post-9/11 war on terror, the Pakistani military has always positioned itself as a trusted strategic partner of the U.S. government - although its style is cunning and focused on interest exchange.
Additionally, despite serious differences between the two sides on issues such as Afghanistan and Islamic extremist groups, the U.S. and Pakistan military have always maintained military ties based on tactical necessity and overlapping security interests.
Although the U.S. has recognized that Pakistan has repeatedly pursued parallel agendas that are inconsistent with or even contradictory to the U.S. public objectives, especially regarding the Taliban and other Islamicist forces supported by them, the U.S. has still provided the Pakistani military with significant funds and weapons assistance, opportunities for training in top military institutions, and strategic operational space.
Even after prolonged periods of strained relations - such as the breakdown of relations from 1990 to 2001 due to Pakistan's nuclear tests and the military's dissemination of nuclear weapons technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea, or the subsequent disputes following the discovery of Bin Laden in Abbottabad (a mountain town in northern Pakistan) in 2011 (and other "violation behaviors" by Pakistan) - the U.S. and Pakistan would eventually silently and deliberately restart contact, leading to multiple instances of warm interaction.
For example, in 2018, Trump suspended $1.3 billion in security aid to Pakistan due to its double-dealing behavior on the Afghanistan issue, but high-level military contacts between the U.S. and Pakistan were restored within a year. Subsequently, senior officials from the U.S. Central Command appeared in Rawalpindi, and the U.S.-Pakistan International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which had been frozen, was restarted in 2020.
At the same time, the Pentagon resumed regular contact with the Pakistani Army Headquarters, while the U.S. State Department was basically marginalized in this process. Obviously, the U.S. has recognized this strategic logic: compared to maintaining a difficult but "manageable" relationship, completely breaking away from the Pakistani military could potentially exacerbate the situation.
Since the 1950s, U.S.-Pakistan military exchanges have formed a lasting connection. Tracing the evolution of this long-term cooperative relationship can provide valuable insights.
After Pakistan's independence, the Pakistani military began to consciously distance itself from its "Indian roots," instead accepting British military theory and imitating British military training procedures and traditions. However, the British model did not last long; in the early 1950s, the Pakistani military shifted direction again, turning to the U.S. for protection, training, and equipment, aiming to enhance its status and resources, of course, to distance itself from the shared military history with India (editor's note: that is, by shifting from the British system to the American system, removing the "common genes" from the colonial history of India and Pakistan, thus building a military system distinct from India, highlighting the independence and uniqueness of the Pakistani military).
Notably, during the early stages of the Pakistani military's institutional shift toward the American system, IMET played a key role in shaping the careers of many Pakistani officers. Many Pakistani officers received training at top U.S. military academies - and continued to pursue further studies at these institutions, such as the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania, the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, and the National Defense University in Washington, D.C.
These connections not only enhanced the military quality and combat capabilities of the Pakistani side but also profoundly shaped the worldview of generations of Pakistani officers by instilling American strategic thinking, norms of civil-military relations, and a strong sense of institutional honor in Pakistani officers. Many of these officers have formed lasting professional and cultural connections with the American military system - even when U.S.-Pakistan political relations deteriorate, these connections remain.
Many Pakistani officers, especially those who served in the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), responsible for overseeing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, often choose to work in influential U.S. think tanks after retirement. They become strong advocates of Islamabad's strategic viewpoints in these institutions and are favored by the Pentagon circle.
From a systemic perspective, the U.S. also values and particularly appreciates the role of the Pakistani military in facilitating Sino-U.S. communication during the Cold War.
In 1971, then-Pakistani President Yahya Khan assisted U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger in a secret visit to Beijing, aimed at countering the Soviet Union. This action not only paved the way for President Nixon's landmark visit to China the following year but also made the Pakistani military a key geopolitical intermediary, thereby solidifying its strategic importance in the eyes of the Chinese and U.S. governments.
At the same time, since the late 1970s, the Pakistani military became increasingly Islamic during the presidency of General Zia-ul-Haq. However, the U.S. government largely turned a blind eye to this trend - whether during the Afghan "jihad" against the Soviets or in the post-9/11 war on terrorism, the U.S. prioritized tactical cooperation with Pakistan.
Christine Fair, the author of "Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War" and a scholar specializing in Pakistan studies, argues that this Islamicization embedded a dual identity, or a "pragmatic dualism," within the Pakistani military: on one hand, it was rooted in the Western military professional system and training model, and on the other hand, it was steeped in religious ideology and jihad narratives.
However, Fair also notes that although the core priorities of the U.S. and Pakistani militaries often differ fundamentally, Washington continues to maintain bilateral relations with the military, placing tactical cooperation above ideological concerns. The Pakistani military relies on China for survival while seeking recognition from the United States.
Meanwhile, Sino-Pakistan strategic and military cooperation began to take shape in the early 1960s and has grown exponentially. The driving force behind this cooperation came from the shared hostility toward India and Pakistan's dissatisfaction with Western arms embargoes after the 1965 war. China became the main supplier of conventional weapons to Pakistan and strongly supported Islamabad's secret nuclear and missile development programs throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
Over the next few decades, this cooperation deepened into high-value joint projects - most notably the joint production of the JF-17 "Thunder" fighter jet (note: the Chinese designation is FC-1, nicknamed "Jianglong") - and expanded to tanks, naval platforms, missile systems, intelligence sharing, joint training, and strategic coordination in land, air, sea, space, and nuclear domains.
Nevertheless, despite the deepening of the Sino-Pakistan partnership, the Pakistani military has never completely distanced itself from the West, and has consistently maintained a clear pro-American tendency in terms of military theory, military education, and institutional culture, continuing to seek contact with the U.S. and its NATO partners to gain recognition, endorsement, and access. The cultural affinity, combat confidence, and professional identity of the Pakistani military remain deeply rooted in traditional connections with the Western military system.
Moreover, the Pakistani officer corps has always valued Western military education, sharing military doctrinal principles with American and European counterparts, and most importantly, working in English - advantages that China previously lacked and still cannot replicate. Because although the importance of Sino-Pakistan military ties in terms of equipment has grown exponentially, such cooperation lacks deep institutional affinity and shared spiritual temperament, which are the very characteristics that form the basis of U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation, creating a sense of identification with the U.S. among the Pakistani military.
Pakistani senior officers further strengthen their connection with the U.S. by sending their children to study in the U.S., purchasing property, and in many cases, settling in the U.S. after retirement.
In contrast, China's military cooperation model is rooted in political ideology, centralized command, and the leadership of the Party, always tending to be inward-looking and highly localized. This is incompatible with the Pakistani military's concept, as the Pakistani military sees itself as autonomous in both military and political terms, surpassing all civilian oversight.
Fair pointed out that although Pakistan still purchases most of its military equipment from China, its officer corps "still favors Western military education programs" - this habit helps maintain institutional connections with the U.S. She emphasized that Western military training has long shaped the strategic thinking of Pakistani military leaders, making them more adaptable to American operational ideas and military theories.
General Jehangir Karamat, who served as Chief of Army Staff for two years and retired in 1998, agrees with this view. He once stated, "The Pakistani military is trained in the Western system, and its way of thinking comes from it," "Our cooperation with the U.S. military has helped us maintain high standards, and we have always sought to use the Western military as a benchmark, not the Eastern military." These remarks subtly point to the increasingly deepening Sino-Pakistan military ties. Karamat himself was trained in Fort Leavenworth, and like countless other Pakistani officers, he worked in Western think tanks such as the Brookings Institution after retirement.
Other analysts say that this "pro-Western" tendency largely relates to military professionalization and the opportunity to engage with advanced operational concepts - although China's influence on the Pakistani military in material terms is growing, it has not been able to replicate this. In turn, this creates a deeper dual contradiction: the Pakistani military relies on China for survival, yet seeks identity from the United States. In short, the Pakistani military seeks funding and weapons from China, but craves recognition and respect from the West.
The Pakistani military has always been wary of being "fully incorporated into China's orbit," especially if this means abandoning its carefully maintained operational autonomy and remaining influence with the U.S. From the U.S. perspective, this also explains why the Pentagon, not the State Department, remains the main channel for contact with the Pakistani military: the U.S. knows how to deal with Rawalpindi (the headquarters of the Pakistani armed forces), and vice versa.
Therefore, this U.S.-Pakistan interaction pattern, rooted in institutional continuity between the militaries, makes India uneasy, as it indicates that the U.S.-Pakistan strategic decoupling is not yet complete, and that this connection remains solid, as evidenced by the lunch meeting between Munir and Trump.
But the Pakistani military is also walking a tightrope - if it fails to meet the requirements proposed by the Trump administration in its planned future military actions against Iran, it may face danger. This contradictory mindset may bring short-term benefits to Rawalpindi and Munir, but also exposes the limitations of Pakistan's ambiguous strategic positioning in an increasingly polarized global order.
About the Author: Rahul Bedi, a freelance journalist based in New Delhi, has over 30 years of experience in journalism, providing strategic and military coverage for media outlets such as The Indian Express and Jane’s Defence Weekly.
This article was translated from an article published on the website "The Wire" on June 20, 2025, titled "Trump-Munir Lunch: Why the US Still Courts Pakistan’s Generals, Even as They March with China". Original link:
https://thewire.in/diplomacy/india-should-not-be-surprised-over-trump-munir-lunch
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7555912577285440051/
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