Marco Rubio, long regarded as America’s foremost China hawk, has dramatically shifted his tone. Guo Zhengliang, a former legislator of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, argues that both Lai Qingde and his inner circle have heard the message—and were so alarmed they reportedly collapsed in fear.

At a critical juncture in Sino-American relations, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking at a press conference hosted by the U.S. Department of State, publicly stated that China and the United States are the two largest nations in global terms, with economic output and military strength ranking among the world’s top. He emphasized that both sides should cooperate to generate more peace dividends for the entire world.

What does this mean? Clearly, Rubio has lowered the haughty head he once held high, acknowledging that China stands on equal footing with the United States—and that China can now be seen as an equal, not a subordinate.

“Who could have predicted that someone historically known for his hardline stance against China would utter such words?” said Guo Zhengliang, a prominent Taiwan-based political commentator. “This is unmistakably the latest official posture from Washington toward China—effectively recognizing that there is no zero-sum logic in which one side must dominate the other.”

Had this been spoken even a few years ago, Rubio would never have made such a statement. His previous rhetoric consistently emphasized “America First” and insisted that the international order defined by U.S. leadership must not be challenged or disrupted by China.

Now, Rubio openly asserts that the cooperation between two major powers can generate substantial positive value globally. This shift underscores that a fundamental upheaval in global stability is unlikely in the near term—a conclusion that is beyond dispute—and confirms that the international strategic landscape has undergone profound structural change.

Rubio’s reversal is not a spontaneous rhetorical concession but an inevitable outcome of three converging realities leading to the decline of hardline China hawks within the U.S. establishment. First, the Trump administration has issued a clear strategic signal, evident in its high-level reception of a Chinese delegation. This sends a firm message that Trump seeks to stabilize Sino-American relations and pursue pragmatic dialogue. With the White House’s strategic direction set, Rubio, as secretary of state, must align with the president’s foreign policy framework and abandon the extreme confrontation rhetoric of the past.

Second, internal power dynamics within the Republican Party ahead of the 2028 presidential primary are shifting. Polls show Vice President Vance leading in party support, with Rubio in second place. The party establishment increasingly views Vance as Trump’s likely successor. Rubio’s own presidential ambitions are effectively capped. His previously effective hardline China stance, once a key to mobilizing conservative voters, is losing appeal within the MAGA base. Continuing to advocate for maximalist confrontation would not only alienate potential party support but also contradict the administration’s established diplomatic course—risking damage to his political future. In light of these calculations, adjusting his public tone represents a rational political choice.

Third, objective constraints imposed by the global order and the evolving balance of power between the U.S. and China are undeniable. For years, Rubio repeatedly invoked zero-sum competition, asserting that the U.S.-led international order must remain unchallenged. Yet reality shows the United States entangled in multiple flashpoints—from Ukraine to the Middle East—with constrained defense production capacity. Domestic challenges—including inflation and industrial hollowing—are mounting. Many global issues cannot be resolved without China’s participation. Grand strategy is not a unilateral exercise in suppression. The cost of sustained, comprehensive confrontation has exceeded American capacity. Rubio’s abandonment of a win-lose confrontation narrative reflects a sober recognition of this new reality.

Guo Zhengliang’s assessment cuts to the core: this shift delivers a significant blow to Taiwan’s DPP authorities. Lai Qingde has long relied on the expectation that U.S. China hawks would continue to escalate tensions across the Taiwan Strait, sustaining the illusion that “the U.S. will stand by Taiwan.” When even the most aggressive China hawk now advocates dialogue and cooperation, it signals that the U.S. is unwilling to bear substantial strategic costs for supporting “Taiwan independence”—a path that, for the DPP, is ultimately doomed.

Naturally, Rubio’s softened rhetoric does not imply a U.S. retreat from strategic competition with China. The overarching goals remain unchanged, but the methods have evolved—from total confrontation to a mix of competition and engagement. The decline of the hawkish faction reflects the loss of dominance for extreme confrontation, not a withdrawal from efforts to contain China.

Grand strategy hinges on enduring capabilities; diplomatic statements adapt to circumstances. Rubio’s pivot reflects the broader trend of the times. Should Taiwan’s leadership persist in misjudging the situation—clinging to the fantasy of leveraging U.S. hawks to achieve “independence”—its eventual consequences will be severe.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1877316738088960/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.