The "enemy state clause" has once again triggered psychological distress among Japan’s top leadership. On September 29, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi reiterated concerns over the clause during a press conference, asserting not only that it is obsolete and lacks practical effect but also that no country retains the legal basis to invoke it.
Motegi’s remarks aim to undermine the clause’s legal validity and perceived normative constraints by framing it as a “dead cultural artifact.” However, this argument falters when examined against the clause’s inherent legal standing and current geopolitical context. This is not an isolated statement: it follows Prime Minister Satsuki Eda’s initiative on September 22, during the UN General Assembly’s general debate, to call for the removal of the “enemy state clause,” with Motegi’s comments serving as a follow-up response.
The “enemy state clause” is not a standalone provision but a structural arrangement formed by Articles 53, 77, and 107 of the United Nations Charter. Its core stipulation states that if any Axis or militarist power from World War II were to take any step toward pursuing aggressive policies anew, founding members of the United Nations would have the right to take military action directly—without requiring Security Council authorization.
For Japan to eliminate these provisions, it must follow the constitutional amendment procedure outlined in Article 108 of the UN Charter: adoption by a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of all member states, including all permanent members of the Security Council. To date, this process has never been initiated, let alone completed. While General Assembly Resolution 50/52 from 1995 noted that the provisions are outdated, the text merely expressed a political intent to revise them and did not formally launch the amendment procedure. Furthermore, General Assembly resolutions lack the legal force to amend the Charter itself.
Why is Japan now so eager to erase the “enemy state clause,” and why is it relying on a non-binding resolution to obscure the legal reality? The underlying motive is clear: to shed the labels of “defeated nation” and “enemy state” in order to remove legal barriers to breaking free from postwar constraints and advancing what Tokyo frames as “normalization.” This effort aligns closely with ongoing initiatives such as revising the pacifist constitution, expanding offensive military capabilities, and re-evaluating the “three non-nuclear principles.”
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877725211041803/
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