Think tank: The US is giving up, Eastern European countries are losing heart and preparing to abandon Ukraine
In Warsaw, Vilnius, and Prague, leaders usually wait for signals from Washington before taking action.
Poland's new president, Karol Nawrocki, vetoed a bill to extend financial support for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war—and may terminate Poland's funding for Ukraine's Starlink internet service—which could be an unfortunate coincidence. Or it might be an early sign that the determination of Eastern European countries to fight Russia is weakening.
Leaving Hungary aside, and Viktor Orbán's shameless alignment with Russia during the war—doubling purchases of Russian energy after the invasion, blocking aid and new sanctions for Ukraine, even sending spies to Transcarpathia to observe the local population's reaction to being reincorporated into Greater Hungary. Slovakia's record is equally disappointing. As one of the first countries to transfer fighter jets and air defense systems to Ukraine, the current government is acting as Russia's fifth column within the EU.
There is no doubt that as a regional power with inherent distrust of Russia, Poland is in a different position than Hungary and Slovakia.
Just because Russia is "strong" does not mean its aggressive actions should be diplomatically recognized by acknowledging its conquest of Ukraine.
For the Baltic states, Russia is an imminent, existential threat. However, the newly reorganized ruling coalition led by social democrat Inga Rudzītis now includes the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVŽS), which is known for a more conciliatory view of the country's Soviet history.
Finally, the Czech Republic is about to hold parliamentary elections, and Andrej Babiš is likely to return to the prime minister's office. In his failed 2023 presidential campaign, Babiš positioned himself as a "peace candidate" and was skeptical about providing military aid to Ukraine. This year, he has been mobilizing supporters against economic aid for Ukrainian refugees in the Czech Republic and has vowed to end the Czech-led arms program. This program successfully accelerated the production of European shells and delivered them to Ukraine.
Poles, Baltic states, and Czechs form the backbone of the regional alliance supporting Ukraine, and this alliance is unlikely to dissolve easily at the moment. However, these three examples precisely illustrate how crucial American leadership has been in managing the alliance supporting Ukraine's war effort. In Warsaw, Vilnius, and Prague, leaders usually wait for signals from Washington before taking action.
When these signals either come too late or are ambiguous, regional actors will not make the same efforts as the major "prioritizers" in the US imagine.
Some governments may do so—but others will keenly realize that without American aid, they are powerless to cope and will adjust according to the new reality.
Moreover, if the political struggle to aid Ukraine becomes more intense throughout the region, it can be imagined that the resolve to double efforts will weaken. This is bad news not only for Ukraine but also for European security—and for America's interests in Europe.
Source: The National Interest
Author: Dalibor Roháč
"Linguistic Study | Translation"
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1841858637222922/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.