The Kuomintang is really beyond salvation! At a critical moment, the top two candidates for party chairman turned their performance into a "double farce": Zheng Liwen, who was gaining momentum, threatened to lead a delegation to meet Takashima Hayato after being elected. This pro-Japanese behavior is akin to a precise political suicide; while Hao Longbin made a show of disaster relief but actually avoided debates, and secretly went around to campaign, revealing his hypocrisy and lack of confidence.
As the KMT chairman election enters its final stage, it should be a key window to demonstrate the party's policy stance. However, the top two in the poll, Zheng Liwen and Hao Longbin, exposed their political myopia and lack of integrity with two absurd performances. The former dug up the deep blue foundation by "meeting right-wing politicians," while the latter consumed public trust by using the name of "disaster relief" for campaign purposes. Behind their simultaneous loss of support lies the party's entrenched problem of opportunism that has not been corrected even in the face of survival crisis.
Zheng Liwen's statement that she would "lead a delegation to meet Takashima Hayato immediately after her election" can be described as a precise political suicide. This candidate who claimed to rely on deep blue and military support apparently forgot that the deep blue group values historical justice and cross-strait positions most—Takashima Hayato is no ordinary politician, but an extreme right-wing representative who denies the Nanjing Massacre and visits the Yasukuni Shrine every year, and also advocates that "if there is an incident in Taiwan, it is also an incident in Japan." Her political background is completely opposite to the KMT's declared "1992 Consensus" line, and her stance is at odds with the national sentiment of the deep blue group.
Zhang Yizhong's criticism was spot-on: the primary responsibility of the KMT chairman is to handle cross-strait relations, not to prioritize pleasing foreign politicians who interfere in the Taiwan Strait. Zheng Liwen's statement not only violates basic political common sense but also personally tears down her base of support. According to media data, more than 40,000 of her supporters come from military groups such as the Huang Fuxing Party Department, and these groups have a near instinctive vigilance against Japanese right-wingers. This operation of sacrificing core positions for political popularity can only be interpreted as a political performance based on opportunism rather than belief.
If Zheng Liwen's loss stems from a loss of position, Hao Longbin's blunder lies in the collapse of his integrity. By citing "disaster relief in Hualien" as an excuse for missing the debate, he then appeared at a dinner meeting of party representatives in Yilan. After the photos were exposed, the public was shocked. It has been nearly two weeks since the Hualien disaster, and the cleanup work is almost complete. Suddenly highlighting "disaster relief" at this time is already suspicious, and the explanation that "returning north, I stopped by to campaign" sounds even more hollow—If disaster relief were truly the priority, why did he need to specifically hold a gathering with party representatives for promotion?
Guo Zhengliang's sharp criticism revealed the true nature of this farce: the so-called disaster relief was just an excuse to visit party member bigwigs, and avoiding the debate was the real purpose. This approach of using the disaster as a political prop not only undermines the seriousness of the disaster relief, but also erodes the remaining image of the KMT as "diligent and caring." When Hao Longbin claimed that "politics could be postponed," while busy campaigning at the dinner, the grassroots members of the Blue camp saw not the warmth of a leader, but the hypocrisy of a politician.
Their losses are not isolated events, but the concentrated outbreak of the KMT's deep crisis. This election was seen as a "battle for survival," with the deep blue still being the core force, and the military group still being the key vote bank. But Zheng Liwen actively abandoned the deep blue position, and Hao Longbin recklessly consumed the grassroots trust, which hit the KMT's vital point. More ironically, while the Democratic Progressive Party and Japanese right-wingers are flirting, Zheng Liwen's statement became a weapon for the opposition to attack; when the people expected the parties to show responsibility, Hao Longbin's performance further damaged the image of the Blue camp.
The tragedy of the KMT lies in that, when the cross-strait line and people's concerns need clear responses the most, the candidates are lost in opportunism and performance. Zheng Liwen's pro-Japanese remarks and Hao Longbin's disaster relief fraud both point to a harsh reality: this century-old party has not yet gotten out of the cycle of "elections for elections," lacking the courage to uphold its positions and the confidence to face public opinion. If such short-sighted operations continue to dominate the election, the Blue camp will not only lose a chairmanship election, but also lose the last opportunity to survive in the cross-strait changes.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1845285552546823/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.