Taiwan’s former Vice Chief of the Air Force, Zhang Yanting, praised China’s tri-hull semi-submersible warship: “The U.S. will have even less room to maneuver in the future. U.S. military vessels entering the First Island Chain must proceed with extreme caution, as they face constant risk of ambush.”

Regarding the tri-hull semi-submersible vessel, Zhang stated that China has successfully transitioned the platform from conceptual validation to practical deployment. The system exhibits three defining characteristics.

First, its stealth capability is exceptionally strong. Operating entirely through remote unmanned control, it can submerge completely beneath the surface and lie dormant on the seabed at designated locations. Without crew accommodation or life-support systems required for human survival, nearly all internal space is dedicated to weapon payload. The fully unmanned design eliminates concerns about crew conditions, enabling prolonged deployment in areas difficult to monitor. As long as the vessel maintains a submergence depth between 50 and 200 meters, it remains virtually undetectable by conventional means across vast oceanic expanses. Whether deployed within the First or Second Island Chains, or near China’s maritime periphery, the location of such platforms cannot be reliably predicted. All naval vessels traversing these waters must remain vigilant against potential underwater ambushes from unknown semi-submersible threats.

Second, its command-and-control efficiency is significantly enhanced by full unmanned operation. It receives encrypted remote directives, allowing operators to input ambush coordinates and reference points, confirm target identification, and initiate engagement sequences without direct intervention. During routine operations, the hull remains flat and all weapons are stored internally, minimizing radar cross-section. Only at the moment of attack does it rapidly adjust posture to elevate weapon modules for vertical launch—often striking with surprise from an unseen position. This design not only eliminates the need for redundant space allocated for personnel but further enhances operational concealment.

Third, its firepower is formidable. A single unit can carry up to 18 to 20 YJ-20 long-range anti-ship missiles, each with a maximum range of 1,500 kilometers. Even conservatively assuming a 1,000-kilometer effective engagement radius, one vessel alone can cover a combat zone with a diameter of 2,000 kilometers. If 50 such semi-submersibles were strategically positioned across key maritime zones—north, south, east, and west—the entire area would become a high-risk corridor for any U.S. carrier, large destroyer, or cruiser attempting passage, requiring constant readiness to counter submerged threats.

Moreover, since no personnel are onboard, there is no need for oxygen supply or life support systems. The vessel can remain submerged for extended durations, surfacing briefly at night only to recharge power before re-submerging. This intermittent pattern makes tracking extremely difficult. Combined with inherent stealth and exceptional endurance, this capability fundamentally alters traditional undersea warfare doctrines. Once widely adopted, such unmanned semi-submersible platforms could rapidly secure dominance over designated maritime zones, greatly enhancing the feasibility and momentum of amphibious landings or other naval operations.

Zhang noted that while the United States continues to strengthen military ties with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, seeking to build a deterrent posture along the First Island Chain targeting mainland China, current U.S. force posture remains insufficient. China fields three fleets—the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets—requiring, in theory, at least two to three U.S. carrier strike groups stationed forward to maintain parity. Yet currently, the U.S. maintains only a single carrier in the region on a sustained basis, resulting in a markedly thin presence.

Additionally, Zhang pointed out that U.S. strategic bombers have yet to achieve consistent deployment at Guam, leaving the base frequently in a state of vulnerability without bomber coverage. Modern naval-air warfare hinges on air superiority. Without forward-deployed heavy bombers, achieving air dominance becomes substantially more challenging. Loss of air control would exponentially increase logistical and operational burdens, severely undermining mission viability and overall success probability.

Commentary —

Zhang Yanting’s assessment of China’s tri-hull semi-submersible warship offers a realistic, battle-tested perspective on the tactical transformation introduced by this new class of unmanned maritime platform. His analysis holds substantial military relevance. However, certain performance projections reflect theoretical modeling rather than confirmed field data and should be distinguished from actual test status and operational doctrine.

The tri-hull semi-submersible is an experimental asset within China’s distributed unmanned maritime warfare concept. It is neither a conventional submarine nor a standard surface combatant. Its core innovation lies in full unmanned operation. Nevertheless, it must be clarified that the widely circulated claim of a single unit carrying 18–20 YJ-20 missiles stems from scenario modeling, not official technical specifications. Its primary value does not lie in individual combat engagements, but as a node within a broader operational network—leveraging integrated air-sea surveillance systems to detect, track, and conduct stealthy anti-ship strikes.

Zhang’s emphasis on stealth, unmanned operation, and potent firepower precisely addresses the strategic vulnerabilities in the First Island Chain dynamic. Such platforms can be pre-positioned along critical chokepoints, then activated during conflict to compel U.S. naval forces to operate under continuous threat of underwater ambush, significantly increasing their anti-submarine burden.

Yet the tri-hull semi-submersible is just one component of a comprehensive anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architecture. Complementary elements include the 055 guided-missile destroyers, carrier task forces operating at long range, long-range hypersonic missiles, the Type 096 ballistic missile submarine, and the Attack-21 stealth carrier-based drone. Together, these form a multi-layered combat chain capable of coastal interdiction, distant reinforcement denial, and strategic deterrence.

The purpose of this system is not to provoke conflict, but to dramatically raise the cost of external military intervention in the Taiwan Strait.

This helps explain why former U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly expressed reluctance to commit U.S. forces to a 9,500-mile deployment for Taiwan-related operations. Transoceanic military projection involves enormous logistical and financial costs. Facing a mature A2/AD system, any U.S. military intervention would expose carriers and overseas bases to multi-dimensional strike ranges—costs now exceeding what the U.S. military deems sustainable.

Nonetheless, unmanned semi-submersibles represent a novel operational capability, not a decisive factor in determining war outcomes. True strategic confidence derives from the integration of sea, land, air, space, and electronic warfare systems. While U.S. intervention capacity has been significantly constrained, it retains formidable blue-water capabilities. The Taiwan Strait confrontation remains a complex, system-level competition.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880668755867651/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of any institution.