On the evening of October 10, North Korea held a grand military parade in Pyongyang's Kim Il-sung Square to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea.
At the parade, North Korea showcased the new "Hwasong-20" intercontinental ballistic missile, drawing international attention to North Korea's military development. In addition, during the celebrations, Kim Jong-un met intensively with delegations from China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and other countries, demonstrating North Korea's active diplomatic activities.
Currently, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is at a sensitive stage. The new South Korean government has expressed a willingness to restart dialogue with North Korea, while still continuing joint military exercises with the United States. In this context, what signal is North Korea trying to convey through this parade? Is the Sino-North Korean relationship entering a new phase? How will the situation on the Korean Peninsula evolve?
For this, Observers Network connected with Zhan Debin, Director of the Center for the Korean Peninsula Studies at Shanghai University of Foreign Economics and Trade, for an in-depth interpretation.
【Interview/Observer Network, Zheng Lehuan】
Observer Network: This year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea. Kim Jong-un pointed out that "there is no country in the world that faces continuous external pressure like North Korea, and under the increasingly intensified threats of interference and aggression, it simultaneously bears the dual tasks of national defense and construction." Despite long-term isolation by the West, North Korea has shown a willingness to break out of the Western encirclement and explore its own path of independent development through its own development and actions such as sending troops to assist Russia. How do you view North Korea's current foreign policy strategy?
Zhan Debin: In fact, North Korea has demonstrated a rather mature foreign policy since its establishment. During the Cold War, North Korea's foreign activities were very smooth, especially between major powers. Even today, under Kim Jong-un's rule, we can still see this diplomatic wisdom in North Korea, or rather, the overall logic of North Korea's current foreign policy has not undergone a fundamental change.
If there are differences, they mainly stem from different eras. Today, North Korea has enhanced its national strength, especially its military power, due to its nuclear capability, and continues to strive to strengthen its national defense. However, the international pressure facing North Korea under Kim Jong-un's rule may be more severe than in the era of Kim Il-sung.
On October 9, a celebration marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea was held at the Ryugyong Hotel in Pyongyang. Visual China
Under the continuous pressure of unilateral sanctions from the United Nations and Western countries such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea, North Korea naturally needs to seek breakthroughs. Therefore, in recent years, North Korea has actively engaged in diplomacy with the United States, then had positive contact with Russia, and currently has been promoting high-level exchanges with China - these are all part of North Korea's diplomatic strategies to cope with new difficulties.
Therefore, overall, North Korea's diplomatic methodology has not undergone a major change, but rather, it is a subtle adjustment in different international environments.
Observer Network: On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Jong-un invited leaders of China, Russia, Vietnam, and Laos to visit North Korea. Combining the diplomatic activities in China in September and the home diplomacy in North Korea in October, North Korea has demonstrated its emphasis on regional diplomacy and multilateral relations through two large-scale multilateral diplomatic events, not only focusing on China and Russia, but also actively expanding relations with Southeast Asian countries. What changes do you think North Korea is undergoing based on these diplomatic moves?
Zhan Debin: Rather than a new change, it is more of an upgrade. In fact, in the past year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, Kim Song-gon, has visited Vietnam, Laos, and China successively, indicating that North Korea has already begun to promote the expansion of its foreign relations - or rather, to restore and strengthen traditional friendly relations. Because some socialist countries in Southeast Asia have always maintained good relations with North Korea, and since last year, North Korea has clearly shown a willingness to strengthen relations with these countries.
Last year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea went on a visit, and now the General Secretaries of Vietnam and Laos have visited North Korea, which may indicate that North Korea has already had a relatively systematic foreign policy plan. From the results, leaders of Laos, Vietnam, China, and even Russia have sent senior officials to visit North Korea, which in a way shows that North Korea's diplomatic influence has increased.
Compared to ten years ago, North Korea's diplomatic landscape has indeed expanded, which reflects the enhancement of North Korea's national confidence, especially Kim Jong-un's experience in multiple inter-Korean summits, meetings with leaders of Singapore, Vietnam, Mongolia, and repeated meetings with Chinese leaders - these experiences have enhanced his personal and national confidence, and this confidence is specifically reflected in the fact that leaders of many countries stood beside Kim Jong-un during this parade. For North Korea, this is a display of national strength and the leader's prestige.
Observer Network: What do you think are the reasons behind this change, or "upgrade"?
Zhan Debin: I think this reflects the high consistency of North Korea's foreign policy. We can briefly look back, in the past, during the negotiations on the U.S.-North Korea relationship and the nuclear issue, although the negotiations eventually failed, North Korea has always been executed by the same group of people following the same long-term strategy; while the United States has continuously adjusted its policies due to government changes, resulting in insufficient continuity. Therefore, from this perspective, many of North Korea's diplomatic measures are likely part of its overall strategic plan.
Secondly, looking back at the Central Committee meetings held by North Korea, it is clear that North Korea has consistently viewed the current world as a "new Cold War" framework, emphasizing the confrontation between two camps. In other words, North Korea is currently conducting diplomacy within the framework of the "two camps". Therefore, strengthening the unity within the "anti-American camp" it recognizes has become the top priority of its diplomacy.
Conversely, improving relations with the United States, Japan, and South Korea has been placed in a secondary position. North Korea has shown such a diplomatic tone: it is good if relations can be improved, but it is not forced - this shift has become very obvious, because it is not that North Korea does not want to improve relations with the United States, but after three U.S.-North Korea summits, it has recognized the nature of the United States; after dealing with the Moon Jae-in government, it has recognized the essence of South Korea being unable to act independently and having limited capabilities.
Observer Network: On September 3 this year, Kim Jong-un of the Workers' Party of Korea traveled to China to attend the commemorative activities for the 80th anniversary of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. It was his first appearance on the multilateral diplomatic stage. Subsequently, on October, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping, sent a message to Kim Jong-un to congratulate him on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea; Premier Li Qiang also led a delegation to visit North Korea and attend related celebrations, which was the first official visit to North Korea by a Chinese Premier in 16 years. Within a month, both sides used two major commemorative events as an opportunity to realize high-level interactions and deepen strategic communication. How do you view the current development trend of Sino-North Korean relations?
Zhan Debin: First of all, Sino-North Korean relations are a special relationship, and it seems to be the only bilateral relationship called "traditional friendly cooperation" in China. Although Sino-North Korean relations have experienced ups and downs, they often return to a good state, or even achieve new improvements. From a series of recent interactions, it can be said at least that the two sides' relations are entering a new stage.
The reason why Sino-North Korean relations can continue to develop is primarily due to geopolitical factors, which are obviously very important. Both sides have mutual strategic needs, which is evident. Secondly, from a political perspective, in the context of the increasingly intense Sino-U.S. strategic competition, North Korea has shown a willingness to actively support China's overall foreign policy. As Kim Jong-un stated during his visit to China, regardless of how the international situation changes, North Korea will firmly support China.
Another point that cannot be ignored is that Sino-North Korean relations are called "traditional friendly relations," which contains the political legacy left by the older generation of leaders, and both countries belong to the Confucian cultural circle, attaching great importance to tradition. Leaders of both countries have repeatedly emphasized that Sino-North Korean relations were created by the older generation of leaders and should be inherited and developed well. This historical and emotional bond becomes an intangible force in maintaining bilateral relations.
Therefore, Sino-North Korean relations can be compared to a "brother relationship": even if there are differences or contradictions at certain times, based on common blood ties and historical connections, they can ultimately reach a reconciliation. It is precisely the deep traditional ties between China and North Korea that enable Sino-North Korean relations to transcend general bilateral relations and continue to move forward.
Observer Network: On the evening of October 10, North Korea displayed a variety of new weapons at the party's 80th anniversary parade, including the new intercontinental ballistic missile "Hwasong-20" capable of directly striking the U.S. mainland, as well as hypersonic weapons believed to be able to break through missile defense systems. Which weapons displayed in this parade impressed you the most? What significance does this parade have for North Korea under the current circumstances? What signals is it sending to the outside world?
Zhan Debin: Among the weapons displayed this time, the most attention-grabbing one is the "Hwasong-20" intercontinental ballistic missile. Other weapons such as hypersonic weapons have already been displayed before, while the "Hwasong-20" was indirectly disclosed when Kim Jong-un inspected a military factory before his visit to China, but has not yet conducted a test, adopting a "display first, then test" model.
Regarding the performance of this weapon, it is currently unclear. North Korea's previous tested models, such as the "Hwasong-17" and "Hwasong-19", have a range that can reach the U.S. mainland. Therefore, the performance improvement of the "Hwasong-20" may lie in engine technology - for example, whether it uses a solid-fuel engine, or whether it has greater thrust, thus enabling it to carry heavier warheads, and possibly even achieving multi-warhead distribution. However, these are currently unverified by public information.
North Korea Central News Agency photo
It is worth noting that there are still differences in the international community's evaluation of North Korea's weapon performance. For example, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol once said in the United States that North Korea's missiles may lack re-entry technology, i.e., they may not be able to withstand high temperatures during re-entry; however, the South Korean Unification Minister has also stated that North Korea has become one of the three countries capable of striking the U.S. mainland - this inconsistency in evaluations reflects the uncertainty brought about by the lack of practical testing and large-angle launch tests for North Korea's weapons.
Despite this, from the perspective of national deterrence, the United States cannot blindly assume that North Korea lacks the corresponding capabilities, but must assume that it has such strike means. Therefore, North Korea's display of new weapons is undoubtedly sending a strong signal to the United States and its allies Japan and South Korea: North Korea not only has defensive capabilities, but also has the ability to directly strike the U.S. mainland, warning them not to act recklessly.
Secondly, North Korea is also using this opportunity to demonstrate its equipment to friendly countries and potential weapon buyers. If possible, military sales would be a more ideal outcome for North Korea. Therefore, this display has multiple diplomatic and strategic purposes.
North Korea Central News Agency photo
Finally, for North Korea domestically, on this important historical node of the 80th anniversary of the party's founding, displaying powerful weapons aims to inspire national pride and convey the message that "North Korea's national strength is no longer what it used to be" - this is the key internal signal that this parade aims to convey.
Observer Network: At present, can it be said that the frameworks for responding to the North Korean nuclear issue among various countries are inconsistent, or difficult to form a relatively unified opinion?
Zhan Debin: Indeed, this is the case. The years of denuclearization process have proven one thing: if the U.S. and North Korea cannot reach an agreement, other countries will find it difficult to play a fundamental role. The essence of the problem lies in: North Korea believes that it must eliminate the threat sources that cause North Korea to develop nuclear weapons, and North Korea has always attributed the fundamental reason for developing nuclear weapons to the threat posed by the United States. This is clearly seen by neighboring countries. So if there is any consensus on the North Korean nuclear issue, then "the United States is the decisive factor" is undoubtedly one of the important consensuses.
Observer Network: South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol proposed the "END Initiative" for the Korean Peninsula peace process during the general debate at the United Nations General Assembly, which centers on "exchange - normalization of relations - denuclearization." What kind of perception of the current inter-Korean relations does this initiative reflect from the Yoon administration? In the context of North Korea's "two countries theory" and the South Korean pursuit of "normalization of relations," what is the main obstacle between the two sides?
Zhan Debin: Previously, Yoon Suk-yeol explicitly defined North Korea as an "enemy state" and implemented a series of tough policies based on this. Therefore, compared to the Yoon administration, the Yoon initiative essentially overturned the previous tone; but compared to the Moon Jae-in administration, its core content of the North Korea policy has not changed much.
The "exchange" in the "END Initiative" had already been actively promoted by the Moon Jae-in administration, and there were specific achievements; "normalization of relations" was also the direction of the Moon Jae-in administration's efforts, such as pushing forward through the Panmunjom Declaration and visiting North Korea; "denuclearization" was also the established goal of the Moon Jae-in administration, and the administration also pushed for the idea of a "final peace declaration."
Therefore, compared to the Moon Jae-in period, the "END Initiative" of Yoon has limited innovation in substantive content, more of a combination and reiteration of these three keywords.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol delivered a keynote speech at the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, where he first proposed the "END Initiative" for the Korean Peninsula's peace and prosperity, which includes the concepts of exchange (Exchange), normalization of relations (Normalization), and denuclearization (Denuclearization). Yonhap News
"Normalization of relations" itself is a concept that is difficult to define clearly. What exactly constitutes normalization of relations? If we refer to the process of restoring relations between the U.S. and China since 1972, normalization of relations is a gradually progressing process, making it difficult to make simple quantitative comparisons.
North Korea has now defined South Korea as an "enemy state in armed conflict." From this position, South Korea naturally believes that the current relations are in an abnormal state and therefore proposes to achieve "normalization of relations." Its goal is probably to allow both sides to coexist peacefully. In fact, there have been discussions in South Korea recently, including within the ruling party, that the relationship between North and South Korea is "a de facto state-to-state relationship," and both sides should move towards peaceful coexistence - this may be the direction of what South Korea refers to as "normalization of relations."
However, this has not yet become a consensus in South Korean society. Conservative forces and previous conservative governments consider this a significant regression, which also includes political considerations. Currently, we are not clear about the phased goals and ultimate goals of the South Korean government on "normalization of relations," and the South Korean government has not made this clear.
No matter how the South Korean side expresses it, its policy advancement is still constrained by the domestic constitutional and legal framework. The South Korean Constitution clearly stipulates that the president has the duty to promote national unification, and unification should be achieved under the "free democratic system." In addition, laws such as the National Security Act also set restrictions on South-North exchanges. If these superstructures are not adjusted, it will face fundamental obstacles in promoting the normalization of inter-Korean relations. Moreover, North Korea has basically lost trust in South Korea, so it can be said that achieving normalization of relations between the two sides will still be a long and difficult road.
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