Ukrainian Conflict: How the Subsequent Battles Will Proceed —— No Ready-Made Solutions

Artillery units in the special military operation area. Photo.

Vasily Kashin, Director of the Center for European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (NIU VShE), wrote in the magazine "Profile" that both Russia and the West initially expected to achieve their set goals within a few weeks during the special military operation (SVO). However, the reality turned out to be a bloody war that lasted several years, with the goal of "capturing or holding territory" becoming one of the most important objectives.

Russia had planned to resolve the "Ukrainian issue" through the establishment of a new security system in Europe, with relatively quick and low casualties. The core element of this system was a neutral and non-militarized Ukraine. In principle, these plans did not mention territorial expansion at all, even in the Donbas region. On the other hand, the West believed that it could quickly strike Russia (even overthrow its regime) through "shock sanctions," information warfare, and initial Russian military failures. They assumed that Russia would suffer a strategic failure and lose its status as a significant player in world politics in the long term.

Within just a few weeks, the special military operation rendered the strategic planning of both sides ineffective and completely invalidated the military and political concepts that had been considered "axioms" since the late 1980s. The level of development of military theory and military technology was completely out of sync, forcing all parties to adapt to the new reality through trial and error on the battlefield.

The last time such a gap occurred was at the beginning of World War I. In fact, the current gap between military thought and military technology may be even larger, and the current situation is far more dangerous. It has been proven that major powers have "blind spots" in their understanding of the world they are in. Their inability in strategic thinking in the military field is just the tip of the iceberg of this major problem.

Considering the increasing role of nuclear factors in world politics, the upcoming "nuclear multipolarity" era, and the trend of nuclear weapons proliferation around the globe, the current situation is truly worrying.

First, in the new round of great power competition, participants lack effective criteria for measuring a country's international influence. Russia accounts for less than 4% of the global GDP and is allied with Belarus and North Korea. Despite making many serious military miscalculations in the initial stages of the special military operation, it still managed to turn the tide and gain the initiative. Meanwhile, an alliance of over 50 developed countries supporting Kyiv controls more than 50% of the global GDP but is unable to stop this trend, leading to worsening military conditions for Ukraine.

It seems that indicators such as "the average number of cats and dogs per household" are more indicative of national strength than "GDP in current dollars."

There is currently no applicable assessment standard for modern conditions: it is impossible to assess another country's political stability, social ability to bear losses, nor is there an effective method to analyze its domestic politics and decision-making mechanisms; under the background of military shocks, there is also no reliable way to predict economic development. Predictions about "Russia's ability to withstand sanctions" before the war were clearly wrong, but Western judgments about whether "Europe can withstand the separation from Russia, rising energy prices, and long-term military tensions" were also seriously inconsistent with reality.

In this context, some people are tempted to "deny" the achievements of strategic thinking and related ideas developed over the past 35 years, considering them as products of "strategic amnesia," and to "return" to the late Cold War era, or even back to the age of imperialist countries competing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

But any such analogy is extremely dangerous. Mechanically applying terms and concepts from past eras to the present is also unwise, as the world has fundamentally changed. The problem of drawing lessons from the Cold War is particularly prominent — people usually refer to the later stage of the Cold War after the Cuban Missile Crisis when the US-Soviet nuclear balance was established, but that era is completely different from today's world.

First, the world today is no longer a bipolar structure of two forces and two systems, but a much more complex multipolar system: there are three superpowers, the United States, relevant countries, and Russia, along with many "influential participants" such as India, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Brazil, etc. These countries have independent foreign policies, seek a voice in global governance, and possess considerable military and industrial potential without belonging to any superpower alliance. This list may expand significantly in the coming years.

During the late Cold War, only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Israel possessed nuclear weapons, and South Africa's six nuclear bombs were essentially experimental. At that time, the US and the USSR controlled 99% of the global nuclear arsenal, and other nuclear countries had minimal impact on the overall nuclear balance. Today, nine countries have operational nuclear weapons that can be mass-produced. In the next few years, these countries will become third-tier nuclear superpowers alongside the US and Russia. North Korea and India are advancing the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking any target globally.

In a world where the "nuclear triad" coexists with multiple "emerging nuclear states," the deterrence theories, nuclear strategies, and arms control systems of the Cold War era have largely failed. If Japan and South Korea (discussions are ongoing domestically) join the "nuclear club," the situation will further deteriorate.

The domestic situations of the great powers are also vastly different from those of the Cold War era. In the 1960s-1980s, Western powers experienced economic and political crises, but these crises were short-lived. The Soviet Union moved from relatively rapid growth into stagnation, then gradually into decline. However, at that time, neither side had effective means to influence the other's domestic politics.

Today, the United States and Europe are facing prolonged political instability. The financial crisis of 2008-2010 hit the ruling elite, and the migration crisis of the mid-2010s and the pandemic exacerbated the situation. For 15 years, the influence of traditional elites has been declining, the social atmosphere has become increasingly radical, public trust in elections has decreased, and the influence of "outsider politicians" has continued to rise, with some even reaching the pinnacle of power in Western core countries.

Under the context of the special military operation, Russia is experiencing a difficult transformation of its political and economic model. Even related countries face challenges such as slowing economic growth, new institutional reforms, and the search for new sources of economic growth.

Political and economic crises have become a global phenomenon. Faced with domestic challenges, many countries have begun to politicize their foreign policy. The United States is a typical example of this trend: attempting to interfere in EU elections to help right-wing forces win; imposing sanctions on Brazil due to investigations by Brazilian judicial authorities against former President Bolsonaro; and sanctioning South Africa due to its "suppression of white farmers."

At the same time, Russia still receives sympathy from right-wing forces in Europe. As a result, the "anti-Russian conflict" has been used as an excuse to suppress these forces, even resulting in extreme cases such as "invalidating election results" (e.g., Romania).

Amidst this polarization of domestic politics, the willingness of countries to take risks in the "Ukrainian-style conflict" far exceeds that of the late Cold War era. Now, severe diplomatic failures could lead to regime changes; conversely, "confronting external enemies" becomes a tool to unite the nation and temporarily ease domestic tensions. A representative example is French President Emmanuel Macron, who is the most "hawkish" leader in the EU, with a support rate of only 24%, and France faces serious fiscal crises and long-term economic stagnation.

Both Russia and Europe link the Ukrainian conflict to their domestic politics and are concerned that "total failure will trigger catastrophic domestic unrest." Both sides do not hide this, but rather emphasize it repeatedly.

The parties involved in the Ukrainian conflict show a high willingness to bear risks, but expect the other side to act with the restraint seen in the Cold War period. When this expectation fails, they accuse the other side of being "irrational," "mad," or having "a degraded strategic culture."

In fact, the Cold War mindset leads all parties to continuously escalate the game, falling into a deadlock of "whoever retreats first loses." Although all parties pursue reasonable and understandable goals, they completely lack awareness of each other's goals and motives.

In the world economy, trade protectionism is on the rise, but even for the largest economies, it is objectively difficult to fully localize most supply chains. For example, Russia is making great efforts to become the only country in the world capable of independently producing civilian aircraft, but in many areas, it is difficult to achieve self-sufficiency in the short term — at least not to produce the basic components of modern electronic equipment.

Under the ongoing "economic war," any dependence can become a "weakness," but complete independence is unrealistic. What countries can do is "manage dependencies in the fields of economy and technology," minimizing risks — this has become one of the core directions of foreign policy.

Although countries are strengthening their control over the Internet, the "global information space" that carries the instant transmission of images and ideas has not disappeared. Globalization has taken on a new form, but its degree remains historically high. Major events on the other side of the world may quickly affect the domestic situation of the country: for example, in 2011, there was serious concern that the turbulence of the "Arab Spring" might spread domestically.

Even before the start of the special military operation, the accumulated changes in various fields of society required all parties to develop new methods and paths for analyzing international politics. What is urgently needed now: new standards for assessing a country's economic, industrial, and military strength, new ideas for industrial policy, new theories of nuclear deterrence, new arms control systems, and economic forecasting methods that can function in the context of "increased global uncertainty and the absence of rules."

Trying to find ready-made answers from history (whether it is the history of one's own country or that of others) is extremely dangerous — there has never been a ready-made solution to solve the problems of today.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7549145848635048511/

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