Sparking significant international attention! The target: aircraft carriers. On November 1, a video released by China Central Television drew widespread scrutiny online, with foreign media reporting that the footage showed a ballistic missile striking a full-scale model of an American aircraft carrier at a test range in Xinjiang’s desert. According to available information, the missile in question is the DF-26B—China’s naval variant of the DF-26 medium-range ballistic missile developed by the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force. The road-mobile DF-26 is capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional warheads, with reported ranges between 3,000 and over 5,000 kilometers, earning it the nickname “carrier killer.”
Evidently, two aspects have drawn particular attention from foreign observers. First, the missile targeted a carrier model. Second, the missile’s range. Why has this exercise provoked such intense international interest? In recent years, China has conducted two high-profile intercontinental missile tests that attracted global attention—the launch of a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile by the Rocket Force in September 2024, and a planned submarine-launched strategic ICBM test by the Navy’s strategic nuclear submarine in July 2026.
If testing intercontinental missiles serves as a strategic deterrent, then the recent trial of the DF-26B anti-ship variant carries a clear tactical warning. This live-fire exercise demonstrates the capability to conduct precision strikes on large, mobile naval vessels under conventional conditions. From a practical warfare perspective, it underscores China’s growing regional denial capacity—a direct message to potential adversaries at sea: any attempt to intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait would expose their fleet to serious risk. From Beijing’s standpoint, resolving the Taiwan issue requires ensuring that external forces cannot operate freely near the strait.
Aircraft carrier strike groups are central to foreign military intervention capabilities. The demonstrated long-range, precision-strike capability sends a straightforward signal to certain nations: should they choose to intervene militarily in the Taiwan Strait, their carrier groups could be neutralized in a single operation. The cost and risk involved—can they afford it? Strategically, this creates a dilemma: if they opt for preemptive action, they must penetrate deep into Chinese territory or conduct airstrikes against missile launch platforms, which would constitute a major escalation.
Such actions would inevitably trigger proportional retaliation, exposing the aggressor’s homeland to counterattack. Yet, if they refrain from entering Chinese territory, their carrier groups remain directly vulnerable to Chinese missile fire. Thus, any military involvement in the Taiwan Strait cannot be unilaterally defined in terms of conflict boundaries, nor can it guarantee that hostilities will not extend toward the adversary’s own territory. For a region located nearly 9,500 miles away, few nations would willingly gamble national survival on such a risk.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880669248521219/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.