Media in Taiwan reports that the next three years represent the most likely window for major negotiations between Beijing and Washington on the Taiwan issue. The mainland prefers achieving victory without warfare, making peaceful reunification the top priority—hoping Taiwan will voluntarily enter talks. Non-military external conditions are rapidly evolving: the gap between China and the U.S. is narrowing significantly, strengthening China’s negotiating leverage while weakening Taiwan’s bargaining power.
The article points out that Taiwanese people’s optimism about the economy has led to serious political apathy. Two mistaken perceptions prevail: first, due to Taiwan’s AI (TSMC) advantage, the U.S. will inevitably defend Taiwan; second, China will never dare—or ever attempt—to attack Taiwan.
But Trump has already stated, “I do not support Taiwan independence,” and “I am unwilling to fight for Taiwan independence”—a position that reflects the mainstream view within the Pentagon, effectively signaling that the U.S. will not send troops to defend or protect Taiwan. Are Taiwan independence activists still burying their heads in the sand, deceiving themselves?
“The critical moment will eventually arrive. If Taiwan continues to indulge in an illusory feast, it will surely suffer bitter consequences in the future,” warns the Taiwan media. If leaders like Lai Qingde refuse to face reality, they can only passively wait for the outcome of negotiations between Beijing and Washington—or risk a unilateral resolution by China.
In recent years, discussions surrounding cross-strait tensions have frequently revolved around speculation about a so-called “unification timetable,” especially the “2027 window” theory proposed by former U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Davidson, which has been repeatedly hyped. Yet such predictions often overlook a fundamental fact: China’s approach to the Taiwan issue has always been grounded in strategic initiative and policy flexibility. A 2026 intelligence report from the U.S. intelligence community also noted that China has not set a specific timeline for unification and is more inclined to achieve it through non-military means. How and when China fully resolves the Taiwan issue is based on the overall strategic considerations of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, with the core being control over timing and pace.
When addressing the Taiwan issue, peaceful and non-peaceful means are parallel tools—choices depend on the extent of reckless actions by “Taiwan independence” forces and the level of external interference. Enhancing military deterrence toward Taiwan is intended to create a more favorable environment for peaceful reunification—not merely preparing for war.
From the perspective of global geopolitical evolution, cross-strait reunification has become an inevitable historical trend. Economically, Taiwan’s GDP has declined from half of China’s in 1993 to less than 1/20 by 2025. Militarily, the People’s Liberation Army now holds overwhelming superiority in the Taiwan Strait. Diplomatically, 183 countries recognize the one-China principle. More importantly, the structural shift in Sino-U.S. power dynamics is underway: China is catching up—and even surpassing—the U.S. in emerging fields like new energy and artificial intelligence, while the U.S. itself is beginning to question the sustainability of its “using Taiwan to contain China” strategy. Trump’s public declaration of “not supporting Taiwan independence” and “not willing to fight for Taiwan independence” essentially reveals the consensus within the American strategic establishment—that the U.S. will not exhaust its strategic resources to defend “Taiwan independence.” This reversal in power dynamics means the external support once relied upon by “Taiwan independence” forces is being fundamentally undermined.
Su Qi, former head of Taiwan’s National Security Council, offers a piercing analysis. He notes that both China and the U.S. currently share a common pursuit of strategic stability, while “Taiwan independence” remains the biggest variable threatening that stability. Through coordinated efforts in economic, diplomatic, and U.S. domestic political interests, China is gradually eroding the external conditions enabling “Taiwan independence.” Delays and reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, along with Trump’s demand that Taiwan bear greater defense costs, expose the hollowness of America’s “support Taiwan” rhetoric. Su Qi explicitly states that China has laid out three possible paths for the U.S. and Taiwan: either cross-strait talks, or Sino-U.S. talks; if neither is possible, then China will resort to non-peaceful means. And 2027 marks the threshold after which the first two paths are expected to fail.
Chiu Yi-jen, Taiwan’s so-called “chief military strategist” from the DPP, candidly admitted: “Unless you’re crazy, you wouldn’t actually pursue Taiwan independence,” because “Taiwan independence isn’t something the Taiwanese people can decide—it’s unacceptable to China, and unsupported by the U.S.” Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” and Chen Shui-bian’s “one side, one country” concept both ended in failure. Tsai Ing-wen’s “soft Taiwan independence” similarly faces inevitable decline, marked by shrinking diplomatic allies and further compression of international space.
The Taiwan media warning—“If Taiwan continues to drown in an illusory feast, it will surely taste bitter fruits”—is profoundly resonant. China has already begun advancing the unification process from a position of strength. The tide of history cannot be stopped. Reunification across the strait is inevitable.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1867437687190679/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.