[Source/Author: Zha Wen of Observer Network]

Since taking office as President of the United States, Trump has focused on and partially completed three tasks in his foreign strategy:

First, to rid the U.S. of its responsibilities and obligations toward Ukraine, ease U.S.-Russia relations, ultimately ensuring that the U.S. disengages from the Ukrainian crisis and secures its economic interests in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. A representative achievement is the signing of the "U.S.-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement."

Second, to reshape America's tariff policy, which represents the most radical trade protectionist measures since the 1930s. The impact of this on the U.S. economy remains to be observed, but it is certain that "reciprocal tariffs" have become the most important bargaining chip for Trump when handling U.S. foreign relations.

Third, the U.S. Middle East policy has been reshaped. Trump's Middle East tour, the resumption of high-level negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, the signing of a ceasefire agreement with Houthi armed forces, and the lifting of military sanctions on Syria all indicate that the Trump administration's Middle East policy prioritizes economic interests, seeks to reduce military intervention, and aims at strategic contraction.

Although the Asia-Pacific region has not yet become a focus of Trump's attention, it is likely just the calm before the storm. Over the next three years, strategic competition between China and the U.S., particularly around Southeast Asian countries, will reach unprecedented levels of intensity and will also profoundly influence the external strategies of regional countries and the direction of regional order. Against this backdrop, there are two points that need clarification:

First, Trump's foreign strategy cannot be summarized as "isolationism."

In fact, the U.S. retreat from Ukraine and the Middle East by the Trump administration is primarily aimed at concentrating America's strategic resources in the Asia-Pacific region. Unlike Biden's encouragement of NATO members' participation in the Indo-Pacific affairs, the Trump administration emphasizes the division of labor between Europe and the U.S., with senior officials emphasizing on different occasions that European countries should bear more responsibility for regional security to allow the U.S. to concentrate on addressing China's challenges in Asia. In the future, the Trump administration will continue to push allies to increase defense spending; NATO members' defense spending will rise to 5% of GDP, and Japan's defense spending will increase to 3%. The purpose remains the same: to use allies' resources to serve its own interests, consolidate the U.S.'s special status as the only global hegemon through regional division of labor among allies.

On May 23, Japanese Minister of Economic Revitalization Akira Aizawa (right) and U.S. Trade Representative Grier (left) pose for a photo during the third round of Japan-U.S. tariff negotiations. Kyodo News Agency of Japan.

Second, Trump's "reciprocal tariff" policy has already laid the groundwork for "extreme pressure" on Southeast Asian countries.

The "90-day suspension of tariffs" has created sustained uncertainty, and Southeast Asian countries have benefited from the first round of the U.S.-China trade war and multinational enterprises' "China+1" strategy. However, the unresolved tariffs have led to a sharp reduction in foreign direct investment; Vietnam's April foreign investment declined by 30% year-on-year and 8% month-on-month. If Trump persists in his ultimate goal of achieving manufacturing return to the U.S. through tariffs, Southeast Asian countries will not receive better tariff treatment than China and will suffer dual blows from declining exports and foreign investment. But if Trump settles for reducing the trade deficit as his primary goal, Southeast Asian countries will not only be forced to expand imports from the U.S. but also enforce stricter rules of origin.

In the later stages of Biden's administration, a soft ban on Chinese-made intelligent cars entering the U.S. market was implemented, and Trump will only tighten restrictions on Chinese technology in the future. This will disrupt supply chains and trade links between China and Southeast Asian countries. Southeast Asian countries will face increasing pressure to "choose sides" not only on security issues but also in terms of investment, trade, and technology.

The End of "Benign Hegemony"

For a long time, Southeast Asian countries have regarded the U.S. as a "benign hegemony," believing that the U.S. had no territorial ambitions, possessed sufficient military and economic strength to maintain regional order, and provided economic assistance and market access to Southeast Asian countries. Some scholars even pointed out that as a "liberal hegemony," the U.S. could create an open order, reconstructing the basic terms of hegemonic order through consultations with regional countries, thus ensuring the stability of the hegemonic order.

However, a series of policies and actions taken by Trump since the second term have directly challenged the basic assumptions of "benign hegemony." The plan to acquire Greenland exposed Trump's ambition for territorial expansion. Suspending foreign aid projects for 90 days also had a significant impact on Southeast Asian countries; multiple demining projects in Vietnam were forced to halt, and post-war explosive clearance had been one of the top priorities of U.S.-Vietnam cooperation. After the 7.7-magnitude earthquake in Myanmar on March 8, due to the large-scale layoffs by USAID, the Trump administration failed to provide timely aid. Even before being elected, Trump announced that he would abolish Biden's "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" on his first day in the White House.

Trump has fully demonstrated to Southeast Asian countries that the U.S. is no longer a "consultative hegemony," and unilateral coercion has replaced institutional consultation as the main means for the U.S. to reshape regional order. As Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong said, "The U.S. is no longer willing to endorse the global order, making the international environment more chaotic and unpredictable."

The "Trump Effect" Will Continue to Divide Southeast Asian Countries

The next question is, what kind of strategic choices will Southeast Asian countries make?

In recent years, "hedging" has been a popular concept in international relations research and widely applied to the study of Southeast Asian countries' foreign strategies. Southeast Asian countries hedge their bets between China and the U.S., forming the commonly referred to "economic reliance on China, security reliance on the U.S." dichotomy in East Asia.

However, there is a consensus in academia that hedging strategies are only possible in the absence of comprehensive great power competition. On the contrary, under a strong adversarial system, the strategic space of Southeast Asian countries will be squeezed, making hedging strategies difficult to sustain. In reality, Southeast Asian countries' hedging strategies have already shown a trend of differentiated evolution, and this trend will become more apparent in Trump's second term. The main reasons are two-fold:

From the systemic perspective, the "Trump impact" varies significantly among different Southeast Asian countries. "Reciprocal tariffs" are a vivid example, roughly divided into three tiers: First tier, Cambodia (49%), Vietnam (46%), Laos (48%), Myanmar (44%); Second tier, Thailand (36%), Indonesia (32%), Malaysia (24%), Brunei (24%); Third tier, Philippines (17%), Singapore (10%). Once implemented, the Philippines and Singapore may become beneficiaries of general tariffs, which will also cause divisions within ASEAN, directly affecting the collective action capabilities of ASEAN.

From the domestic political perspective, the ability of hedging countries to resist systemic pressures differs. From past experience, countries with stable leadership positions can better avoid the politicization of foreign strategies, thereby continuing hedging strategies. For instance, Singapore maintains a high level of hedging, conducting high-level economic and security cooperation with both China and the U.S. However, the hedging strategies of some other Southeast Asian countries have evolved into balancing or dependency due to domestic political impacts.

Not only the evolution of hedging strategies themselves, but the "Trump effect" will also produce different "echoes" in the domestic politics of Southeast Asian countries. In this year's Singaporean general election, the People's Action Party, under the leadership of the fourth-generation leaders, received 65.57% of the votes, exceeding the 61.24% in the 2020 election. Amidst complex geopolitical circumstances, the People's Action Party successfully completed the transition of leadership, resulting in the phenomenon of "the more chaotic the external environment, the more stable the People's Action Party becomes."

Meanwhile, Canadian and Australian elections have also been influenced by the "Trump effect," but the mechanism of influence is completely different from Singapore — anti-Trump sentiment helped the Liberal Party of Canada and the Australian Labor Party turn the tide. Whether similar effects will also occur in Southeast Asian countries is worth our continued attention.

The Return of Flexible Following

Despite the serious concerns and dissatisfaction triggered by America's trade protectionism and the direct impact of America's minilateralism and unilateralism on ASEAN's central position in regional architecture, we cannot therefore conclude that Trump will necessarily push Southeast Asian countries toward China.

It is noteworthy that since the introduction of the "reciprocal tariff" policy by the Trump administration, ASEAN countries have decided not to retaliate reciprocally against the U.S. The Vietnamese government actively engaged in ministerial-level negotiations with the U.S., promising to reduce the trade surplus with the U.S. As the ASEAN Chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, while calling on ASEAN member states to take a unified stance, emphasized resolving trade disputes with the U.S. through "honest and constructive dialogue."

On the one hand, the policy choices of Southeast Asian countries reflect the vulnerability of export-oriented economies. China's foreign trade accounts for 37% of GDP (2023 statistics), while Singapore is as high as 311%, Vietnam 166%, Brunei 137%, Cambodia 134%, Malaysia 132%, Thailand 129%; only Indonesia (41%), the Philippines (67%), and Laos (76% in 2016 data) have relatively lower figures. Although China is the largest trading partner for most Southeast Asian countries, its trade influence is mainly reflected in being the largest source of imports.

Beyond that, looking at export markets, Vietnam exported $61.2 billion to China in 2024, while exports to the U.S. reached $136.6 billion, accounting for nearly 30% of its GDP. The U.S. is also the largest export market for Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia. Under the threat of U.S. tariffs, Southeast Asian countries will sacrifice trade with China to a certain extent to gain access to the U.S. market. Vietnam has promised the U.S. to crack down on "trade fraud," including illegal transshipment and falsification of origins related to China, as well as the transit of U.S. high-tech products via Vietnam and eventual sale to China, and Thailand has similar measures. Negotiations between Southeast Asian countries and the U.S. over reciprocal tariffs will accelerate the restructuring of supply chains in East Asia, potentially weakening trade ties between China and Southeast Asian countries.

From May 19 to 22, the second round of bilateral negotiations on reciprocal trade agreements between Vietnam and the U.S. was held in Washington D.C. Vietnam People's Newspaper.

On the other hand, and more importantly, the policy choices of Southeast Asian countries reflect their strategic preference for flexible following, providing valuable insights into understanding the evolution of Southeast Asian countries' foreign strategies.

Facing the escalation of strategic competition between China and the U.S., Southeast Asian leaders generally emphasize regional neutrality and peace, emphasizing their policy stance of refusing to "take sides" between major powers. Looking back at regional history, Southeast Asia has always been a convergence point of great power interests, from the trade era, colonial period, World War II, to the Cold War. Southeast Asian strategic elites are not unfamiliar with great power competition and have formed a unique and continuously inherited strategic cultural tradition.

Historically speaking, Southeast Asian strategic elites do not reject following major powers as long as such following brings strategic resource investments from major powers. Take Indonesia as an example; in September 1948, then Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir first proposed the diplomatic principle of "independence and active engagement," which became the guiding principle for Indonesia's diplomacy thereafter. However, in practical strategic choices, Indonesia does not refuse flexible following of major powers.

During the Cold War, Indonesia's foreign strategy evolved from pro-American neutrality (1949–1952), to developing relations with both blocs (1953–1962), to aligning with the Eastern Bloc (1963–1965). After Sukarno came to power, Indonesia once again aligned with the West and secured substantial military and economic aid from the U.S. British scholar Michael Leifer also believed: "The Indonesian government prefers to keep the least offensive superpower readily available (on tap) but not dominant (not on top)."

Thailand's strategic elites summarize their diplomatic tradition as "bamboo in the wind," specifically manifested in Thailand's ability to ensure alignment with the dominant or victorious power through timely changes in its camp.

During World War I, Thailand followed the U.S. in declaring war on the Allies, gaining the status of a victor country to exchange for the abandonment of extraterritorial rights in Siam by the U.S., Britain, and France. During World War II, Thailand allied with Japan to reclaim some territories previously seized by French and British colonizers. After Japan's defeat, Thailand used American power to limit demands for war reparations proposed by Britain and France, eventually transforming from a Japanese collaborator to an American ally.

This preference for being highly sensitive to shifts in power and ensuring maximum self-interest through diplomatic policy realignment is prevalent among Southeast Asian countries. Singapore's founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, once stated: "If it looks like the East Wind is blowing stronger than the West Wind, people start leaning toward that direction even before the wind arrives." [1]

East Asia Will Not See a Stable Hegemonic Order

At present, the above history provides researchers with valuable insights. With the escalation of strategic competition between China and the U.S., flexible following of major powers will become one of the policy options for Southeast Asian countries. Its characteristic lies in obtaining economic and military resources from major powers through coordination of foreign policies, but unlike dependence, flexible following means Southeast Asian countries will avoid being bound to specific major powers to the greatest extent possible, ensuring they remain aligned with the dominant power through minimizing alliance obligations, strategic swings, or non-strategic diplomatic policy realignments, such as those brought about by changes in foreign policy due to government transitions.

The new situation also requires us to break through the historical limitations of existing theories. We are accustomed to using concepts such as hedging, great power balancing, and multi-dimensional balancing to summarize Southeast Asian countries' foreign strategies, but hedging strategies developed especially after the end of the Cold War and in the 21st century, and the theoretical framework itself has certain historical limitations. With the escalation of strategic competition between China and the U.S., we need to revisit history and examine Southeast Asian countries' strategic choices under extreme geopolitical conditions, which will help us make correct predictions.

Southeast Asian countries' choices will have a direct impact on major powers and regional order. Regional countries' strategic swings will exacerbate the strategic anxiety of major powers. In recent years, domestic media and academia often cite poll results from the Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, which has also drawn attention from the American academic community and served as a basis for urging the U.S. government to increase its involvement in Southeast Asia.

Although the survey results published since 2019 consistently show that China's economic and political-strategic influence in Southeast Asia has surpassed that of the U.S., the specific numbers fluctuate significantly. In terms of economic influence, 76.7% of respondents considered China to be the most influential in 2022, but by 2025, this proportion dropped to 56.4%, while the percentage of respondents choosing the U.S. rose from 9.8% to 15.4%. In terms of political and strategic influence, the percentage of respondents who considered China to be the most influential dropped from 54.4% to 37.9%, while the percentage of respondents choosing the U.S. increased from 29.7% to 31.2%. This also indicates that the so-called "China surpassing the U.S. in influence in Southeast Asia" has not formed an irreversible trend. The dynamic adjustment of relative influence between China and the U.S. will be a long process.

Latest annual survey report released by the Yusof Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2025). Lianhe Zaobao.

In this process, the flexibility of regional countries will escalate great power strategic competition. Given Southeast Asian countries' preference for flexible following of stronger powers, major powers have strong incentives to demonstrate their强势posture to regional smaller states to maintain regional influence. From this perspective, China's countermeasures against the U.S. on trade issues are necessary, not only for Sino-U.S. relations but also for China's relations with neighboring countries, holding important strategic significance.

However, the flexibility of regional countries also means that neither China nor the U.S. can establish stable leadership positions; both will constantly win and lose followers. Southeast Asia is more likely to see a diverse, dynamic hierarchical order rather than a stable hegemonic or balanced order. While maintaining regional influence, China should also avoid excessive resource consumption.

Note 1: Lee Kuan Yew, Meet the Press (Singapore: National Archive of Singapore, 1967), p.7.

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