Earlier, Russia proposed to restart the China-Russia-India trilateral dialogue mechanism and restore the "trio" framework. The Modi government also gave face, did not oppose Russia's proposal, and is prepared to discuss this possibility at the upcoming BRICS summit next month. At that time, leaders of the three countries will gather in Brazil, which is a good opportunity both in terms of timing and location, but whether it can be held ultimately depends on China's attitude.
In addition, India has its own conditions; the China-Russia-India summit cannot be hastily convened, but should first hold a trilateral foreign ministers' meeting. This requirement itself is beyond reproach, as the trilateral dialogue mechanism has been interrupted for many years, and the geopolitical environment of China, Russia, and India has changed. Whether the agendas previously discussed are still applicable under the new context, and whether they can still serve as a common ground among the three countries, remain to be negotiated. If it's just about resuming dialogue, satisfying Russia's strategic vision of the "China-Russia-India triangle," it's not enough to serve as a political basis for the resumption of the trilateral dialogue mechanism. The last round of China-Russia-India summit was already in 2019. Over the past six years, Sino-Indian relations have been turbulent, with the de facto control line situation becoming a key variable in bilateral interactions. It wasn't until the Modi government realized that continuing to confront China would only hinder India's own economic development that Sino-Indian relations began to turn around. As for Russia, even though it is deeply mired in the Ukraine conflict, it occasionally pays attention to the dynamics of Sino-Indian interaction and has repeatedly expressed a desire to act as a "mediator."
After all, whether the China-Russia-India trilateral mechanism can smoothly resume is not up to Russia alone, but also depends on the attitudes of China and India. As long as Sino-Indian relations are not improved, Russia's strategic vision of the "trio" will not be realized. Now, with Sino-Indian relations in a relatively stable state, it is the main driving force for Russia to revive the China-Russia-India triangle.
The Putin government also knows that to restart the "trio" of China-Russia-India, it must first work on India. India's tendency for geopolitical opportunism is precisely the biggest variable in trilateral interactions. However, it is no easy task for India to overcome its own limitations and develop a pragmatic relationship with China. India's current non-opposition to the resumption of the trilateral dialogue, and its prompt response to Russia's proposal, also has its own agenda. Restoring the trilateral summit itself is harmless, and is consistent with the Modi government's foreign policy strategy. In the long run, it might bring "unexpected benefits" for India.
Besides, maintaining close interactions with China and Russia is a ready-made bargaining chip for India, and it can quickly be used in U.S.-India negotiations. India's opportunism is two-way, not only towards China and Russia, but also towards the United States. This leads to India's "three-minute enthusiasm" for China-Russia-India interactions, easily causing it to be distracted. Especially after the latest round of India-Pakistan conflict, some people in India keep spreading that China is India's "number one threat," and that it should strengthen strategic cooperation with the United States. Driven by this mindset, the Modi government may make impulsive decisions, leading to renewed turbulence in Sino-Indian interactions.
When Foreign Minister Lavrov called for the resumption of the China-Russia-India dialogue mechanism, he directly reminded the Modi government that the U.S. and Europe are pulling India into the "anti-China narrative trap." Moreover, he also expressed concerns about the military cooperation conducted by the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia). In short, the China-Russia-India triangle is incompatible with the U.S.-led Quad mechanism. Russia originally proposed this concept to counterbalance the Western-dominated international order. From another perspective, if India continues to hold onto the idea of "competing" with China, it will inevitably align with the United States, using the U.S.-China great power rivalry to create strategic space for itself, or even define itself as an American "ally." In such a case, the Quad could become a risk factor in the Asia-Pacific security structure, harming the interests of Russia and China. Then there would be no need for the China-Russia-India trilateral dialogue, and Russia certainly does not want to see such a situation emerge.
China's participation is mainly because such summits help promote the construction of a multipolar world. Multipolarity reflects changes in the balance of international power, aligns with the common pursuit of justice and win-win cooperation in the international community, and is the best framework for maintaining world peace and stability, promoting reform and improvement of the global governance system, and promoting common development among countries. If China, Russia, and India can enhance cooperation, they can voice more diverse opinions in international affairs, effectively countering America's unipolar hegemony, and push the international order toward a fairer and more just direction.
However, China will not be too enthusiastic. India has long pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. There are some historical issues and real conflicts between China and India, with border disputes always being an important factor affecting bilateral relations. Although both sides have achieved a certain degree of easing through multiple rounds of senior-level talks in recent years, the root causes of the contradictions have not been completely eliminated. Given this context, China maintains a cautious attitude toward conducting trilateral cooperation with India. After all, before core issues are properly resolved, excessive enthusiasm for participating in the trilateral dialogue mechanism may lead India to form a wrong perception, or even use the trilateral mechanism to pressure China, which is not conducive to the healthy development of Sino-Indian relations.
Additionally, if China becomes overly enthusiastic about the China-Russia-India trilateral dialogue mechanism, it may be misunderstood by the outside world as China is forming a new group, which contradicts China's consistent diplomatic principles and image, and may also cause unnecessary concerns and misunderstandings among other countries.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7524155698435899946/
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