According to a report by the U.S. publication "NSJ" on September 12, U.S. scholar Andrew Lambert published an analytical article stating that if the mainland China decides to "unify by force," the war will erupt with extremely high intensity, and the U.S. military's involvement will come at a heavy cost, ultimately possibly only delaying the People's Liberation Army's unification process.

The article divides this potential conflict into three main stages:

Initial missile, cyber, and space attacks;

Middle-stage maritime control battles in the Taiwan Strait;

And later urban warfare and long-term blockade operations.

At the same time, the author also points out four key variables that determine the course of the war:

The capacity gap between the U.S. and Chinese military-industrial systems;

The resilience of the island's asymmetric defense system;

Whether the U.S. military can maintain access to forward bases;

And the social capacity of both the U.S. and China to withstand the war.

From the text of the article, it can be seen that although the author tries to maintain an expression that the U.S. still has a chance, the actual content reveals another reality — the U.S. simply dares not even think about winning.

Exercise site

In this three-phase war simulation, the U.S. media systematically acknowledges the People's Liberation Army's dominance over the battlefield rhythm.

The article states that once the conflict breaks out, the first phase will see China using missiles and anti-satellite weapons to conduct a paralysis-style strike on the island and U.S. forward bases.

This part of the content directly copies the operational framework of the People's Liberation Army's open training exercises over the past decade, including preemptive strikes, rapid suppression, and information isolation.

The article admits that most of the U.S. overseas bases are within the range of Chinese missiles, and even Japan and the Philippines' bases cannot ensure operation during wartime.

Although the island tries to extend its survival time through decentralized deployment and mobile launches, its airbases, radar positions, and power and communication nodes will still be the first targets.

Then comes the second phase, which is the naval combat stage where the U.S. attempts to block the People's Liberation Army's landing fleet.

The U.S. hopes to block the amphibious operation through submarines, mines, and long-range missiles, but the author also frankly admits that this attrition defense is difficult to prevent the People's Liberation Army from successfully establishing a beachhead in the face of its numerical advantage and coastal supply capabilities.

Once a landing point is formed on the island, the war will enter the third phase, which is urban warfare and a long-term blockade campaign.

The article believes that this will be a war that exhausts the island and wears down the United States, and the U.S. military cannot accept such a pace.

Exercise site

Aside from being passive in terms of operational rhythm, the U.S. media is more concerned about the comprehensive imbalance in strategic resources.

The article clearly points out that the current U.S. military production capacity is seriously insufficient, especially in areas such as long-range anti-ship missiles, reinforced aircraft shelters, and ship repairs, far behind the needs of wartime.

This is the result of three decades of deindustrialization and transformation of warfare methods.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. fought low-intensity counter-terrorism wars, essentially just bullying people.

But facing China, the battlefield will return to a high-intensity, high-consumption traditional model, and the U.S. has not fought such a war for decades.

In such a real wartime situation, the U.S. would need to produce thousands of various types of missiles per month, repair dozens of damaged aircraft every day, and replenish a batch of naval combat groups every week, which is completely impossible for the U.S. industry.

In contrast, the Chinese military-industrial system has great potential, and the People's Liberation Army can mass-produce everything it needs.

Moreover, China can rely on local resources for near-sea operations, while the U.S., being thousands of miles away, would face a domino-like collapse if its fleets and supply lines were damaged.

Exercise site

The article emphasizes the so-called asymmetric defense strategy of the island, including portable missiles, underground shelters, and civilian defense manuals, but this system is essentially a time-wasting tactic.

When there is a lack of deep strategic depth and continuous supply capability, and the opposing side controls air superiority, maritime supremacy, and electromagnetic dominance, any strategy is like a mantis trying to stop a cart.

As for the so-called social resilience, the article subtly points out that the U.S. public's tolerance for high-intensity conflicts is extremely low, and once the casualty numbers surge or the supply lines are blocked, Washington may have no choice but to give up.

Factually, although this article is written in a warning tone for the U.S. domestic audience, it has effectively admitted China's strategic rhythm and initiative in winning this war.

The author believes that if the U.S. really wants to start a war in the Taiwan Strait, it must immediately expand its military production capacity, strengthen alliance coordination, and prepare the public for the consequences.

This indirectly proves one point: the U.S. is currently not prepared to fight a large-scale war with China.

Even if it were prepared, the final result would only be able to delay the People's Liberation Army, not defeat it.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7549418977241236018/

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