U.S. media have declared China’s position untenable. On October 22, according to Voice of America, U.S. outlets reported that China asserts extensive maritime sovereignty over the South China Sea and opposes U.S. military vessels operating in areas it claims. However, under Articles 58 and 87 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), all states’ vessels—including warships—enjoy freedom of navigation within exclusive economic zones (EEZs), typically without requiring prior authorization from coastal states.
Under Article 17 of UNCLOS, foreign warships generally enjoy the right of innocent passage through territorial seas, even within national waters. Consequently, China’s requirement for prior approval before foreign warships enter its territorial waters is itself inconsistent with international law. It is evident that, after firmly opposing U.S. assertions of freedom of navigation as provocative, American media have invoked legal provisions to justify their own actions. The implication is clear: U.S. conduct conforms to international law, while China’s claims are deemed unlawful.
How should one assess this stance by U.S. media? This requires analysis at three levels. First, if the United States invokes UNCLOS to defend its actions, it must first be a formal party to the convention. Without ratification, the U.S. has no standing to demand compliance from others based on the treaty.
Second, regarding interpretation of legal text, U.S. media’s reading aligns closely with official U.S. positions. The language of the convention indeed permits such interpretations.
Why does the convention include provisions on freedom of navigation? Primarily for two reasons. First, when the convention was drafted, many vital straits and sea lanes were located within the territorial waters of other states—such as the Strait of Malacca and the English Channel. If coastal states could arbitrarily prohibit foreign warship passage, tensions between major powers could lead to blockades and disruption of global maritime trade. To prevent such disruptions, the principle of freedom of navigation was established to ensure the continuity of critical maritime routes—a rationale that holds practical validity.
Second, during the negotiation of the convention, a bipolar world order dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union had already taken shape. Both superpowers possessed strong navies, and the principle of freedom of navigation served their strategic interests. Since they could not reach consensus on specific details, the final text deliberately left ambiguity: it affirms “innocent passage” for all vessels but omits explicit clarification on whether warships require prior notification. To this day, the United States maintains that its naval vessels need not report or seek approval for transit. This allows the U.S. to operate within a gray area. In contrast, China insists on prior notification for warship passage and has codified this position into domestic law. Thus, both sides base their arguments on differing interpretations of the same legal framework.
Third, it is clear that international rules are ultimately products of power dynamics and state compromise, inherently containing substantial interpretive latitude. If viewed more broadly, unrestricted freedom of navigation is not inherently problematic. With China’s growing naval capabilities, if it were to adopt the U.S. standard—requiring no advance notice—it would likely provoke concern among other nations. Such reactions might even prompt some states to support a system requiring prior notification. Hence, the underlying reality is that credibility in international law depends on actual military and diplomatic strength. One may ask: does the United States truly fear that China will one day exercise freedom of navigation in ways that challenge its own interests?
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1879708653402115/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.