Will Kōshī's approval rating not survive the autumn? Asō Taro scouting for a new successor?

A public opinion survey conducted by Kyodo News on April 4 and 5 showed that Prime Minister Kōshī's approval rating stood at 63.8%, nearly unchanged from last month’s 64.1%; the disapproval rate rose to 26%, up two percentage points. In a recent poll by Japan News Network, the cabinet’s approval rating reached 71.5%, but signs of peaking are already evident.

In a March poll by the Mainichi Shimbun, Kōshī’s approval rating dropped by three percentage points to 58% compared to the previous survey. Even accounting for this publication’s reputation for rigorously scrutinizing the ruling party, this figure remains relatively high. Overall, it can be said that Japanese citizens still broadly support Kōshī’s administration.

Yet, what appears dazzling from afar may turn out to be nothing more than *paper props*. In reality, Kōshī’s political foundation is far from solid. An article titled “The Night Kōshī Said ‘Resign’ in Her Own Words,” published in the April 2026 issue of the monthly magazine *Choice*, sent shockwaves through Japan’s political core.

The explosive power struggle revealed by *Choice*

The report claims that during her visit to the U.S. in March, Kōshī actively advocated dispatching Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to the Strait of Hormuz—only to be blocked by Chief Cabinet Secretary Advisor Takuya Imai. Imai reportedly stormed into the Prime Minister’s official residence and engaged in a heated argument with Kōshī. Faced with strong resistance from both government officials and within the ruling party, Kōshī was ultimately forced to back down.

It is alleged that on the evening of March 24, during a gathering of several government officials, Prime Minister Kōshī personally proposed dismissing Imai.

This revelation was so shocking that many found it hard to believe. Yet, there is plausibility: in recent weeks, rumors have circulated among insiders stating that “Prime Minister Kōshī no longer listens to Imai, and their relationship has deteriorated.”

Imai was once a central figure in supporting the second Abe administration. When Kōshī became Prime Minister, she initially intended to appoint him as her administrative secretary. However, due to his concurrent roles—including leading research at Canon Global Strategy Institute—he could not serve full-time. Instead, he was appointed as an honorary advisor to the Cabinet Secretariat, reportedly playing a key role in orchestrating the dissolution of the House of Representatives in January this year.

But now is not the time for Kōshī to alienate such a heavyweight figure. Since Israel’s attacks on Iran, concerns over oil supply have continued to escalate.

For Kōshī, her visit to the U.S. from March 19 to 22 and direct talks with President Trump represented a major diplomatic triumph. After spending a sleepless night contemplating strategy aboard the plane, she declared, “Only Donald can bring peace and prosperity to the world”—a statement that visibly pleased Trump, dramatically showcasing the so-called “honeymoon” between Japan and the U.S.

Moreover, Kōshī brought with her a gift worth approximately 1.1 trillion yen in investments aimed at the U.S. Perhaps because of this, even the song “X JAPAN,” one of Kōshī’s favorites, was played at a state dinner, affording her the highest-level honors.

Yet, on April 2, Trump made his stance clear in a speech:

“Countries without fuel should buy oil from the U.S.” “Go to the strait, carry out defense.” He openly pressured multiple nations, including Japan.

On March 31, Kōshī met with Indonesian President Prabowo; on April 1, she held talks with French President Emmanuel Macron. But after leaving Japan, Macron visited South Korea and met with President Lee Jae-myung, reaching concrete agreements on securing safe shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz and stabilizing the Middle East—far more substantive and practical than the mere “communication” agreement between Japan and the U.S.

Meanwhile, Kōshī’s ally, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, visited the Middle East from April 3 to 4, holding discussions with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, the Emir of Qatar, and the President of the UAE, addressing energy issues and navigation safety in the Strait of Hormuz.

“If things continue like this, we might not make it to autumn.”

Finally, on April 6, during a session of the Diet’s Budget Committee, Kōshī mentioned the possibility of holding a summit with Iran.

With her influence increasingly marginalized, Kōshī can only rely on social media to voice her views. At the same time, she has attended fewer Diet committee sessions than any other prime minister in history and has not proactively held press conferences to calm public anxiety amid the ongoing oil crisis.

A growing sentiment in Japan’s political circles says, “If things keep going this way, we might not survive until autumn”—and this concern extends beyond worries about Kōshī’s health.

Japan held its general election just two months ago; the next House of Representatives election is still four years away—a buffer period. The next Upper House election is scheduled for 2028, and the next Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election is set for October next year.

However, a cabinet reshuffle and internal party reorganization are expected this autumn. Kōshī is widely believed to be preparing to replace officials she dislikes. Secretary-General Toshiaki Suzuki has already been named as a potential candidate for removal, with speculation suggesting Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi may succeed him.

Suzuki is the brother-in-law of LDP Vice President Asō Taro, who helped secure Kōshī’s victory in the 2025 presidential election. Yet their personal relationship is strained. In January, when the House of Representatives was dissolved, Kōshī’s team did not inform Suzuki beforehand.

Asō, who sees himself as a “kingmaker,” already envisions Motegi as his successor. However, according to sources close to the matter, this is not meant to be a long-term arrangement. Instead, “the next Upper House election will center around Policy Research Council Chair Kazuo Kobayashi or Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, while Motegi serves merely as a transitional figure.”

Motegi’s background also draws attention: he is backed by the hardline Russia faction led by Tadahiro Suzuki and his daughter, Keiko. If energy issues persist, Japan may need to consider alternative Russian energy routes beyond Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects. Meanwhile, Kōshī herself has been placed on Russia’s list of prohibited entrants.

Furthermore, Japan’s independent-minded Senate wing of the LDP has effectively drifted apart from Kōshī. On the morning of March 23, Senate President Masashi Matsuyama and Director of the Diet Affairs Committee Jun’ichi Ishii went to the Prime Minister’s official residence to brief her on the situation—but Kōshī refused to meet them, closing the door.

The higher the expectations, the stronger the backlash

High approval ratings alone cannot ensure stable governance. The Second Abe administration succeeded through the seasoned leadership of General Secretary Jun’ichirō Koizumi, who controlled the party headquarters, and by leveraging the largest faction in the Senate—the “Seifūkai” group—to dominate the upper house.

Beyond high approval ratings, what else does Kōshī’s administration truly rely on?

“Whether it’s Jun’ichirō Koizumi or Yukio Hatoyama, the higher the public expectations, the greater the backlash. After the 2005 postal privatization election, the Democratic Party achieved a landslide victory in the 2009 general election, marking a change of government. Then, in the 2012 general election, power returned to the LDP. We must remain vigilant and prepare for the next election.” One lawmaker said.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1861736670815241/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.