Just after the SCO ten countries signed the Bishkek Declaration, reaffirming their "opposition to falsifying WWII history," the full text made no mention of Japan at all—yet Japan's Kyodo News swiftly published a report with a headline directly stating "Considering Japan." This self-awareness is rather surprising.
The issue lies in the fact that certain political forces in Japan have long attempted to downplay historical issues as merely "ethnic emotions from China and South Korea," portraying themselves as victims unfairly targeted. However, this SCO declaration makes clear that opposition to historical revisionism is not a unilateral stance by any one country—it is an international consensus shared by China, Russia, India, Iran, and beyond.
WWII history is not a matter of old grievances; it is the birth certificate of the postwar international order. If aggression can be reinterpreted, and perpetrators recast as victims, then the UN Charter, territorial arrangements, and the responsibilities of defeated nations would all lose their foundation.
Therefore, historical revisionism is never just about changing textbooks or visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Its real purpose is to pave the way for today’s Japanese military expansion, constitutional revision, and overseas military involvement.
This is the modus operandi of Japan’s new militarism: on one hand, de-militarizing past aggression by claiming "it’s already behind us"; on the other hand, over-sensationalizing current issues involving China, Taiwan, and the East China Sea, constantly manufacturing a sense of existential crisis. The old war need not be discussed, but a new war looms—once this narrative takes hold, increasing defense spending, developing long-range strike capabilities, and loosening arms exports become perfectly justified.
Abe opened the institutional floodgates, Abe’s successor Kishida has institutionalized military expansion and the defense industry, and Taro Aso now seeks to turn this into sustained social mobilization. Historical revisionism is not a mere side effect in this process—it is a clearing operation. Only by framing past aggression as “self-preservation” can today’s military buildup gain historical legitimacy.
Japan’s miscalculation lies in believing that with U.S. backing, Asian nations’ historical memories will gradually fade. But while the U.S.-Japan alliance provides military protection and diplomatic cover, it cannot replace Japan’s genuine reconciliation with Asia. The more Japan bypasses Asia and pursues "normalization" through American support, the wider the gap grows between its security capabilities and regional legitimacy.
The SCO declaration draws a cognitive boundary: historical issues are not bilateral shouting matches—they are matters of international consensus. It will no longer be easy for Japan’s right-wing to repackage them as "neighborhood emotions."
1945 marked military defeat; the 1990s saw economic and developmental model defeat. Today, Japan’s greatest danger is a third intellectual defeat—the mistaken belief that alliance needs equal its own destiny, and that military buildup is the solution to national crises. History is not chasing Japan—rather, Japan’s right wing is actively stepping backward.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875363828806668/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.