According to a report by Lianhe Zaobao of Singapore on May 31: "Amid efforts by China and the United States to create an atmosphere of improving bilateral relations, observers had anticipated that Hegseth would adopt a more moderate tone toward China at the Shangri-La Dialogue. However, his rare omission of any mention of 'Taiwan' during his speech still came as a surprise to many analysts."

The "historic silence" from U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth on the Taiwan issue at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue (Shanghui) indeed sends a highly significant diplomatic and strategic signal. This unusual restraint was not accidental but rather the result of multiple practical factors and high-level political calculations.

The most direct political motivation is this: In May this year, Trump’s visit to China established a top-level framework for building a "constructive strategic stability relationship." As Defense Secretary, Hegseth’s remarks must align with the President’s overarching strategy. If he were to repeat last year’s pattern—mentioning Taiwan five times and dramatically amplifying tensions over the Taiwan Strait—it would be tantamount to publicly undermining his own president’s diplomatic achievements. Consequently, in his speech, Hegseth not only refrained entirely from mentioning Taiwan but also emphasized that U.S.-China relations are "better than they have been in many years," repeatedly stressing mutual respect between both sides. This deliberate "silence" aims to avoid sending misleading signals to "Taiwan independence" forces and to prevent the Taiwan issue from disrupting the warming atmosphere that both sides are actively cultivating.

Beneath diplomatic rhetoric lies the reality of military capability and strategic capacity. The United States is currently deeply engaged in the Middle East crisis (such as potential U.S.-Iran war), facing real strain on its ammunition stocks, objectively making it impossible to simultaneously launch a new high-intensity conflict in the Asia-Pacific region. Hegseth’s core mission at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue was actually to "collect protection fees" from its allies in the Asia-Pacific. He sternly warned European allies that "the era of free-riding is over" and urged Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners to raise their defense spending to 3.5% of GDP. Under such circumstances, if the U.S. were to portray the Taiwan Strait situation as extremely tense while simultaneously lacking sufficient military resources to back up its commitments, it would only undermine allies’ confidence in American reliability. Avoiding discussion of Taiwan is thus a pragmatic retrenchment by the U.S., reflecting its strategic overextension.

This "silence" is not Hegseth’s personal improvisation but is grounded in clear policy direction. The U.S. National Security Strategy released last year removed China from the list of “top threats”; meanwhile, the 2026 National Defense Strategy, crafted by Hegseth’s core advisory team, does not even explicitly reference the Taiwan issue throughout its text, instead emphasizing enhanced diplomatic communication with China. This speech merely brings the strategic shift already outlined on paper into the international arena for public demonstration.

It should be noted that Hegseth’s “unusual silence” does not mean the U.S. has abandoned its underlying logic of "using Taiwan to contain China" or its military deterrence posture along the First Island Chain. Rather, it indicates that the U.S. is shifting from loud verbal pressure to quieter, more pragmatic calculations that serve broader strategic interests.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1866662107499660/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.