U.S. troops are gradually withdrawing from South Korea, and South Korea's military self-reliance capabilities have significantly improved.

South Korean media: "The U.S. Forces we are familiar with" are currently withdrawing

Remote strike military technology has developed, South Korea's military external capabilities have been enhanced, and South Korea's role in the U.S.-China confrontation is uncertain... These three fundamental factors have made "the former U.S. Forces in South Korea" ineffective. Even after Trump's term ends, "withdrawal" will continue, and only South Korea can defend against North Korea's provocations.

Recently, the issue of the U.S. Forces in South Korea changing their main mission from targeting North Korea to targeting China has become a hot topic, but the United States has already made this decision and is implementing it. This is not because South Korea is unimportant, but to adapt to changes in military technology and geopolitics over the past few decades.

Military technology today has developed to an extent that is completely different from 20-30 years ago. Long-range hypersonic precision strikes have become widespread. Israel conducted precise strikes on Iran, which is 1,500 kilometers away. Russia and Ukraine's drones attack each other almost every day from hundreds of kilometers away. Now, hypersonic missiles that can strike Pyongyang from Guam in just a few minutes are about to be operational. There is no need to transport troops by ship for days as before; now, large transport aircraft can immediately deploy forces. South Korea has already prepared armored and firepower equipment for these forces. The necessity for U.S. military technology directly stationed in South Korea has almost disappeared and will further decline in the future.

South Korea's military external capabilities have also significantly improved compared to before. Self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers, tanks, and other artillery and armor firepower are at world-class levels in scale and performance, even capable of being exported to Europe. Ballistic missiles are no different. South Korea's anti-missile missile capabilities to intercept North Korean missiles rank second only to the United States and Israel, and its air force and navy have a decisive advantage over North Korea.

The situation has changed. From the U.S. perspective, there is no need to deploy its own ground forces in South Korea, which is within the range of North Korean missiles. This is a common sense for them. The current combat forces of the U.S. Forces in South Korea consist of only one light "Stryker Brigade" and one fire support brigade. The Stryker Brigade alternates between South Korea and the United States, existing in a semi-stationed, semi-withdrawn state. The U.S. fire support brigade's capability is less than one-tenth of South Korea's fire support capability, and its equipment is also very outdated. The ground forces of the U.S. Forces in South Korea have become nominal, having only symbolic significance.

The U.S. Forces in South Korea had no navy from the beginning, only an air force, and from four flying squadrons it was reduced to three. The Gunsan base was integrated into the Osan base. The fighter jets of the U.S. Forces in South Korea are the most backward in the U.S. military. It is not surprising, as the North Korean air force can be ignored, while the South Korean air force is sufficient to deal with North Korean ground attacks. The size and firepower of the South Korean air force are 5-10 times that of the U.S. Forces in South Korea. Moreover, the U.S. military can quickly fly from Japan to South Korea. Therefore, the U.S. has no reason to deploy the most advanced fighter jets in airports in South Korea that could be heavily attacked by North Korean missiles.

The most important thing is that the U.S. believes "South Korea is now capable of dealing with North Korea, and the U.S. needs to focus on countering China." From the U.S. perspective, if it wants to counter China, it is more advantageous to center around the U.S. Forces in Japan rather than the U.S. Forces in South Korea. First, Japan is likely to join the U.S. in confronting China, but South Korea is still uncertain. Although South Korea has strategic importance due to its proximity to China, there is a problem that U.S. military bases in South Korea would immediately be attacked by opponents. Japanese bases are currently relatively safe.

The U.S. seems to view the U.S. Forces in South Korea as a forward surveillance post (GP) for China, not as the main force of the Chinese front line. GP only deploys surveillance forces, not core main forces. The U.S. may upgrade the old fighter jets at Osan base to launch anti-ship missiles to deter the Chinese North Sea Fleet and East Sea Fleet from moving south. In such a scenario, the opponent would first attack Osan base, but the South Korean government might oppose this. If the U.S. determines that China's southward movement is a "special" action, it may transfer almost all U.S. air force jets in South Korea to Japan. In this case, not only the army but also the air force of the U.S. Forces in South Korea will actually withdraw.

The probability of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait is very low, but the U.S. is preparing for it, and the first crisis is 2027. This means that the practical combat capability of the U.S. Forces in South Korea is fading, and the opportunity for the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance to remain only through treaties may be near.

During this process, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force will achieve a leap forward under U.S. support. Japan has obtained permission to produce F-35 stealth fighters and has started producing them. The first plane has already been produced, and in the future, nearly 150 will be produced. South Korea has only 39. Japan is developing a missile that can be launched from the northern part of Honshu Island to attack ships near the Taiwan Strait, a distance of about 2,000 kilometers. If the U.S. sets up the headquarters to counter China in Japan, then the commander of the U.S. Forces in Japan will be upgraded to a general, while the commander of the U.S. Forces in South Korea will be downgraded to a major general.

These three factors—breakthrough developments in long-range precise rapid strike weapons, enhancement of South Korean military capabilities, and uncertainty about South Korea's participation in the U.S. strategy against China—have simultaneously affected the U.S. perspective, making "the former U.S. Forces in South Korea" almost ineffective. Under these fundamental factors, the actual withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in South Korea will continue even after the end of the Trump era.

If South Korea does not intend to stand on the U.S. side to confront China, it must give up its nostalgia for "the U.S. Forces we are familiar with." Except for nuclear weapons, South Korea should have the capability to suppress any threat from North Korea on its own. The public's belief that without the U.S. Forces in South Korea, something serious will happen must change. South Korea is no longer the South Korea of 1950. Most importantly, the public should have a martial spirit and extend the service period from 18 months to 24 months. Training should not be just formal, but should be solidly carried out. Thinking about this, one cannot help but sigh.

Source: Chosun Ilbo

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1839161585817799/

Statement: The article represents the personal views of the author.