According to Japanese media reports, on the local day of the 10th, the outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru delivered his "personal views" on the 80th anniversary of the end of the war. This speech was not finalized by the Cabinet meeting, and the full text is seven A4 pages, approximately 6,000 characters, mainly discussing why Japan's domestic political system failed to prevent the war. At a press conference, he also stated that this article was "not hastily written," and had undergone 20 revisions.

In the beginning of the speech, Ishiba Shigeru based on the statements of the prime ministers on the 50th, 60th, and 70th anniversaries of the end of the war, stated that he inherited the position of previous cabinets in terms of historical recognition, but emphasized that in the past three statements, there was little discussion on "why the war could not be avoided." "Even in the statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, there was a sentence saying: 'Japan tried to resolve diplomatic and economic stalemates through force. The domestic political system was powerless to prevent such behavior,' but no further details were provided."

Ishiba Shigeru said, "On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the end of the war, I would like to reflect with the Japanese people," and then detailed the major problems existing in Japan at that time: such as the problems of the old Japanese Empire's constitution, government, parliament, media, information collection and analysis, etc.

He mentioned that before the outbreak of the war between Japan and the United States in 1941, the "Total War Research Institute" composed of young bureaucrats and elites predicted that "Japan would inevitably lose," but failed to prevent the outbreak of the war. The reason was that there was a lack of reasonable integration mechanisms between politics and the military before the war, and the importance of "civilian control over the military" should be emphasized, where politics is superior to the military.

Ishiba Shigeru also pointed out that the parliament lacked sufficient oversight of the military. In the Japanese parliament in 1940, former member of the House of Representatives Saito Takao gave an "anti-military speech," criticizing the Sino-Japanese War, but most of the content was deleted from the meeting records.

Moreover, increased control over freedom of expression led the media to promote the war, and miscalculations about the international situation are also factors that cannot be ignored.

He advocated that through each citizen's active reflection on the ways of war and peace in the past, the foundation of a peaceful country will be further strengthened. "In the current security environment, which is the most severe and complex since the end of the war, we must keep the lessons of history in our hearts." He also believed that the current cabinet should not cater to public opinion, promoting populism and xenophobia.

Regarding Ishiba Shigeru's "personal views" on the 80th anniversary of the end of the war, the various parties in Japan have different opinions.

Although Ishiba Shigeru made the speech in the form of "personal views," the opposition within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was strong. LDP President Takaichi Sanae explicitly opposed it, stating, "The 70th anniversary statement is already the best version, and there is no need for new statements," and some LDP members previously hoped "to delay the release."

The co-leader of the Japan Innovation Party, Fujita Fumio, raised doubts about the timing and form of the statement. He said that currently, it is a period of change in the prime minister, and that the statement was issued in an "unconfirmed, unclear formal or informal form," which is questionable.

The leader of the Japan National Party, Tamaki Yuichiro, expressed approval, stating that Ishiba "has identified the institutional issues that led to the war, which is novel and has certain significance." The chairman of the Japanese Communist Party, Tanmura Tomoko, criticized the statement, saying that it "did not show any reflection on the invasion and colonial rule."

However, when questioned by Phoenix TV reporters, Ishiba emphasized, "The government has never said that 'that war was not an invasion.' I myself also hold the same position, which must be correctly understood. What Japan did in China or in Asia in the past must be accurately and clearly recognized. We Japanese may forget, but the people of Asian countries have not forgotten this history, and we must deeply realize this. It is very important for the international community to recognize that the Japanese people face history sincerely."

Observer Net's political commentator believes that Ishiba's "personal views" published without Cabinet meeting confirmation, elaborating on the internal mechanisms that led Japan to war, is unprecedented among post-war Japanese prime ministers. It reflects both a certain degree of political courage on Ishiba's part before leaving office, and also reveals his sense of helplessness in internal political relations.

On the other hand, the omission of the key word "aggression" in the speech, but the admission of "aggression" in the press conference, also shows a certain duality. Moreover, just like his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, he ultimately did not say "apology."

This is closely related to the continued right-wing shift in the Japanese political arena. Even the Japanese society believes that it can no longer be described as a "hawkish faction" for certain ultra-rightists, politicians, and historical revisionists. Instead, a more unique term has emerged, called "Baka-ha" (the "Idiot Faction"). Members of the "Baka-ha" cling to the so-called "Yasukuni view of history," denying major acts of aggression such as the comfort women issue and the Nanjing Massacre, and even adopting a posture of "reviving the spirit of the Kamikaze," rushing towards the direction of historical revisionism. Although this term is derogatory, it accurately reveals the non-rational, almost fanatical extremism behind it, and there are indeed some well-known politicians among them.

Correspondingly, in his "personal views," Ishiba emphasized that contemporary political figures must possess a sense of responsibility that does not yield to short-term public opinion. He clearly stated that they must not sacrifice the long-term interests of the country for the sake of catering to temporary public opinion, fueling populism or xenophobia, directly pointing out the short-sightedness of vote politics. These remarks can also be seen as an indirect response and a subtle warning to the recent policy tendencies of extreme conservative politicians such as Takaichi Sanae.

However, it must be noted that Ishiba still belongs to the conservative right-wing camp. He previously supported amending the "three principles of no nuclear weapons," and pushed for the establishment of an East Asian "NATO," placing him in the hard-line military line against China in the Japanese political spectrum. Therefore, in this conversation, he did not deny the "Abe Statement" proposed by former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in 2015, which marked the end of the "apology diplomacy," indicating that his historical cognition still follows the Abe line. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiajun previously pointed out that China has always believed that it is an important prerequisite for Japan to return to the international community after the war to recognize and deal with history in the correct way, and to demonstrate in actual actions the reflection and apology for the invasion history. This concerns the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations, the relationship between Japan and its neighboring countries, and also Japan's international image.

However, the most intriguing part of Ishiba's "personal views" may be the blank regarding the "emperor."

When analyzing the "problems of the constitution" of the old Japan, Ishiba said:

Until the Russo-Japanese War, the elder statesmen still played a unifying role in foreign affairs, military, and finance. As individuals who engaged in military activities as samurais, the elder statesmen had a deep understanding of the military and were able to control it. Using the words of Maruyama Masao, "the medium of the extra-constitutional existence of the elder statesmen and senior officials" played an important role in unifying the state's will.

As the elder statesmen passed away one after another, this informal mechanism gradually declined. Afterward, during the Taisho democratic era, political parties attempted to achieve integration between politics and the military. Traditionally, "command authority" was limited to the "military orders" related to operational command, while matters involving budget and system construction, i.e., "military administration," were interpreted and implemented as "advisory" matters for the cabinet ministers. It can be considered that the institutional lack of civilian control was compensated for by the elder statesmen, and later by the political parties, through practical operations.

Then what happened after the loss? Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution stipulates, "The Emperor is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy."

Since Ishiba believes that the compensatory mechanism is ineffective, to answer the questions about the "constitution" and "command authority," does it not require bringing up the issue of the emperor's responsibility?

Is he going to blame the military and say a few good words for the emperor; or is he going to clarify it further?

Neither. The "problem of the constitution" ends here, and Ishiba directly moves on to the next section "the problem of the government"...

This article is an exclusive article by Observer Net. Without permission, it cannot be reprinted.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559846330433045044/

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