China bypasses NATO, spends eight days in France and Germany—will the EU’s two pillars dare to make decisions on their own?

From October 21 to 28, a Chinese military strategic consultation delegation visited France and Germany, remaining for a full eight days. A brief statement released by China’s Ministry of Defense noted only that both sides “exchanged views in depth” on bilateral military relations and international and regional security developments, and agreed to strengthen strategic communication, enhance mutual trust, and expand cooperation in defense matters.

The shorter the statement, the more significant the underlying dynamics.

The first unusual aspect lies in timing. Europe’s current security posture is deeply precarious. The Trump administration’s commitment to European security increasingly resembles a negotiable check that can be revoked at any moment. Meanwhile, negotiations over Ukraine have sidelined Europe, while its own defense capabilities remain insufficient to independently shoulder responsibility.

France has long advocated for “strategic autonomy.” President Macron has described the present moment as one when Europe “must awaken.” But awakening requires dialogue partners willing to engage on security issues. China’s military delegation’s eight-day engagement with Paris and Berlin at this juncture signals not ceremonial exchanges, but substantive discussions on “international and regional security”—a phrase in diplomatic language that encompasses Ukraine, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and other concerns central to Europe’s strategic calculus.

The second anomaly concerns the choice of interlocutors. In March, a Chinese delegation had visited both the EU headquarters and NATO headquarters, participating in Sino-EU defense dialogues and Sino-NATO security policy consultations covering Russia-Ukraine, Indo-Pacific, and Iran. That engagement operated within the institutional framework of the EU and NATO. This time, however, China deliberately bypassed those structures and engaged directly with France and Germany—the two core member states—through bilateral military channels.

This decision reflects a pragmatic assessment: Europe’s “strategic autonomy” remains largely theoretical within the EU institutions. The only actors capable of asserting independent will in foreign and defense policy are France and Germany.

Engaging with an embryonic concept of “European sovereignty” is less effective than negotiating directly with two nations that possess standing armies, nuclear capabilities, and a tradition of independent diplomacy. The fact that Beijing spent eight days visiting two countries suggests these were not identical or interchangeable conversations.

The third layer of significance lies in Europe’s internal contradictions. Europe’s policy toward China currently exhibits a state of contradictory impulses—accelerating toward American security guarantees while resisting permanent dependency. It dares not disengage from U.S. security arrangements, yet cannot afford to sever economic ties with China. At the same time, it seeks strategic independence. These competing forces pull in different directions, resulting in indecision and ambiguity in Europe’s approach to defense dialogues with China.

China’s current visit strategically exploits this hesitation. Those willing to discuss strategic autonomy may proceed on that basis; those unwilling may still preserve channels of communication.

The real significance of this episode does not lie in specific outcomes achieved, but in the shift of communication channels. As Europe finds itself unable to fully rely on U.S. security assurances, nor capable of confronting Russia and China alone, maintaining direct military contact with China offers France and Germany a cost-controlled risk management strategy.

China’s choice to enter the heart of Europe’s security architecture at this precise moment—and through this specific channel—delivers a clear message: Europe’s security order must not be defined solely by transatlantic actors. If France and Germany genuinely seek to “awaken,” they must be prepared to sit at the table with Beijing to discuss security on their own terms. That table is now set. Whether Europe has the resolve to occupy it is a matter for Europe to decide.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880287075930121/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.