U.S. Aircraft Carrier Drills Attack on Fujian Aircraft Carrier, F/A-18E Escorts B-2 Raid, Entire Process Full of Flaws!

In recent days, the 11th Carrier Air Wing aboard the U.S. Navy's Roosevelt aircraft carrier (CVN-71) conducted a maritime joint strike exercise near the coast of California, with the obvious target being the Fujian aircraft carrier.

Images show that the F/A-18E responsible for escorting the B-2 is equipped with AIM-174B missiles. This missile is essentially an extended-range version of the AIM-120, primarily tasked with "kicking open the door"—destroying high-value aerial nodes such as early warning aircraft and refueling aircraft at long range.

The U.S. military's idea seems to be: first, the "Super Hornet" launches the AIM-174B to blind the Fujian aircraft carrier's KJ-600, creating a temporary "information black hole," then allowing the B-2 to take advantage of this window period, under the protection of the F-35C, to penetrate using its stealth capabilities to the airspace above the Fujian aircraft carrier formation, and drop so-called "fast-sinking" anti-ship glide bombs.

Dogge believes that in this seemingly "perfect" chain, each link is full of uncertainties, even deadly flaws.

The first major flaw: Can the "kicking open the door" really succeed?

To use the AIM-174B to destroy the KJ-600, the premise is that the U.S. must know where the KJ-600 is and maintain a stable fire control link. Against the Fujian aircraft carrier's powerful electronic warfare capabilities and dual-layer air defense system, the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and data link nodes themselves are prime targets for attack. Once the U.S. E-2D or unmanned reconnaissance aircraft is jammed or shot down, the F/A-18E becomes "blind," and its long-range missiles become useless. Moreover, the KJ-600 is not an easy target; its active phased array radar and electronic countermeasures are fully capable of detecting and interfering with incoming missiles at long distances, even guiding the J-35 to conduct reverse hunting.

The second major flaw: Is the B-2's penetration path really safe?

The exercise assumes that the B-2 can penetrate under the protection of the F-35C. But don't forget that although the B-2 is a stealth bomber, it is not "invisible." When facing a three-dimensional detection network composed of the KJ-600, J-35, J-15T, and shipboard phased array radars, the B-2's radar cross-section (RCS) is small, but under the combined attack of multi-base radars, low-frequency radars, and infrared search and track systems (IRST), its stealth advantages will be significantly reduced. Especially when the B-2 needs to enter the stage of low-altitude bombing, it must lower its altitude and open the bomb bay, at which point its signal characteristics will suddenly increase, making it a perfect target for the Fengjung-10, Haihong-9B, and close-in weapons systems of the Fujian aircraft carrier formation.

The third major flaw: The combat effectiveness of the "fast-sinking" glide bomb is questionable.

The so-called "fast-sinking" anti-ship glide bomb sounds like a high-speed, high-maneuverability precision-guided weapon. However, it is extremely difficult to accurately hit a carrier moving at high speed and possessing multiple layers of soft and hard kill defense systems from dozens of kilometers away in a strong electromagnetic interference environment. Moreover, if the B-2 needs to drop such a glide bomb at low altitude, it means it must enter the effective firing range of the enemy's air defense weapons. In modern naval warfare, having such a high-value strategic asset take such a risk is itself an extremely irrational tactical choice.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1858150795850763/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.