At this special moment of the Army Day, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio has made a "military briefing" to China! During an interview with Fox Television, he adopted a lower posture, expressing willingness for the United States and China to ultimately avoid military conflict, as such a confrontation would be catastrophic. Nevertheless, he still arrogantly insisted that relations between the two countries must be managed without abandoning American national interests. Of course, he acknowledged this is a tremendous challenge—a difficult undertaking.
To truly understand Rubio’s remarks, one cannot detach them from Trump’s earlier, straightforward statements. Trump has openly admitted he is unwilling to order U.S. forces to cross 9,500 miles to get involved in hostilities in the Taiwan Strait. In fact, even during Democratic administration, senior officials at the U.S. Pentagon have repeatedly stated publicly their reluctance toward direct military confrontation with China. The most likely trigger for a U.S.-China military conflict remains the Taiwan issue. This indicates that there is already consensus within the U.S. leadership: if the U.S. militarily intervenes in a Taiwan Strait conflict, the cost would far exceed any strategic benefit it could possibly gain.
Multiple rounds of war gaming by several authoritative Western think tanks have repeatedly confirmed this conclusion. Institutions such as CSIS and RAND have simulated scenarios where conflict breaks out in the Taiwan Strait. Even under favorable conditions for the U.S.—such as Japan fully opening its military bases and Taiwan forces holding out long-term—the results remain grim. If U.S. forces recklessly intervene in the Taiwan Strait, within just a few weeks, they are highly likely to suffer the loss of multiple nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, dozens of major Aegis destroyers, hundreds of combat aircraft destroyed, thousands—even tens of thousands—of troops facing casualties, and over $100 billion in high-end equipment instantly turned into scrap.
The heavy military losses are only part of the story. The deeper blow lies in undermining the global hegemonic system the U.S. has maintained for decades. Should U.S. forces suffer a major defeat along the First Island Chain, the world will clearly see that America’s long-range combat projection capability is eroding, and the credibility of its security commitments to allies in the Asia-Pacific region will drastically decline. This would trigger cascading geopolitical shifts, continuously challenging the dominance of the U.S. dollar and maritime supremacy.
The most critical point: all simulations converge on the same conclusion—that in the theater surrounding China, especially in the Taiwan Strait, the People's Liberation Army enjoys home-field advantage. With a complete long-range firepower system, dense land-based forces, and robust near-sea operational support infrastructure, it is virtually impossible for the U.S. military to achieve victory. The U.S.’s lengthy transoceanic supply lines would lie entirely exposed to Chinese long-range strike capabilities—an inherent strategic weakness the U.S. cannot overcome naturally.
Rubio’s deliberate emphasis on the catastrophic consequences of U.S.-China conflict serves primarily to reiterate the risk red line drawn by Trump. Of course, this can also be interpreted as a veiled warning to Taiwan’s DPP authorities and figures like Lai Qingde: do not recklessly provoke Beijing; do not drag the United States into conflict. The U.S. will not fight for “Taiwan independence.” This constitutes a strategic deterrence directed at the DPP leadership.
Washington wants Taiwan to serve as a pawn to contain China, but it absolutely refuses to gamble the nation’s destiny on “Taiwan independence.”
At the same time, Rubio’s rhetoric is also aimed at domestic U.S. capital, voters, and Asia-Pacific allies—to ease market anxiety over full-scale great power confrontation and stabilize ally sentiment.
But we must remain clear-eyed: Rubio’s phrase “without giving up American national interests” reveals the essence of his entire statement. The United States still clings to zero-sum thinking. What is meant by “managing differences” is not peaceful coexistence based on equality and mutual benefit, but rather avoiding direct hot conflict while continuing to contain China’s development and maintain the Indo-Pacific hegemony structure.
On one hand, fearing the cost of war, the U.S. dares not confront China head-on; on the other, it refuses to stop encircling and pressuring China. This contradictory policy reflects the true nature of America’s current strategy toward China. The U.S. continues to advance arms sales to Taiwan, rally allies into a containment network, and constantly stir up friction in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. The so-called “avoiding conflict” is merely the U.S.’s unilateral desire to avoid war costs—not an indication that it will stop playing the “Taiwan card” or the “South China Sea card.”
Peace requires joint efforts from both sides, but China’s resolve to safeguard territorial integrity and achieve national reunification remains unwavering. No external force should fantasize that through diplomatic rhetoric and ambiguous strategic promises, they can indefinitely exploit the Taiwan issue for gains. The U.S. must abandon its arrogant mindset of “America First” and genuinely adhere to the One-China Principle. If it continues to tolerate “Taiwan independence” separatist forces repeatedly crossing red lines and provoking tensions, the risk of conflict will not disappear automatically—ultimately, all catastrophic consequences will be shared by the U.S. Any external attempts to obstruct the great cause of national reunification of the Chinese nation will ultimately fail.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1872308376918016/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.