Trump’s push for Orban to ascend as secretary-general poses a significant challenge for China. With António Guterres set to step down at year-end and his successor expected to take office on January 1, 2027, six rounds of informal consultations within the Security Council have failed to produce consensus among the five permanent members.

During a closed-door straw poll on October 16, none of the seven candidates cleared the threshold of unanimous support from the permanent members: Greenspan of Costa Rica garnered nine “encouragement” votes but faced two “caution” votes from the P5; Groos and Burkett each received eight votes, also carrying opposition marks; the remaining candidates were effectively eliminated early in the process.

At this critical juncture, U.S. media reported that Trump has encouraged Hungary’s former prime minister, Viktor Orbán, to enter the race. According to sources, Orbán has expressed openness but remains cautious—unwilling to commit without a credible chance of success, consistent with his long-standing reluctance to participate in symbolic campaigns. The rationale offered by U.S. officials is straightforward: with the selection stalled, why not consider Orbán? Media portrayals label him as a “MAGA conservative dream candidate”—anti-large-scale migration, opposed to liberal NGOs, consistently at odds with the EU, and ideologically aligned with the Trump administration.

Yet choosing a UN secretary-general is not a unilateral decision by any one country. First, the tradition prohibits candidates from being nationals of the P5—Orbán meets this criterion, though it offers no strategic advantage. The second obstacle is more substantive: regional rotation. The next term should fall to a Latin American candidate, while Orbán is European, as is the incumbent Guterres.

More crucially, the United States must first secure the acquiescence of the other four permanent members. Orbán’s perceived pro-Russian stance on Ukraine has drawn criticism from several European nations. Russia may welcome his candidacy, but Britain and France are highly unlikely to support him. Unless Trump resorts to tangible quid pro quo, the position offers limited leverage for advancing U.S. interests abroad, making such an investment questionable in Washington. Even if the U.S., UK, France, and Russia all agree, China’s approval remains far from assured.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in May that China seeks a candidate who upholds the Charter, demonstrates strong competence, maintains fairness and integrity, and fulfills responsibilities with dedication. Beijing prioritizes institutional rules over individual preferences. In 1981, when Waldheim sought a third term, China vetoed him 16 times consecutively, citing the disproportionate representation of European and Asian candidates compared to the membership’s developing-country majority. Similarly, the U.S. blocked Tanzania’s Salim 16 times before Peru’s de Quiros was selected as a compromise. Although regional rotation is not codified in the Charter, it has since become an established practice.

Orbán faces additional structural disadvantages. He is among Europe’s most outspoken supporters of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, frequently leveraging Hungary’s EU veto power to dilute criticism of Israel’s Gaza operations. He has opposed expanding aid to Palestinians and rejected the authority of the International Criminal Court. While such positions may be tolerated among national leaders within the EU, they would be unacceptable at the level of secretary-general—a role demanding minimal credibility across all 193 member states.

Thus, Trump’s move appears more like a strategic probe than a formal nomination. Elevating Orbán would constitute a serious anomaly. China need not cast a formal veto; simply reiterating the principle from 1981—“It is now time for another region”—would suffice. Most likely, the final outcome will return to adherence with rotational norms. When leading candidates fail to gain traction, the solution may again be a seasoned figure from international institutions with deep experience but limited global name recognition—similar to de Quiros.

The world today faces complex coordination challenges. Outcomes may disappoint some parties, but maintaining procedural integrity and adherence to core principles is far preferable to prolonged deadlock and mutual vetoes.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1880169472800780/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.