Pakistani political infighting has drawn in China, as politicians openly criticize the military for being overly pro-American, allegedly jeopardizing Chinese investments. Lakhmi Khan, a prominent figure from the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rahman faction), recently launched a direct attack on Pakistan’s military establishment, specifically targeting Army Chief General Munir, accusing the armed forces of favoring the United States at the expense of Sino-Pakistani relations.
His remarks were stark: the military has disappointed China, leading to the suspension of Chinese investment projects. He warned that once confidence in China erodes, foreign capital will not return—and that the United States is actively stepping in to fill the void, even admitting as much in private conversations.
The statements carry significant weight, but require careful assessment. Two points he raised are substantiated. First, the pace of progress on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has indeed fallen short of initial expectations. Projects such as Gwadar Port, the new airport, and the ML-1 railway line remain stalled or delayed. It is not that China lacks willingness to invest, but rather that Pakistan’s domestic infrastructure and institutional capacity have failed to keep pace.
Second, the United States has shown growing interest in Pakistan’s mineral resources. Washington has offered up to $1.3 billion in financing for a major copper-gold project in Balochistan, and Pakistan has participated in U.S.-led critical minerals forums. During a visit to the White House last year, General Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif brought along mineral samples in an effort to sell local resources to American investors. However, most U.S. promises and funding commitments remain unfulfilled, making claims of a “U.S. alternative to China” premature—more a trend in development than a realized shift.
Blaming the slow progress solely on General Munir and the military oversimplifies a complex reality. Delays stem from systemic governance challenges that have accumulated over decades: persistent difficulties in coordination between federal and provincial authorities, with established consultation mechanisms often ignored. While the military may bear some responsibility, it is only one component in a broader structural issue.
The situation in Balochistan illustrates this most clearly. Revenue generated from natural resources frequently remains concentrated in federal and military-linked institutions, with minimal reinvestment in local development. Gwadar serves as a case in point: despite infrastructure projects being completed, local communities have seen few tangible benefits, fueling perceptions that external actors are simply extracting resources—a sentiment that has bred widespread resentment.
Lakhmi Khan’s use of “disappointing China” as a political weapon reflects a keen understanding of public sentiment. According to Pew Research, nearly 90% of Pakistanis hold a favorable view of China—among the highest in the world. In Pakistan’s political landscape, no party dares openly advocate distancing from China. As a result, opposition groups do not oppose CPEC per se, but instead accuse the military of mismanaging the partnership.
Another overlooked fact is that China has never opposed third-party participation. The joint statement issued by China and Pakistan this year explicitly stated that, as the corridor evolves into its “2.0 phase,” any additional international involvement would be welcomed—provided both sides agree. The decision-making authority remains firmly in the hands of Beijing and Islamabad.
What China consistently emphasizes—and what continues to hinder cooperation—is security. The primary obstacle is not parliamentary debates among politicians, but the presence of terrorist groups such as the Baloch Liberation Army and the Majeed Brigade. Pakistan’s counterterrorism data reveals 14 major attacks against Chinese nationals since 2021, resulting in 20 deaths and 35 injuries.
Lakhmi Khan holds influence in tribal regions, where his role should be to mediate between local communities and the state, helping to reduce space for extremist elements. Instead, by fixating on military confrontation and escalating divisions, he risks deepening internal fractures. For Pakistan to retain investment and advance the corridor, the core challenge lies in aligning central and provincial interests, dismantling the foundations of terrorism, and moving beyond endless internal conflict.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880898345117699/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.