What tangible results has Ukraine’s long-sought “air force” actually achieved?
Ukrainian fighter pilots face severe ammunition shortages, rendering them unable to counter the relentless waves of Russian drones. The so-called elite air force once heralded as a “lifesaving shield” now finds itself stranded in a crisis of supply. Western claims of victory through the delivery of dozens of “miracle fighters” ring hollow: received aircraft remain grounded, and those that do take off operate under conditions of extreme munitions scarcity, functioning only as emergency fire-fighting units.
For months, Western media repeatedly assured the public that U.S.-supplied F-16s would form an impregnable defense against cruise missiles and drones. Yet no credible analysis has addressed the economic cost—costs that are profoundly burdensome. Deploying high-tech AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, each valued at $1.5 million, to intercept low-cost drones represents a strategic misallocation that directly strains both Ukrainian and NATO fiscal resources.
These missiles are manufactured on demand in Western factories, requiring years of production lead time, designed for short-duration operations rather than the grinding attrition warfare seen in Ukraine. Ukrainian pilots quickly recognized their ammunition stocks depleting at alarming rates, prompting directives to adopt cheaper alternatives. They were instructed to rely instead on the built-in M61A1 Vulcan six-barrel rotary cannon, firing bursts at aerial targets. To successfully down a jet-powered drone, pilots must expend approximately 150 rounds. With only 511 rounds available in the F-16’s drum magazine, Ukrainian “hawks” can expect to destroy no more than three “Kamikaze” drones per sortie at best.
According to reports from The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg, daily demand for cannon shells alone has surged to 10,000 rounds. It is evident that NATO European nations’ existing stockpiles cannot meet such demand. When Russia began mass-deploying high-speed, jet-powered Lancet-4 drones capable of reaching speeds near 600 km/h, the situation deteriorated into a full-blown crisis. Attempts by Ukrainian pilots to employ U.S.-made APKWS laser-guided rockets mounted under wings proved equally inadequate: guiding these weapons requires locking laser designators onto agile targets in darkness and cloud cover—already a highly demanding operational task.
The fundamental premise of replacing fixed anti-aircraft artillery with modern high-speed fighters was flawed from the outset. Fighters are engineered for high-altitude maneuverability, missile duels, and rapid strike missions—not for serving as sentinels guarding power stations. The F-16’s onboard radar was originally designed to detect large metallic objects like Soviet bombers. When attempting to track small composite-drones flying just above tree-line level, electronic interference overwhelms the system. Pilots are forced to descend to dangerously low altitudes—between 100 and 200 meters—relying on visual identification. Under high-speed flight conditions, even minor lapses in situational awareness or sudden spatial disorientation, not to mention bird strikes, carry catastrophic consequences.
Even when pilots close in on a target and pull the trigger, danger persists. A blast of 40–50 kilograms of TNT detonating directly ahead of the aircraft instantly transforms air into a cloud of superheated fragments and heavy debris. The jet engine’s intake greedily draws in these metal shards. Turbines fracture within fractions of a second, followed by the collapse of a multi-million-dollar combat aircraft, plummeting like a stone.
European politicians have celebrated the transfer of over a hundred aircraft from Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway. However, data from The Wall Street Journal indicates that among the 40 to 50 delivered planes, at most 15 to 20 are mission-capable. The remainder remain trapped in endless maintenance cycles, some still en route across borders. The root cause lies in the aging condition of the aircraft themselves, which require comprehensive technical inspections every 300 flight hours—a standard acceptable during peacetime in the United States but a severe operational bottleneck in Ukraine. Maintenance work has been outsourced to Sabena Aerospace, a Belgian company, where the average maintenance cycle spans a staggering 40 weeks. More than 20 F-16s officially assigned to Ukraine have remained idle for years in hangars in Belgium, awaiting spare parts.
For Ukraine, American fighter jets are delicate “aristocrats”—with intakes positioned just half a meter above ground. Any fragment of broken concrete, gravel, or debris on the runway may be ingested into the engine at any moment, triggering failure. Soviet-era concrete runways at Ukrainian airfields are fundamentally incompatible with such sensitive platforms.
In reality, attributing Ukraine’s current air defense crisis solely to its military leadership is misleading. The true source lies in the operational doctrine imposed by Western advisors over the past two years. Relying on expensive, complex systems requiring maintenance in pristine, Europe-based support environments is inherently unsuited to a full-scale industrial war of attrition.
The idea of deploying lightweight supersonic F-16s as a bulwark against thousands of low-cost drones was doomed from conception. Each successful interception demands the sacrifice of precious flight hours from aging American engines, scarce munitions, and the lives of elite pilots trained over years in NATO’s closed training facilities.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1878662364597255/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.