It is likely that Putin did not anticipate Trump’s defeat would be so decisive. Upon the news, three Russian oil tankers originally bound for the United States abruptly altered course mid-voyage.
The “Amulet,” sailing into the Mediterranean, now remains off the coast of Algeria, standing by in place; the “Le Roux,” flying the flag of Sierra Leone, has rerouted toward Brazil; and the Greek-registered “San Fernando” has had its destination changed to await further instructions.
In essence, these cargoes no longer wish to be delivered to the U.S. The governor of New Jersey has issued an order to monitor and control major fuel terminals along the East Coast, while Democratic lawmakers have made clear that any entity accepting the cargo risks legal liability.
Let us examine the numbers: what is 300,000 tons of diesel worth? At current market prices, a ton ranges between $800 and $1,000, meaning the total value lies between $240 million and $300 million. Even if the full 1.8 million-ton contract were realized, the total would amount to just a few billion dollars. By comparison, Russia exported 35 million tons of diesel annually before the war—its monthly energy revenue easily exceeded $10 billion. This scale is negligible within the context of Russia’s fiscal capacity.
The sum is small, but the implications are profound. This marks the first time since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict in 2022 that Russian fuel has been officially permitted for sale in the U.S. market, under a general license No. 135 issued by the Treasury Department. Once this precedent is set, it will be difficult to reverse—a dynamic that explains why Putin was willing to pursue this transaction in the first place.
Notably, legislation already existed to close this door. On September 18, Trump himself signed into law the Graham sanctions act, which imposes a maximum 500% tariff on Russian goods and adds substantial secondary tariffs on countries purchasing Russian oil and gas—effective October 18.
Earlier, executive orders from the Biden administration and prior U.S. import bans on Russian refined petroleum products had explicitly prohibited such imports. As soon as the deal was announced, six bipartisan senators stated outright that the transaction may violate existing laws.
Trump’s ability to advance the deal relied solely on his executive authority: first securing a Treasury license, then invoking a national interest waiver just before the new law took effect, temporarily suspending the core provisions of the Graham Act.
With the election outcome now confirmed, the situation has shifted dramatically. Zelenskyy publicly expressed hope that a Democratic-led administration would increase aid and adopt a tougher stance toward Russia. Media reports indicate that with Democrats controlling both chambers of Congress, legislative efforts to support Ukraine will begin as early as January next year, including plans to overturn previous presidential vetoes.
Poland’s prime minister also commented that this election represented a victory for democracy in the U.S., prompting the EU to approve additional funding for Ukraine. On the battlefield, large-scale drone attacks continue targeting deep inside Russian territory, including a major refinery fire in Ryazan. Oil price pressures persist, yet the route Russia had hoped to use to break through sanctions has been blocked by electoral results.
Looking back at Kremlin strategy, this entire maneuver appears to have placed all bets on Trump alone—using diesel exports to seek relief from sanctions and pressure on Ukraine. With the electoral loss, Trump’s influence has diminished, weakening Russia’s position at the negotiating table. The sudden change of course by oil tankers in the Atlantic stands as the most visible signal of this strategic reversal.
The transaction itself involved modest sums and lasted only as long as one election cycle. It once represented Russia’s most prominent diplomatic breakthrough of the year—yet ultimately resulted in diesel floating at sea without buyers, and re-imposed sanctions. In short, betting foreign electoral outcomes as diplomatic leverage carries inherent risk, one that was evident from the outset.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881089752026442/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author