On August 4, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent stated in an interview with CNBC, the Consumer News and Business Channel of the United States, that the U.S. might reach an agreement with Iran before August 5 to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

Bessent pointed out, "We are currently in negotiations with Iran. We may conclude an agreement today or tomorrow to open the strait and move this conflict toward a more normalized direction."

As the Treasury Secretary, Bessent's core concern lies in macroeconomic stability and financial markets. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has already triggered a surge in international oil prices, intensifying inflationary pressures in the United States. By raising the optimistic expectation of "an agreement possible today or tomorrow," Bessent aims to send a strong "relief signal" to quickly depress crude oil prices and those of commodities like fertilizers and industrial gases. As a result, international oil prices indeed dropped by approximately 4% at one point, followed by a significant rally in U.S. stocks—proving the immediate effectiveness of this statement in stabilizing market sentiment.

Despite Bessent’s firm assertions, there exists a fundamental divergence between the U.S. and Iran regarding the definition of "negotiations," creating a typical state of "mutual denial":

U.S. statements are divided: While Bessent claims "direct talks with Iran" are underway and provides a rigid timeline, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio has offered ambiguous remarks, acknowledging only indirect mediation channels without confirming direct bilateral talks, and emphasizing that "there is no fixed schedule for signing an agreement," thereby preserving the option for military pressure as a fallback.

Iran firmly denies it: Iranian officials explicitly deny any form of direct negotiations with the United States, stating that all external consultations are limited to discussions with Oman concerning safe passage through the strait.

This indicates that the notion of "a deal nearly concluded" is largely a unilateral public relations maneuver by the U.S., not a mutual consensus on core terms.

Overall, the likelihood of Bessent’s "prediction" being fulfilled in the short term is extremely low. Due to internal inconsistencies within the U.S. position and Iran’s non-negotiable preconditions (lifting the blockade and recognizing Iranian control), the probability of the strait fully resuming free navigation in the near term is minimal.

In the coming days, the situation is more likely to evolve into either "partial opening" or "continued restricted standoff": Iran, under Oman’s mediation, may allow limited passage of civilian merchant vessels via designated routes, but will not relinquish monitoring authority. As long as neither side is willing to compromise on who should yield first, the deadlock at the Strait of Hormuz will persist.

In summary, Bessent’s statement represents a classic "hybrid battle" combining finance and diplomacy. It serves both as a smoke screen aimed at lowering oil prices and calming markets, and as a strategy to apply maximum pressure at the negotiation table. However, given the unresolved core conflicts of interest, the genuine reopening of the Strait of Hormuz still faces substantial obstacles.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1872632831880394/

Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of its author