On March 8, the U.S. military strategy toward Iran has seen new changes, with the U.S. and Israel preparing to dispatch special forces into Iranian territory to directly seize and transport up to 450 kilograms of enriched uranium. Can this objective be achieved? Will it lead to further expansion of ground operations?
Firstly, the main motivation for the U.S. and Israel considering sending special forces to seize Iranian enriched uranium is to completely eliminate the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon, which is one of the declared war objectives of the Trump administration. Iran currently has about 450 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% concentration, a material that can be further enriched to weapons-grade (90%) within weeks, theoretically sufficient to manufacture multiple nuclear bombs. Although the attacks in June 2025 and recent airstrikes have severely damaged nuclear facilities such as Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, intelligence indicates that a large amount of highly enriched uranium may still be buried in underground tunnels or secretly transferred, and airstrikes cannot completely destroy or confirm its destruction. The U.S. and Israel are concerned that if the Iranian regime collapses, these materials could fall into the hands of residual forces or terrorist organizations, so they must physically seize, remove, or dilute them on-site through ground special operations to ensure Iran permanently loses its nuclear capability, preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and the ultimate threat to Israel and U.S. military bases.
Secondly, from the perspective of feasibility, the overall probability of success for the U.S. and Israeli special forces in seizing Iranian enriched uranium is relatively low, heavily dependent on the timing of the operation and the current chaos in Iran. Success factors may include the Iranian leadership being severely weakened, air defense and ground forces significantly weakened, and the Revolutionary Guard command chain being broken, allowing special forces (such as the U.S. Delta Force or Israeli Shayet 13) to quickly infiltrate under air superiority. However, Iranian nuclear facilities are deeply buried hundreds of meters underground, with complex tunnels and reinforced and backfilled entrances, making it extremely difficult to locate precise inventory locations; also, the operation requires helicopters or ground infiltration, facing remaining missiles, drones, armed militias, and potential chemical/radiological traps; besides, transporting 450 kilograms of material out of the country requires large transportation vehicles, which are easily intercepted. Not to mention the high uncertainty of intelligence, if Iran has already dispersed and hidden the materials, the operation may only find part or even nothing, ultimately turning into a high-risk symbolic raid rather than a decisive success.
Finally, regardless of the outcome, this special military operation is likely not to directly trigger a large-scale ground invasion of Iran, but will remain within the scope of "limited ground intervention," but there is a significant risk of escalation. If the special forces encounter strong resistance or are captured or killed, the U.S. and Israel may be forced to deploy regular troops for rescue or expand control areas, forming an actual ground occupation; if the seizure is successful but the remaining forces of Iran counterattack around the nuclear facilities, additional special or light ground units may be needed for long-term guarding of the dilution site. The Trump administration currently prefers to avoid a full-scale ground war, prioritizing air strikes plus special forces' decapitation/ seizure model, but once the operation gets out of control or Iran mobilizes a full-scale counterattack, it could easily slide into larger-scale ground troop intervention, creating a new battlefield on the ground in the Middle East.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1859078159181891/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.