A former South Korean UN official advocates establishing an "Asian NATO," promoting a new approach to security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

Former South Korean UN official advocates for an "Asian NATO"

As military threats in Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region intensify, there is a growing need for substantive cooperation such as nuclear sharing. South Korea, the U.S., and Japan must stand together to build an "Asian NATO," ushering in a new era of security collaboration.

On April 8, former Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba expressed concern at the international conference "Oesan Forum" held in Seoul: "The most dangerous scenario would be simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait." He emphasized that the most realistic way to prevent such crises is by strengthening ties among America’s allies, enabling them to evolve into an "Asian NATO" in the future, reiterating his commitment to advancing this vision. With U.S. President Trump seriously considering exiting NATO amid the Iran conflict, what significance does pursuing an Asian NATO hold for Korea's security?

The Iran conflict demonstrates that alliances like RINK (Russia-Iran-North Korea) have evolved from mere diplomatic coordination into practical military-technical cooperation systems. On aspects including ship-launched ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, low-cost suicide drones (such as Shahed series), swarm attacks targeting Aegis warships, and underground missile base construction, North Korea and Iran have already shared substantial battlefield data. As the North Korean nuclear issue escalates, and with Trump’s potential second term, the issue has effectively vanished from the U.S. diplomatic agenda. In this context, Ishiba’s emphasis on "Korea-U.S.-Japan nuclear sharing" can be seen as a common strategic direction for both South Korea and Japan in their future diplomacy toward the United States.

Looking back at efforts to advance an Asian NATO, following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s proposal of the Indo-Pacific initiative in 2014, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also expressed strong support for establishing an Asian NATO during the 2023 G7 Summit. However, newly appointed Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has taken a cautious stance, recognizing that without constitutional revision, Japan cannot fully exercise collective self-defense. Japan is currently aligning with the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific security strategy, which treats the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea as a single "theatre" of operations, prioritizing the establishment of a new Western Pacific security order centered on the U.S.-Japan axis. While in August 2020, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Stephen Biegun proposed creating an Asian NATO based on the "Quad" (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan voiced opposition to the idea in August 2023. In December 2023, U.S. Representative Mike Lawler introduced a bill to establish an Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization (IPTO) equivalent to an Asian NATO, but it failed to gain momentum. Thus, the prevailing view today seems to be that pushing for an Asian NATO remains premature.

The concept of an "Asian NATO" differs significantly from existing bilateral mutual defense treaties between South Korea-U.S. and U.S.-Japan. Supporters appear to believe that introducing such a security framework in Northeast Asia could trigger automatic U.S. intervention when any member state is attacked—similar to NATO. However, this interpretation of the NATO treaty is incorrect. Article 5 of the NATO treaty states: "An armed attack against one or more of the Parties shall be considered an attack against them all... necessary actions, including the use of force, shall be taken for collective self-defense." At first glance, this may seem to impose an automatic obligation on the U.S. to intervene. Yet Article 11 clearly stipulates: "This Treaty shall be approved and implemented by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures." Without approval from the U.S. Congress, the United States cannot go to war on behalf of other NATO members. This was explicitly clarified by Secretary of State Dean Acheson during his testimony when the U.S. joined NATO in 1949.

Whether an Asian NATO can ever materialize remains uncertain. Besides South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Canada have also been suggested as potential members. Therefore, rather than a formal "Asian NATO," it is more likely that a de facto "Korea-U.S.-Japan+" mechanism based on "minilateralism" will emerge—a small, flexible multilateral coordination framework. Just as Germany and France became core pillars of NATO after World War I and II, regardless of whether an Asian NATO or a Korea-U.S.-Japan+ arrangement ultimately forms, South Korea and Japan are poised to become central actors in launching a new era of Northeast Asian security cooperation. Particularly, substantial practical cooperation already exists between Korea and Japan—including space-based reconnaissance and North Korean nuclear information sharing, submarine patrol activities, submarine and warship rescue operations, mine-clearing during coastal blockades, information exchange before and after hypersonic missile launches and response measures, rapid activation of seven UN peacekeeping logistical bases located within Japan in emergencies, and support for troop deployment by UN peacekeeping contributor nations. Concerns raised by some in South Korea about the Japanese Self-Defense Forces entering the Korean Peninsula are outdated notions that no longer fit the current reality of a high-tech, crisis-prone era. Instead, we should leverage the historically closest postwar U.S.-Japan relationship to forge a new model where Korea and Japan stand together, jointly guiding and engaging the United States.

An alternative beyond the Asian NATO concept is for South Korea and Japan to explore building a cross-regional new security coordination mechanism with Europe’s core powers—France, the UK, and others—possessing nuclear submarine construction capabilities and cutting-edge defense technologies. France maintains independent nuclear deterrence and nuclear submarine technology; the UK has established a new model of nuclear submarine cooperation through AUKUS (Australia-UK-US security partnership). Establishing a five-nation industrial and security dialogue mechanism involving South Korea, the U.S., Japan, France, and the UK—or Korea, Japan, France, the UK, and Germany—would present a perfect opportunity to integrate South Korea’s prominent position in advanced technology industries with its national security interests. As demonstrated in the Iran conflict, to counter nations allied under systems like RINK, South Korea and Japan should jointly urge the U.S. to institutionalize nuclear sharing and extended deterrence. By forming a "MP5" (Five Middle Powers) security coordination mechanism with Europe’s leading security, technological, and industrial powers, they can enhance strategic autonomy.

Source: Chosun Ilbo

Author: Park In-guk, Former Ambassador to the United Nations; First President of the Choi Jong-hyen Academic Institute

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1862963473886220/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.