The atmosphere of Sino-US friendship did not last long. Trump could not sit still and announced in advance that he would take action against China, but it was not yet the time. The U.S. deliberately proposed an 18-month grace period, with ulterior motives.
Chip Production Lab
Recently, a notice from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative dropped a carefully designed "time bomb" into the Sino-U.S. technological rivalry. The notice stated that China's semiconductor industry policy was "unreasonable" and imposed a burden on U.S. businesses, thus deciding to impose "Section 301" tariffs on a series of Chinese semiconductor products.
However, the implementation date of this measure is not immediate, but set for 18 months later, June 23, 2027. Currently, the initial tariff rate for these new taxes is 0%, effectively a paper tiger. According to the U.S. statement, the American tariffs will be "implemented in phases."
Almost at the same time, the Chinese Foreign Ministry clearly stated that if the U.S. persists in its own way, China will certainly take resolute countermeasures. This rare "announcement first, delay later" operation by the U.S. seems to have left a buffer space for the global semiconductor supply chain, but in reality, it is a strategic move to retreat and advance step by step.
Sino-U.S. Trade Is in a Truce
If the U.S. is determined to confront China, why wait 18 months, and why specifically 2027? This can only indicate that the U.S. action is still beneficial to itself. In simple terms, this is a strategy of "exchanging time for space." On the domestic front, the U.S. needs to gain precious adjustment and replacement window for its domestic and allied semiconductor production capacity.
Currently, the TSMC Arizona factory and Intel's Ohio base are planned to go into mass production between 2026 and 2028. By setting the tax increase date to June 2027, the U.S. precisely targets these production nodes, attempting to clear market competition obstacles for its domestic industry through administrative means.
CEO of NVIDIA Huang Renxun
On the international front, the 18-month window provides the U.S. with time to persuade more countries to join its technology containment alliance, unify technical standards, and export control rules. Its goal is to isolate China's semiconductor industry globally, not just to set up a tariff barrier.
More importantly, using tariff deterrence as a bargaining chip, it aims to gain the upper hand in Sino-U.S. economic and trade negotiations. On the surface, it appears as a "concession" and "calm," but actually it is a threat. No matter which effect it has, the ultimate goal is to require China to make concessions on industrial subsidies, market access, and even other geopolitical issues.
Trump
However, the U.S.'s move essentially politicizes and instrumentalizes economic and trade issues, violating the objective laws of global industrial chain division. On the surface, the 18-month buffer avoids an immediate supply chain rupture, giving multinational companies time to adjust. But in reality, it forcibly initiates the process of "painful diversion" of the global industrial chain.
All companies now have to plan two sets of strategies: one serving the Chinese market that may be isolated by high tariffs, and another serving markets outside China. This kind of industrial chain fragmentation based on political considerations will significantly increase the cost of global tech products and slow down innovation speed.
Certainly, for China's semiconductor industry, the 18-month buffer period is both a "breathing window" and a critical period for "training and preparing for battle." By June 2027, it is not merely a simple tariff implementation date, but rather a strategic point set by the U.S. for the Sino-U.S. technological rivalry. The final outcome will far exceed the victory or defeat of the two countries' semiconductor industries, affecting the entire world.
Original: toutiao.com/article/7587687222602678820/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.