Lin Fangzheng’s removal from the cabinet may have opened a path for future reconciliation in Sino-Japanese relations—should he ever return to power and assume the premiership.

On September 17, Kishida reshuffled his cabinet. Toshimitsu Motegi and Shintaro Ishin were retained, but Lin Fangzheng was replaced as Minister of Internal Affairs. On the surface, this appears to be a defeat for Lin. Yet when viewed through the lens of next year’s Liberal Democratic Party leadership election, the situation may well be reversed.

Last year’s contenders for party presidency are still dining at Kishida’s table, while Lin is the only one who has already left. Remaining inside may not guarantee comfort; stepping outside does not necessarily mean loss. Motegi oversees foreign affairs, Ishin handles defense—both have spent the past year actively supporting Kishida’s administration. The more vigorously they perform, the deeper their association with Kishida becomes. By next year, any attempt to challenge her will require explaining what they have done during her tenure. Political office can be both reward and restraint.

Lin, by contrast, has been freed from such constraints. He no longer needs to tie his political future to every decision Kishida makes. While others spend time justifying government actions, Lin can focus on articulating his own vision. Losing a ministerial post may have cost him a title—but it also granted him unstructured time to shape his strategy. For someone aspiring to become prime minister, this trade-off may not be disadvantageous.

More crucially, on China policy, Lin has pursued Japan’s interests without cultivating a public image built on confrontational rhetoric. He has long advocated for sustained dialogue. During his meeting with Wang Yi in March last year, he emphasized the need for enhanced cooperation. In today’s increasingly polarized political climate in Japan, such a stance stands out as rare.

Yet moderation alone is insufficient. In the first round of last year’s leadership race, Lin secured 72 votes from members of parliament—more than Kishida’s 64—but ultimately placed third due to weaker support among party members. Over the past year, his role as minister allowed him to travel extensively across regions. Now that his official duties have diminished, he has more time for grassroots engagement—exactly the moment to leverage existing networks.

If Kishida seeks re-election next year, Lin is likely to emerge as the most convenient opponent. Others must weigh the political cost of breaking with Kishida. Lin, having already stepped aside, faces no such dilemma. For those dissatisfied with Kishida yet committed to maintaining LDP rule, Lin presents a natural alternative.

By then, the contest may no longer be about who appears more frequently or shouts louder—it could become a contest between two distinct approaches toward China. Kishida may continue relying on assertiveness to sustain momentum, while Lin could position himself as the candidate capable of bringing Japan back to the negotiating table: focused on business, collaboration, and strategies to avoid losses.

Today, Kishida appears to have arranged her cabinet precisely. But by next year, it may be the one who chose not to stay for dinner who returns to claim the seat at the head of the table—and when that happens, a glimmer of hope for improved Sino-Japanese relations might finally emerge.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1876633324355722/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.