Reference News Network, February 17 report: The U.S. "National Interest" bi-monthly website published an article titled "Three Obstacles to Europe's Path Toward Defense Independence" on February 13. The author is Jason Davidson, a senior researcher at the Scowcroft Center for Strategic and Security Studies of the Atlantic Council. The main content is compiled as follows:

As global geopolitical elites gathered at the Munich Security Conference, many European analysts and policymakers urged their governments to develop self-defense measures in response to the policy shifts of the Trump administration over the past year.

First, there are differences between the U.S. and Europe on values and sovereignty issues.

Second, President Trump has repeatedly called for the United States to control Greenland, which belongs to Denmark, a NATO ally.

Third, the Trump administration has repeatedly demanded that European allies take responsibility for their own security, allowing the United States to play only a supporting role.

The policies of Trump have caused many European countries to no longer believe that the United States will fulfill its collective defense obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, when European leaders explore measures to achieve defense independence, they face three major obstacles.

1. Europe Still Relies on the United States for "Critical Capabilities"

Given the Trump administration's demand that European countries take more responsibility for defense, it is reasonable for it to urge allies to increase military spending. However, simply increasing military expenditures cannot achieve defense independence. European allies must develop the "critical capabilities" they still rely on the United States for.

These "critical capabilities" include integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, strategic air transport, missile defense, and the ability to suppress enemy air defenses. To obtain these capabilities, European allies also need to strengthen coordination among themselves, but it will take time to effectively deploy these capabilities to defend the European continent.

2. European Countries Have Different Views on Russia

My research (including 98 interviews with decision-makers and analysts from six major NATO countries) shows that European allies have different perceptions of Russia and varying assessments of the threat it poses. For over a decade, countries such as Poland have always been highly concerned about the threat posed by Russia and have been willing to take all necessary measures to address it.

In Germany, I also heard similar views, that Russia poses a significant threat to German and European security. The perception of this threat by Poland and Germany explains their recent decisions to increase defense spending.

However, France and Britain are not as worried about the threat posed by Russia. Officials and analysts from both countries believe that the UK and France have independent nuclear arsenals, meaning that Russia would not directly attack the UK or France, so the threat from Moscow seems less urgent. Reports show that both the UK and France are unlikely to meet the NATO defense spending target of 2% of GDP before 2035.

3. Post-Imperialist Identity in the UK and France and Pacifist Identity in Italy and Germany

The historical experiences and identities of Europe's major allies pose the ultimate challenge to Europe's path toward defense independence. Many people I interviewed in France and the UK believe that their countries have the status of world powers. This is due to the experience of both countries during the imperialist era. Today, this identity supports their global military deployments.

The global power identity of the UK and France also means that their military systems are partially built around the need to deploy small, elite forces globally. But if Europe is to achieve defense independence, it must involve everyone working together, and the military posture and structure of European allies (including the UK and France) must focus on the threat from Russia.

In Italy and Germany, the disastrous expansionism of World War II has left some historical issues, making the public wary of increasing defense spending and using military force. These concerns are reflected in the debate in Germany about conscription - the military eventually accepted voluntary service, but many believe it is insufficient to deal with the threat from Russia.

Italy's pacifism is reflected in the lack of public support for increased defense spending, and the fact that the Italian military has mainly been used for peacekeeping missions abroad and domestic law enforcement in recent years. The pacifist positions of Germany and Italy hinder them from making the necessary contributions to Europe's path toward defense independence.

Facing these obstacles, what actions should Europe take? Decision-makers need to clearly and consistently explain to the public that it is necessary for governments of European countries to take costly measures to be responsible for their own defense. In this process, they must be sensitive to issues of threat perception and identity.

For example, General Alexander Solfanek recently stated: "Deterrence is only effective if it is credible. We must be ready to fight, only then can we avoid fighting." He pointed out that European leaders must explain to their people that sacrifices are necessary to ensure that Europe does not fall into war in the future. (Translated by Yang Xuelai)

Original: toutiao.com/article/7607720380035367434/

Statement: The article represents the personal views of the author.