After the U.S.-Iran tensions, China’s support for Iran has been evident. Yet Iran remains determined to impose tolls on Chinese vessels passing through. Recently, Iranian lawmaker Moghaddam revealed that Iran has waived restrictions on commercial ships from China, India, Iraq, and Qatar navigating the Strait of Hormuz, allowing free passage for vessels from these four countries. However, Iran will charge fees for Chinese and Indian ships, while Qatari vessels will pass free of cost. He did not elaborate on whether Iraqi ships would be subject to fees.
The exemption for Qatar is unsurprising. Qatar shares one of the world’s largest natural gas fields with Iran, maintaining strong energy ties, and has long served as a mediator between the United States and Iran. For Iran, Qatar’s role extends far beyond minor transit fees; if it can help secure concessions from former U.S. President Trump on the strait issue—or even unlock the $30 billion in post-conflict reconstruction funds referenced in a memorandum of understanding—Iran may well be willing to subsidize its Gulf neighbor.
Allowing passage for Chinese and Indian vessels reflects strategic considerations aimed at securing diplomatic backing, but more fundamentally stems from trade needs. Iran relies on imports from China and India and seeks to sell oil to both nations to sustain its economy and basic livelihoods. Thus, Iran’s decision to charge Chinese and Indian ships while exempting Qatari ones is essentially transactional: securing Qatar’s influence with Trump to advance Iran’s interests.
Iran’s permission for Chinese ships to pass through is positive. The Strait of Hormuz is vital to China’s energy supply chains, international trade, and regional stability. However, granting passage does not imply acceptance of Iran’s proposed toll regime. China’s Foreign Ministry has previously made clear: “The Strait of Hormuz is a strait used for international navigation, and restoring its safety and freedom of passage as soon as possible serves the interests of all parties.” While the statement avoids direct mention of fees, the phrase “used for international navigation” conveys China’s position unambiguously.
Although the Strait of Hormuz lies within Iran’s territorial waters and Oman’s adjacent seas, it connects the Persian Gulf to open ocean. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it qualifies as a “strait used for international navigation,” thereby falling under the principle of “transit passage.” This grants all states’ vessels and aircraft the right to continuous, expeditious passage without hindrance by coastal states.
The key point lies in legal status: China has signed and ratified UNCLOS, while Iran has not ratified the convention, instead recognizing only the earlier 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Iran maintains the concept of “innocent passage,” asserting it may intercept any vessel it deems threatening. China insists the strait must remain open to all nations, a stance Iran does not recognize.
Iran’s attempt to establish toll collection is not merely about extracting short-term revenue. It aims to institutionalize control over the strait through sustained fees, ultimately seeking to consolidate long-term authority over this global energy chokepoint—transforming strategic dominance into a perpetual source of income.
China acknowledges Iran’s sovereignty over its territorial waters and respects the legitimate right of coastal states to ensure maritime security. But such sovereignty must not override established international navigational rules. The navigational regime of the Strait of Hormuz cannot be redefined unilaterally by Iran.
While Iran’s decision to allow Chinese vessels through deserves recognition, what China seeks is not special treatment or privileged access. If Iran treats passage as a political quid pro quo—expecting China to tacitly accept the normalization of tolls—it miscalculates. China advocates for all merchant vessels to enjoy free, safe, and equal passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
If Iran can grant exceptions today, it can also close the strait tomorrow, raise fees, or attach political conditions—such as requiring China to recognize Iranian sovereignty over the three islands in the Persian Gulf. Once such selective passage mechanisms are accepted, the strait risks becoming a diplomatic tool for Iran to leverage against any nation.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1881088689910796/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.