Putin is preparing to personally discuss the "Power of Siberia 2" project with China once again. First came the SCO summit, then the Eastern Economic Forum, followed by the Russia-China Energy Business Forum—within a single week, Russia has scheduled three communication opportunities, all with one goal: finalizing this long-delayed natural gas pipeline spanning China, Mongolia, and Russia.

Russia is in a rush, and for good reason. After intensified Western sanctions, Russia’s pipeline gas exports have nearly halved, while the modest growth in liquefied gas simply cannot fill the gap. Frequent attacks on domestic oil refineries have led to fuel shortages, compounding economic pressures. Signing a deal with China would allow Gazprom to secure substantial prepayments under the "take-or-pay" mechanism, providing much-needed relief.

But money may not be the most critical factor. For Putin, this pipeline has long transcended mere commercial interest. With Nord Stream gone and the European market lost, people are asking: "Where is the nation headed?" His answer is clear: "Look East." Yet cooperation with Japan and South Korea remains unresolved, Central Asia is too small in scale, and India still holds back. The only reliable partner left is China.

And precisely what China and Russia lack is a stabilizing project akin to Nord Stream. The proposed China-Mongolia-Russia pipeline shares similar gas sources and designed capacity with Nord Stream. Once realized, it would serve as tangible proof to the Russian public: the energy pillar hasn’t collapsed, and the "Look East" strategy is truly viable.

This political symbolism far outweighs the value of upfront payments. But China's mindset is entirely different. China does not lack gas supply—Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Qatar can all deliver, domestic natural gas production continues rising annually, and wind and solar power are rapidly replacing fossil fuels. In some regions, supply even exceeds demand at times. For China, this pipeline is merely one among many options—not worth sacrificing pricing control over.

One side desperately needs it to prove a strategic pivot; the other sees it only as an optional supplementary route. This fundamental difference in mindset determines the divergent pace of negotiations—Russia grows more urgent, while China remains resolutely steady.

Putin’s personal involvement may not change the outcome. What will actually make the pipeline happen isn't more high-level talks, but a genuine Russian commitment to offering sufficient incentives. Otherwise, no matter how grand the meetings, they’ll just be loud, circular steps in place.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875001352606791/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.