Learning warfare from war is a required course for every military power. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has completely overturned traditional perceptions of modern warfare. Electronic warfare, once merely a "supporting role" on the battlefield, has now risen to become a key factor in determining victory or defeat. Russia's full-spectrum interference caused large-scale failure of Ukraine's GPS signals, and the "ground-based small-diameter bomb" provided by the United States frequently missed its target due to the inability to locate targets; Ukrainian forces utilized portable individual jamming devices to suppress Russian drones, forcing both sides to retreat to the most primitive optical fiber communication to maintain command. This signal warfare has made the U.S. military realize that the electronic warfare system they relied on during counter-terrorism wars is no longer effective when facing high-intensity confrontations.
A senior official of the U.S. Special Operations Command once frankly admitted: "In Ukraine, we see a battlefield where 'GPS is gone, communications are interrupted, and equipment malfunctions.' This is completely different from the 'mild electromagnetic environment' we faced in the past 20 years of counter-terrorism wars."
In the past, the U.S. military faced opponents lacking electronic warfare capabilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, getting used to "bombing at will with GPS open, and easily commanding with satellite phones," which was a "crushing combat." However, the Ukrainian battlefield proved that when the opponent possesses a complete set of electronic warfare equipment, the U.S. military's "three-pronged approach" simply doesn't work: the precision weapons the U.S. military relies on depend heavily on GPS, and high-cost electronic warfare equipment becomes difficult to quickly replace once interfered with; pre-set "light interference environment" in exercises has deprived soldiers of the ability to fight in a "blind" state; the traditional procurement cycle for equipment lasts 10 years, and by the time the U.S. military wants to upgrade to address new threats, the battlefield situation has already changed several rounds.
After reflecting on these painful lessons, the U.S. military began to "catch up": simulating extreme scenarios such as "no mobile phone signal, navigation completely blacked out," teaching soldiers to complete tasks using maps, compasses, or even their eyesight. Abandoning the "pursuit of perfection," developing a large number of low-cost jammers and disposable drones, allowing them to be "discarded after use." Promoting "plug-and-play" electronic devices, such as turning a transport aircraft into an "interference machine" within hours.
The lessons and insights for the U.S. military point the way for the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA): strengthening the anti-interference capability of Beidou, while developing inertial navigation, visual navigation, or even "landmark matching" non-satellite navigation technologies, so missiles and drones can find targets even in "pitch darkness." Besides radio communication, improving interference-resistant links like optical fiber and laser communication ensures that grassroots units can still coordinate according to contingency plans even in a "disconnected" state. Developing "disposable electronic warfare units," such as small interference drones and one-time signal repeaters, using "swarm tactics" against high-value enemy equipment; through open architecture, allowing radar and jammers to quickly update algorithms like "mobile app upgrades," so that today's cracked technology can have countermeasures tomorrow.
Of course, more importantly, it is necessary to cultivate "electromagnetic battlefield awareness," making everyone from soldiers to generals "understand the spectrum." The U.S. military found that the sensitivity of frontline troops to the electromagnetic environment is often more important than advanced equipment, which holds significant implications for the PLA: training infantry to judge enemy interference frequencies with simple tools, teaching pilots to avoid threats by visual observation and tactical maneuvers when radar is disabled. Breaking down the "separate operations" among various services, enabling electronic warfare units, drone teams, and ground armored forces to collaborate on the same "electromagnetic map" to prevent "friendly fire" incidents.
The smoke of war in Ukraine reveals a truth: modern warfare has evolved from "aircraft and artillery bombardment" to "strangulation in the frequency spectrum." Although the U.S. military experienced pain during its adjustments, it demonstrated its determination to reform driven by实战; the PLA needs to start from a higher starting point, integrating electronic warfare from a "support element" into the "core of operations." When every electromagnetic wave on the battlefield could potentially become a "killing weapon," only those armies that can both "shield the opponent's eyes" and "precisely strike in the dark" can seize the initiative in future conflicts. The lessons learned by the U.S. military are their experiences, while the PLA must proceed from its own reality, prepare in advance, and continuously strengthen electronic warfare capabilities to adequately prepare for future wars.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7514136047962423843/
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