Foreign Media: Strategic Implications Behind the PLA’s “Silent Drills”
According to a report published on November 11, 2026, by The Diplomat website, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has recently deployed large-scale naval and air forces around Taiwan and across the Western Pacific. Although Beijing has not formally announced any military exercises, the scale and geographic scope of the deployments have drawn significant international attention. In a joint assessment titled “China and Taiwan Dynamics,” released on November 6 by the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISW) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), it was noted that the PLA may be conducting an undeclared large-scale military exercise simulating a blockade and isolation of Taiwan. Media outlets in Taiwan, reporting on the ISW-AEI analysis, referred to this operation as a “silent drill.”
On November 3, Wu Chao-xie, head of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, stated that over 100 PLA naval vessels and coast guard ships were deployed in relevant waters of the Western Pacific. These operations spanned the Northern, Eastern, and Southern theater commands and included at least four major surface combatant task groups, among them the Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group. Additional indications suggest that the Fujian aircraft carrier has departed from its base at Sanya, Hainan.
On November 2, Taiwan’s defense authorities detected 49 sorties of PLA military aircraft, with 36 operating south of Taiwan—potentially coordinated with long-range naval deployments.
The ISW-AEI report observed that the scale of PLA training activities last week exceeded that of the 2025 “Mission of Justice” circum-Taiwan drills. The presence of the Liaoning in the Western Pacific, the Fujian near the Bashi Strait, coast guard vessels operating east of Taiwan, and further movements of additional warships and aircraft conducting joint readiness patrols collectively suggest a possible effort to create a strategic encirclement of the island.
From the structural and operational level of the PLA’s training, the current activities appear more likely to represent cross-theater deep-sea force deployments and joint command-and-control exercises involving naval units from different theaters, rather than a dedicated exercise designed specifically to blockade or isolate Taiwan. The focus appears to lie in how the PLA Navy can disperse its fleet into smaller task groups to evade surveillance by U.S. and regional actors, penetrate the first island chain, and establish forward presence in the Western Pacific.
An important point worth noting is that naval task groups under each theater command may not be fully aware of their ultimate deployment objectives prior to departure. Upon reaching designated tactical positions, they may receive new operational directives from either their respective theater joint operations command centers or the Central Military Commission.
Regarding the intensive joint readiness patrols conducted between October and November, a plausible explanation lies in the relatively frequent typhoons during the summer and autumn seasons, which may have disrupted the PLA Air Force’s ability to meet required flight training hours. As such, these activities may not primarily aim to retaliate against or respond to Taipei, but instead serve to fulfill routine operational training requirements. Such naval training should still be distinguished from actual joint warfare preparations targeting Taiwan, as the gap between them remains substantial.
What draws the most attention in this deployment is not merely the number of combat-capable vessels involved, but the coordinated actions among the Northern, Southern, and Eastern coastal theater commands, as well as the potential integration of three distinct maritime forces: the PLA Navy, China Coast Guard, and maritime militia.
Operationally, this coordination could effectively unify three previously independent theaters into a cohesive operational framework spanning the first island chain. From a military perspective, the significance of cross-theater integration surpasses the strategic ambiguity created by Beijing’s refusal to formally announce exercises.
Although some media outlets interpret the latest PLA activities as preparation for a sudden blockade or isolation of Taiwan, it must be acknowledged that Chinese vessels operating in the region remain within the potential engagement ranges of anti-ship missile systems operated by the United States, Japan, and the Philippines.
Even if the PLA disperses its naval forces and traverses multiple straits along the first island chain, these formations will continue to face persistent monitoring by U.S., Japanese, and Philippine forces.
From Taiwan’s perspective, further strengthening defense cooperation with the United States, Japan, and the Philippines—particularly leveraging the geographical positioning of Yonaguni Island, Taiwan proper, and the Batanes Islands—could result in a coordinated defensive posture capable of exerting pressure on PLA naval formations from both sides of the first island chain.
This presents another critical dimension in assessing PLA military activities. Analysts should not focus solely on how the PLA Navy might surround Taiwan, but also consider the risks these forces face from multiple directions.
In sum, what external observers describe as “silent drills” does not necessarily constitute a theater-level, multi-service joint military exercise. Rather, it is more accurately characterized as a cross-theater, deep-sea force deployment led primarily by the PLA Navy.
A key development to monitor is whether the Fujian, currently operating at sea, will rendezvous with the Liaoning for dual-carrier operations in the Western Pacific.
Another significant indicator is whether the Fujian will transit through one of the straits near the Philippines again during its journey westward. Such a move could signal an intent by the PLA Navy to replicate earlier operational patterns previously executed in waters surrounding Japan.
These developments will serve as crucial benchmarks for assessing the future direction of PLA naval operations.
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Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881611630465088/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s).