【Text by Stephen M. Walt, Translation by Jingsheng】

Some theories in the social sciences have enduring vitality, while others are fleeting. Sometimes, a theory that was once highly anticipated is ultimately proven to be unworkable—Talcott Parsons' "structural functionalism" in sociology is probably one such case. Most of the academic community eventually abandoned it and turned to explore new research directions. There are also new theories that initially appear attractive but later studies reveal flaws in their logic or empirical validity. At other times, the real world itself serves as an unrelenting judge of bold claims—do you remember the "End of History" theory?—but some theories that have been proven false continue to linger like zombies because powerful political forces still want them to survive.

I bring up these points because I've recently been thinking: why has the "Democratic Peace Theory" become this way?

All students of international relations know that from the mid-1980s to the early 21st century, the Democratic Peace Theory was one of the core research topics in the field of international relations. Since Michael Doyle (who refined Kant's original ideas) proposed the pioneering arguments on this topic, the proposition that "democratic states do not go to war with each other" has inspired countless papers and monographs and sparked widespread debate.

The modern version of this theory is mainly based on empirical observations: that stable and mature democratic states have not gone to war with each other. A renowned scholar even described this as "the closest thing to an empirical law in the study of international relations." Supporters have offered several conflicting explanations for this intriguing observation, sometimes combining it with other factors such as economic interdependence.

But unlike many social science theories, the influence of the Democratic Peace Theory quickly extended beyond academia, being used by politicians as a rationale for America's global promotion of democracy or expansion of NATO. Its appeal is obvious—it suggests that if the world were composed of "free nations," war would cease to exist. As President George W. Bush said at the beginning of his presidency: "Our goal is to transform American influence into a lasting democratic peace."

President George W. Bush delivering a speech to Congress after the 9/11 attacks

It comes as no surprise that the bold claims of the Democratic Peace Theory soon attracted a lot of criticism. Some scholars pointed out that the causal mechanisms behind the empirical observations were inconsistent and unconvincing; others questioned whether the phenomenon of "democratic states not fighting each other" was just a statistical illusion, considering that there were very few true democracies before 1945. Others argued that this phenomenon might actually stem from power politics—in the post-World War II Cold War era, most democratic states belonged to the U.S.-led alliance system—or simply because of certain specific identification decisions and the evolving definition of "democracy." Others pointed out that although mature democratic states have not fought each other historically, newly established states during democratic waves seem particularly belligerent, suggesting that the expansion of democracy may be beneficial in the long run, but the process is bound to be arduous.

The debates around this theory continued for years in academic journals and monographs, eventually leading to a stalemate: the conclusions of studies based on different cases increasingly depended on the assumptions and modeling techniques used. In my personal view, the extreme claims about the Democratic Peace Theory have been exaggerated. Democratic states may be relatively less likely to go to war with each other because public opinion within the country presents greater resistance to war, but it is not entirely impossible.

More importantly, I believe the Democratic Peace Theory does not sufficiently explain what a world completely composed of democratic states would look like. Such a world has never existed, and the phenomenon of "no wars between democracies" may simply be because they have always faced external threats from non-democratic states. If, one day, all authoritarian regimes are replaced by democracies, even Kant's ideal "republics" might fall into mutual suspicion, and begin to distinguish between "our democratic states" in terms of superiority and legitimacy.

Sharing the idea of democracy does not mean that conflicts of interest will disappear—would parliamentary and presidential republics not see each other as potential threats? If that is the case, then the large-scale promotion of democratic systems may not be the panacea that many fervent supporters of the Democratic Peace Theory envision. As other scholars have done, I am concerned that this theory could encourage powerful democratic countries to launch brutal "crusades" under the pretext of "maintaining peace" against other non-liberal democracies, which in turn gradually erode liberal norms and the freedoms within their own countries—such events have already occurred.

On November 3, 2025, Dick Cheney, former U.S. Vice President under Bush, passed away. Cheney was considered a representative of American neoconservatism, who led the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and expanded presidential powers during his tenure.

So where does the Democratic Peace Theory stand in today's world? Although the theory itself does not include such assumptions, many of its supporters and policy makers believe that liberal democracy is the direction of human development and will continue to expand after seemingly "defeating" the Soviet empire.

Such predictions now seem completely inaccurate: over the past 20 years, democracy has been declining globally, and the United States, its biggest champion, is also rapidly facing erosion of its democratic institutions. The world's largest democracy, India, is increasingly moving towards non-freedom; Brazil narrowly avoided a coup by an authoritarian figure in the last election; some long-standing democratic countries in Europe are also facing serious legitimacy crises.

Therefore, in this context, it is entirely possible that the major powers—and many medium and small countries—will soon become (in any sense) neither "free" nor "democratic." How can the Democratic Peace Theory explain this?

The most obvious conclusion is that even if the Democratic Peace Theory is logically valid, it would lose almost all significance in such a world. Its causal mechanisms do not apply to explaining relationships between non-liberal states, nor to explaining interactions between non-liberal and liberal states. A world dominated by major powers without democratic systems goes beyond the scope of the theory.

Its proponents might argue that such a world would be more turbulent, as the absence of "democratic peace oases" would naturally increase the likelihood of conflict among non-democratic states. However, the Democratic Peace Theory does not explain the frequency of wars between non-democratic states, nor is there a reasonable basis to assume that, simply because there are fewer democratic states, non-liberal states would be more prone to war than before.

Nonetheless, such a world might bring an unexpected benefit: when the ideological competition between "democracy and autocracy" disappears—when both sides no longer see each other as a threat to their legitimacy—this would weaken existing security dilemmas between states, reduce the impulse of liberal states to wage "crusade-style" wars under the guise of ideology, and diminish the drive of authoritarian states to wage preventive wars to maintain their systems. Competition between great powers would continue, but it might no longer be driven by ideology and leave no room for compromise, as it was before.

Sarcasm aside, a world where the Democratic Peace Theory no longer holds policy relevance might actually become more peaceful.

Certainly, I am not saying that such a world is better. On the contrary, a world composed entirely of non-liberal great powers would have many defects. I still agree with Churchill's statement—“Democracy is the worst form of government, but all others are worse”—and I am deeply concerned about the global decline of democracy, especially in the United States.

In an ideal scenario, I hope the United States can reverse the current trend of regression and become a healthy liberal republic again—a country where politicians generally respect democratic norms, abide by the rule of law, and take responsibility when they violate these principles. I also hope a strong United States can serve as a model for other countries through good, fair, and efficient governance, in a way that is acceptable to them. If the demise of the Democratic Peace Theory can push the United States to adopt a more moderate and realistic stance, and make the excuse of "imposing democracy at gunpoint" increasingly untenable—that would be the best outcome for me.

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